

A DEBATE CONCERNING THE STATUS OF SECULARISM AS A
COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINE

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ABSTRACT

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Secularism is usually defined as the separation of politics and religion. The prevalent approach to secularism is to conceive it as a political principle. The main goal of this research is to illuminate the insufficiency of this definition. Secularism reflects a more holistic, and comprehensive attitude than being solely a political principle. It has a strong disposition to be a worldview that is concerning the wellness of humankind in this world rather than the other world. The chief and foremost feature of secularism is to reject the institutional authority of religion. Simultaneously, to consolidate its power, secularism ought to be authoritative and exclusionary to a certain extent. The main thesis in this research: secularism is an authoritative discourse that has an intrinsic inclination to operate as an ideology that is exclusionary to religion. This is assessed along with the following subject matters: (1) the origin of secularism in the 19th century, (2) the impasse of constitutional secularism when confronting the moderation of secularism as accommodation of religion, (3) the attempts to curb the comprehensiveness of secularism.

Keywords: secularism, constitutional secularism, religion, ideology

ÖZ

SEKÜLERİZMİN KAPSAMLI BİR DOKTRİN OLARAK STATÜSÜNE İLİŞKİN BİR TARTIŞMA

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Sekülerizm, genellikle din ve siyasetin birbirinden ayrılması olarak tanımlanır. Sekülerizme ilişkin yaygın yaklaşım sekülerizmi siyasal bir ilke olarak anlamaktır. Bu araştırmanın asıl amacı bu tanımlamanın yetersizliğini aydınlatmaktır. Sekülerizm, yalnızca siyasal bir ilke olmaktan daha bütüncül ve kapsamlı bir tutumu yansıtır. İnsanoğlunun öte dünya yerine bu dünyadaki iyiliğini ilgilendiren güçlü bir dünya görüşü olma eğilimine sahiptir. Sekülerizmin temel ve en önemli özelliği dinin kurumsal otoritesini reddetmesidir. Aynı zamanda sekülerizm gücünü sağlamlaştırmak için, belli bir oranda dışlayıcı ve otoriter de olmak zorundadır. Bu araştırmanın temel tezi: sekülerizm dine karşı dışlayıcı ve bir ideoloji gibi hareket etmeye kendiliğinden eğilimli otoriter bir söylemdir. Bu tez, aşağıdaki konularla birlikte değerlendirilir: (1) Sekülerizmin 19. Yüzyıldaki kökeni, (2) anayasal sekülerizmin sekülerizmi ılımlılaştırmak için dinin kamusal alana dahil edilmesi ile karşı karşıya geldiğindeki ikilemi, (3) sekülerizmin kapsamlılığını yumuşatmak için yapılan girişimler.

Anahtar kelimeler: sekülerizm, anayasal sekülerizm, din, ideoloji

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INTRODUCTION

In political science, religion was not a research topic until the 1990s and the early 2000s. The reason is that religion was not highly present in society, there was no such religious activity in society that would deteriorate the secular order as well. Within the 1990s, religion gradually became a highly relevant topic for research on the increased visibility of religious groups in civil society. This development has consequences regarding the relationship between religion and politics.

In the academic field, secularism usually denotes the separation of religion and politics. The prevalent approach to secularism is comprehending it as a governmental tool that has no such end by itself. This approach envisages that secularism is a proper way of dealing with religion. In this work, I focus on a critique of this approach which has certain insufficiencies regarding the scope of religion in society. I offer a holistic approach which suggests comprehending secularism as a worldview.

This study aims to approach secularism as a discourse in which the comprehensive worldview aspect outweighs the formal institutional separation of religion and politics. This approach helps us to overcome the insufficiency of the political principle approach that misses the more intricate relation of secularism with religion. The significance of this approach is that it understands secularism as a comprehensive worldview which has the motivation to construct society epistemologically, socially, and politically. By categorizing different versions of secularism, it would be more insightful to grasp the dimension of secularism's comprehensiveness. Understanding secularism as a worldview endows an explanatory ability to religion's position in society. The holistic approach enables us to grasp that secularism includes the separation of institutional authorities of

religion and politics, the opposition to religious worldview, and the management of religion. The worldview aspect of secularism is my major point of departure.¹ To put it in other words, my arguments regarding the quality of secularism are based on the worldview aspect. The convenience of this approach is to avoid narrow definitions of secularism that would restrict our insight into the political arena.

This study approaches secularism as a comprehensive doctrine, like a worldview. The term comprehensive doctrine has been employed by John Rawls. Rawls refers to comprehensive doctrine as a set of beliefs that have moral, religious, and political discourses about which way of life is good, and which values individuals and societies ought to have. A comprehensive doctrine is about the value of life, the conception of the good, the ideals of conducts that people would have, and the boundaries of human life. A comprehensive doctrine determines the boundaries of people's lives. In this respect, I use the term comprehensive doctrine in a Rawlsian way. However, this study will focus on Jürgen Habermas's post-secular model rather than Rawls's political liberalism because it is suggested in this study that the post-secular model is considered a more progressive attempt in terms of inclusivity and equality.

The approach that understands secularism as the separation of religion and politics suggests the impartiality of political power by this separation. However, the presence and participation of religions in the public sphere are restricted. Religious arguments and religious reasoning are not allowed to be accommodated into the public sphere. The holistic approach suggests the reason for this restriction toward religion which is the significance of secularism being a worldview. To sustain the

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secularity of the state, secularism is required to restrict religion to a certain extent. This restriction could reach a point of exclusion, or controlled inclusion. Nevertheless, secularism could not let religion play a constitutive role as equal. Therefore, secularism has an authoritative character.

My main criticism to secularism is that it cannot remain impartial. The worldview aspect of secularism, as has been employed in this study, is not a point of criticism. In other words, being a worldview, or inclination to operate as an ideology is not a negative quality. However, this quality has impacts that would create certain problems in terms of equality, impartiality, and inclusivity. The worldview aspect of secularism enables us to observe the opposition to transcendental, but religious in particular, mindsets in social and political spheres. This holistic approach endows us with an ability to distinguish different versions of secularism that are different in extent and intensity. Understanding secularism in this way gives us the different dimensions of secularism; the opposition to transcendence, the opposition to the institutional authority of religion, the opposition to revelation as a knowledge regime, and the centrality of reason to develop a consciousness pertinent to this world. The opposition of secularism to religions, the ones which demand the institutional authority of political power is the core of the opposition of secularism to religion. This approach enables us to get a deeper comprehension of secularism that is more than separation, and the privatization of religion. Secularism has a constitutive role in relation to religion which is characterized by its authority to include, restrict, or totally exclude religious speech, religious symbols, religious practices, and religious claims regarding the constitutional system in the public political sphere.

In this respect, three different versions of secularism; exhaustive secularism, political secularism, and constitutional secularism, will be investigated. I argue that the comprehensiveness and authoritativeness of secularism differ in three versions. However, one determinative rule does not change: secularism is in opposition to the

institutional authority of religion. My main thesis is: Secularism is an authoritative discourse that has an intrinsic inclination to operate as an ideology, a worldview which is exclusionary to religion. This is assessed along with the following subject matters: (1) the origin of secularism in the 19th century, (2) the impasse of constitutional secularism when confronting the moderation of secularism as accommodation of religion, (3) the attempts to curb the comprehensiveness of secularism.

Secularism is a term that has been coined in the 19th century, as a social movement which has the purpose to establish a life worth living that is based on the rules that have been formed to direct a non-religious life. The origins of secularism go back to the religious wars in Europe in the 16th century. After the gradual decline of the power and influence of the Roman Catholic Church, the emerging phenomenon was the differentiation of the political and the religious. Within the emergence as a social movement, differentiation turned into the separation of political and religious authorities which has taken the form of the separation of religion and politics. Secularism began to be defined as the separation of politics and religion. This is the approach that comprehends secularism as a political principle. It is based on a reading that does consider the relationship of religion and secularism as stable which secularism does not intervene in religion and vice versa. However, secularism as a worldview determines the relation constantly. There is no indifference toward religion. Mutual exclusion as both agents never get in their way is a misperception associated with secularism as the political principle.

When the social movement origins have been taken into consideration, secularism is more than statecraft. Secularism has certain aspects regarding how knowledge ought to be obtained, how a political regime should be, how human beings approach the presence in this world, etc. These aspects put secularism in a more encompassing role than statecraft. Secularism exceeds formal political arrangements. The division of this world against the afterworld is fundamental that

characterizes secularism. Therefore, secularism is not a political principle which comprised of religion's privatization. It is not a form of liberalism, it has no such promise to be a liberal discourse and does not have to be a liberal discourse.

Secularism implements certain rights according to its own views. Religious freedoms are restricted to maintain the secularity of the state. The three versions treat religious rights and the presence of religion in the public sphere in different measures. The constitutional version of secularism could be considered the most susceptible version to be contentious because of the extent that religion could influence the public sphere. The political principle approach does not envisage the varied positions of secularism to religion, and how to handle the varied proportion of religion's presence in the public sphere. When religion becomes more active, the constitutional version of secularism has a way to deal with how the limits would be protected. However, the secular reason eventually puts a limitation on the participation of religious claims.

This study focuses on three different versions of secularism. Secularism is best understood as upholding the secularity of the state, the secularity of society, and the secularity of the knowledge regime. Depending on the versions, these characteristics change. However, the essence, the opposition to the institutional authority of religion, does not change. In order to examine the relations of three versions of secularism with religion, I organized this research into three major chapters. In this regard, in the first chapter, three versions of secularism and different definitions of secularism will be traced. This study offers to take into consideration secularism with the terms secular, secularization, and secularity. These terms and their link with secularism will be accounted for. The defense of the secularization of society and the epistemic superiority of the secular over revelation are two features that give secularism a comprehensive worldview aspect. Thereafter, the origins of the term secular which goes back to Christianity, and the origin of the emergence as a social movement will be discussed. George Holyoake,

the founder and the representative of the worldview aspect of secularism has suggested building a life that is not determined by religious rules. I will argue that Holyoake's endeavor would endow secularism with a non-religious quality instead of an anti-position. The significance of Holyoake's understanding of secularism is that it has indicated that secularism is not atheism, secularism might involve atheists, but could not be equated to atheism. This will endow secularism with a non-religious quality which I will argue as secularism's more relevant definition. However, even though Holyoake did not intend secularism to be controlling religion, this non-religiosity does not correspond to indifference to religion. Lastly, the political developments that were pioneering secularism will be accounted for. I will argue that the most important development was the occurrence of the modern nation-state and the decline of the power of the Roman Catholic Church. I suggest that the political developments and the 19th-century secularism should be read as connected phenomena that would indicate the comprehensive and worldview aspects of secularism more properly.

In the second chapter, the authoritative character of secularism will be indicated with reference to the literature. The political principle approach understands the significance of being the constitutive ruler of the modern state is neutrality. Accordingly, secularism is the only way to remain neutral to the religious demand coming from society. This approach also locates religion as a private issue that belongs to the private sphere. Secularism as the valid rule-maker in the public political sphere and religion as a private issue is the basic, however inaccurate perception that feeds the political principle approach. However, the impacts of a transitive characteristic of religion could spill over into the public sphere. The holistic approach takes into consideration the comprehensive quality of religions. The exhaustive and political versions of secularism are more restrictive and exclusionary, therefore more authoritative. The more possibly-contentious version is the constitutional version of secularism and how religion would be handled there needs attention. I address constitutional secularism mostly with reference to Andras

Sajo. The probable conflict of a comprehensive religious view in the constitutional version of secularism will be investigated. Secularism, in this version, needs to avoid allowing religion an influential role in society. Because that might have disastrous effects on the secularity of the state. Thus, I would argue that constitutional secularism does provide religion more space, yet religious practices might be restricted in the public sphere. To refrain to fall into an impasse, the institutional desires of religion are curbed. In the constitutional version, religious actors are not free to execute religious politics, their claims are filtered in public political discussion. I argue that this is a bit mandatory for a secular regime. The problems concerning the misconception of constitutional secularism are traced.

In the third chapter, the argument that secularism is in crisis because of the recent resurgence of religion will be examined. In recent literature, secularism's inability to give an answer to the demands of a religiously pluralistic society is questioned. I argue the reason for that is the political principle approach. Put it in other words, the disposition in the literature as seeing the crisis as a new phenomenon is related to the perception that secularism is a governmental tool. I argue that this is an intrinsic internal problem in secularism's conflictual relation with religion. As a worldview, secularism excludes religion to varied degrees. When religion claims political power or representation in law, there would be a conflict of comprehensive worldviews. Other than that, in societies where religion is more assertive, secularism might be failed to give a proper underground to maintain an inclusive and egalitarian political regime. I investigate two offers which aim to modify the comprehensive attitude of secularism and be more open to religious claims without giving up secularism. Firstly, Rajeev Bhargava suggests a *principled distance* concept that is more responsive to rights. It is a contextual implementation of secularism that is based on interpretations of different situations. Bhargava points out to participation of all relevant parties in a public discussion, making their points and arguing to determine which actions are going to be categorized as affirmed under secularism, which ones are going to be supported, and which ones are prohibited. Bhargava also defends the separation of politics and religion in terms of

neutrality. I discuss Bhargava's suggestion with certain examples. My point of view about the principled distance is that it is still a secular concept that endows religions with a little more functionality. The reason behind the principled distance is the secular reason. I argue that principled distance pursues the presumptions of secularism.

In the final section, I investigate German philosopher Jürgen Habermas and his concept of post-secular society. Habermas takes further the constitutional versions of secularism and includes religious claims in public political discussions. The representation of religious demand in law becomes feasible in a secular language. According to Habermas, it is desired for religious people to tell fellow citizens their reasons in a language that they can understand. Habermas comprehends the necessity of a devout life, a transitive characteristic of a comprehensive religious view. That is a more appealing endeavor than Bhargava's *principled distance*. Habermas takes attention to participation, arguing in civil society, and different parties' willingness to talk and listen to each other. Habermas highlights that the comprehensive dispositions of both sides, religious and secular, ought to be moderated. I investigate the feasibility of his endeavor as a better alternative to secularism for a vividly religious and pluralistic public sphere.

In the concluding chapter, there is a general review of secularism and its validity in providing a better basis for secular and religious people in religiously plural societies in which religions are influential in the public sphere. I present my claim that secularism is highly debatable as an egalitarian and inclusive discourse. In terms of being a worldview, secularism has to close the door to certain religious arguments that have the potential to change the secularity of the state. Habermas's suggestion pushes that door as much as possible, however, there are certain instances which I present in this research that both parties could not come up with an agreement around. There might be certain instances in which people could not moderate their comprehensive views, both secularists and religious people. Surely,

participation in public discussion and listening to other opinions is a huge step and includes possibilities for interaction of different comprehensive worldviews. Nevertheless, I claim that there might be opinions that could not change because those defending opinions might have a determinative role in that person's identity. Thus, I argue that secularism is a consistent discourse, but it has clear limitations to the demands and practices that are not secular.

CHAPTER I

UNDERSTANDING SECULARISM AS A COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINE

In this chapter, my major focus is on the term secularism. I will be investigating secularism by classifying it under three versions: exhaustive secularism, political secularism, and constitutional secularism. Frankly, there is no real categorical difference between them, but they reflect different dimensions, and different intensity levels regarding the application of secularism, which is crucial for my purpose. I want to demonstrate the “authoritativeness” and ideological quality of secularism. I want to argue that in all three versions of secularism, religions are treated as exclusionary at different levels. In the first section, I will sketch a general outline of the three versions of secularism. The second section offers a general description of secularism and its sister terms in the literature. The third section gives a quick look at the origin of the secularism’s terms and at the political developments before the term secularism emerged, and secularism’s relation with Christianity. Let me state at the beginning: this study is a critique of secularism. All three versions are intrinsically working out in opposition to religions. Even though constitutional secularism is more defensible than the other ones, the author of this study is deeply critical concerning secularism whatsoever. Secularism, in all three versions, reveals its authoritativeness, comprehensiveness, and hostility to religion and faith-based worldviews and practices. My purpose in this chapter is to unveil the ideological characteristic of secularism altogether. Overall, I will try to show that secularism is an authoritative discourse that has the disposition to be a comprehensive ideology that holds exclusionary aspect toward religions, even the political or constitutional versions are not able to alleviate repressive characteristic.

Because of this character, secularism, in all three versions, remains in precise and permanent conflict with religions.

1.1. Versions of Secularism

In this section, I will clarify the concepts that are relevant to my analysis of secularism. Let me begin by presenting a general description of secularism. Secularism seems to be one of the constitutive principles of the modern nation-state. The logic of political power is that political and religious institutions ought to be separated. Defining secularism in this way creates an inclination to think that secularism is a political phenomenon and it is a tool for public administration. To find out what secularism qualifies, one may begin with certain major questions. Is it an administrative principle, a political position that aims at a neutral government disengaged with religion? Or is it a comprehensive set of beliefs and practices, an ideology that has political, social, and cultural aspects which rely on the assumption that religion is a premodern, irrational discourse, as something which has to be left behind? Such an ideology of secularism aims to eradicate religion's political, social, and moral influence on society entirely. Then we can ask: is secularism an authoritative discourse? On the other hand, it is commonly accepted that secularism is the separation of religious and political authorities, namely, the church and state. Is this an explicatory and sufficient definition? It is perhaps valid to say that secularism refers to all of the above to a certain extent.

I will explain the frame that will explicate the way I use the terms here: Initially, I have to say that the distinction that I made here might be a little bit confusing. The criterion that distinguishes the terms is the scope which I think is necessary. Firstly, constitutional secularism, which means that the government cannot make laws and policies according to a religion, or religious group's wishes. Religious rhetoric is not allowed. There should be no correlation with any religious groups. In other words, there should be no official establishment of a religious institution, and no

official recognition of any religion. (Casanova, 2009a: 1061) In constitutional secularism, the secularization of society is not aimed. Governments do not take any position in the public sphere regarding the purpose of establishing a secular culture. This is the least intense version of secularism that only at the level of the law, the secular quality of the regime is concerned. Secondly, secularism as a political concept, or political secularism, concerns the relations between state power and religious beliefs, institutions, and practices. (Maclure, 2013: 2) The government establishes the public political sphere and protects it from all the indicators associated with religions. Even though Jocelyn Maclure (2013) has indicated that it does not necessitate an adverse position toward religion, any religious symbol, or any religious discourse would not be allowed. Or to put it another way, religions are permitted in the public political sphere under the rule of secularism. The public political sphere is prevented from being occupied by religious indications. It is being established as a religion-free space. The requirements of public service are obvious that religious people cannot pursue their religious practices which means that any religious symbol is forbidden, and any religious duty during the service is forbidden. There seems no difference between the constitutional, and political usage of secularism. Yet, there is quite a significant difference. Constitutional context does eliminate the chance of using secularism ideologically as much as possible, foremost it is not setting the public sphere as an ideological space. Constitutional secularism is a legal arrangement that does not follow religious or any transcendental rules. (Sajo, 2014: 56) On the other hand, political secularism is not restricted to the separation of political and religious authorities, or neutrality of the government before religions even though it is described as such. In political secularism, the public sphere becomes an ideological space as it becomes the space of the secular. Religion is strictly observed there. The definition that secularism is the separation of political and religious authorities for political secularism is not even grounding the neutrality of the state. In other words, the implementation of neutrality or the free exercise of religion somehow locates the state in an active position toward religion. The difference is that the activity of the state in political

secularism is deeper. Maclure has indicated the moral aims; equality, freedom of religion, and the institutional instruments; separation, and non-establishment, of the secular state. (2013: 3) Perhaps, we can make a distinction that in constitutional secularism, the moral ends were not addressed assertively, but in political secularism, they are being addressed. Thus, political secularism is much more authoritative and ideologically intense than constitutional secularism. I understand political secularism as the relatively limited model of secularism in comparison to exhaustive secularism, as a strong, fully comprehensive worldview. Political secularism does not operate on the level of law only.

Thirdly, that exhaustive secularism means that it is not restricted to public or private distinction, and it has political, social, or cultural purposes which aim toward a religion-free social and political life, a secularized society even in the private sphere. Secularism here, is a comprehensive worldview that intends to the wellness of humankind in this world by being against religion, and all kinds of transcendence. At this point, I have to make clear that I do not consider secularism as the strong advocacy of atheism because categorically, the secular does not correspond to atheism. To put it another way, I am not suggesting the Soviet Union's example of militant atheism by exhaustive secularism. The Soviet practice could be labeled as an extreme form of the implementation of secularism as an ideology but it is not the standard form of ideological implementation of secularism. As I will be investigating in the pages below, secularism is in opposition to institutional religion, and religious worldviews. The ideological tendency, and authoritative characteristics of secularism, as I understand it, come from its comprehensiveness, and certain stipulations. In a secular regime, people who follow a religious way of life would not be suppressed by force, but they would be deprived of utilizing certain rights such as entering public service, public buildings, or schools. They would be facing discrimination, or marginalization in their private life and society, explicitly or implicitly. In political secularism, people face secular norms and applications in the public political sphere only. But in exhaustive

secularism, every part of life would be surrounded by secular norms and implementations. In constitutional secularism, the strict, surrounding position of secularism would be weakened. At this point, we need to investigate the concepts of secular, secularity, and secularization in order to reveal their correlation with secularism and understand better that secularism is a comprehensive worldview. Then, we may locate secularism as one of the comprehensive ideologies. Let me now focus on these concepts.

1.2.The Secular, Secularity, Secularization, and Secularism

In this section, I am going to explain the relevance between secularism and its sister concepts in order to, first, elucidate the ideological character of secularism, and second, why it is valid to consider these terms together.

Jose Casanova is a sociologist known for his book *Public Religions in the Modern World* which he wrote in 1994 which he inquires about the connection between modernity and secularization in the light of the re-emergence of religion as an actor in the public sphere. It is argued that Casanova considers that thinking about secularism in a critical way requires keeping in mind the varieties of secularism and its sister terms. (Calhoun et. al, 2017: 39) Casanova identifies the secular as an epistemological category, a reality that is differentiated from religion in terms of establishing, comprehending, categorizing, and experiencing knowledge. (Casanova, 2009a: 1050) Conversely, secularity is more like a condition, a status that the secular and the religious have been fixed in a certain way in different contexts.

Like the way in which the secular is constituted, there are three sorts of secularity: the first one is mere secularity; as living in the secular time and world. Second, self-contained secularity which is the absence of religion, the status of the secular is understood as the standard, the only valid epistemic category of human intelligence.

Third, secularist secularity means the condition of defending the ultimate superiority of rationality and the necessity to overcome the irrationality of belief. (Casanova, 2013: 28-32) The secularist secularity includes the advocacy of rationality and the secular, as religion is conceived as an irrational form of reflection. Thus, the secularist secularity would be the condition of a hypothetical argument that the secular is superior to the religious. Yet, the secular does not possess any intrinsic entailment about superiority or authority over religion or revelation in terms of reaching knowledge. In other words, the category of secular does not have claims concerning epistemology. It is secularism that has claimed the advantage of the secular against religion by affiliating the secular with reason, non-dogmatism, and criticism because they reflect on the so-called open, non-absolutist, and inclusive spheres.

Rosenfeld refers to secularism epistemologically based on a sharp distinction between faith and reason and excessive dependence on the latter. (Rosenfeld, 2014: 81) Naidu describes the secular as a value that is embedded in an epistemology which is based on science and humanitarianism. (Naidu, 2013) It is claimed that science would make easier material progress. The characteristic of a world led by science is that it is based on reasoning on the basis of empiricism, and innovation. (Naidu, 2013: 54) In this sense, empirical reasoning or innovation is presented as the means to improve the well-being of humankind. Naidu also, points out that secular values need nourishment. (2013: 60) In other words, the state would have to support the cultivation of secular culture through the education system, media, and family. In that case, the secular is a category concerning the material improvement of human life in this world by establishing a different standard of thinking on the basis of empirical reasoning. The significance of this standard is that it is eliminating all the absolutist religious and spiritual, other-worldly forms of thinking. One may argue that fixating absolutism on religion and toleration on the side of secularism and establishing the former as bad and the latter as good is a pure fallacy. On the other hand, secularism is considered as the defender of tolerance

which is not accurate. Toleration is not the paramount concern for secularism. Secularism would eventually collide with comprehensive worldviews, religious ones in particular. Any person who asserts such a religious comprehensive worldview would be in conflict with the culture that secularism aims to construct, not just in the public political sphere. However, at this point, from Naidu's qualification of the secular, I can point out that secularism is the advocacy of the secular against all types of transcendence.

Hashemi conceptualizes secularism as philosophically, sociologically, and politically and indicates that all of them refer to something different than another. (Hashemi, 2009: 106) However, a question should be asked: how can we distinguish the philosophical and political aspects of secularism? How is it possible to explain secularism, philosophically, according to Hashemi, as a rejection of the transcendental and the metaphysical, and this would not include the political sphere? Or defining politically as the separation of the public and private spheres, religion, and politics, may not have any transcendental context? In other words, dividing secularism philosophically and politically may connote that there cannot be politics conducted in the direction of other-worldly purposes. It would not be a consistent interpretation. For instance, a country establishes its political system according to a theocratic fundamental, there is a rule saying that people should not tolerate homosexuality because it will be harmful to them afterworld. Otherwise, they will juridically be punished in this world as well. What will be the consequences? Obviously, a metaphysical-grounded belief would be implemented in politics. How this would not cause political output? It is not possible to divide secularism philosophically and politically into disparate categories. Because philosophical argumentation and political practice are transitive. A transcendent belief about people's sexual attitudes would have political consequences. Thus, Hashemi's suggestion concerning the division does not seem to be plausible.

Secularization, on the contrary, is a sociological process that may have three meanings which developed at different levels: declining of religious beliefs and practices in individuals' lives which is seen as a sign of human progressive development, we can see this process as developing at the personal level. Second, the privatization of religion is that religion loses its influence in society and is allowed only in the private sphere, we can call it secularization at the social level. And the third is the differentiation of the spheres from religion as politics, economy, and science have different rules and principles independent from religion which can be called secularization at the institutional level. (Casanova, 2007: 7) Casanova indicates that politics, economy, and social life, were shaped according to the religious norms in the past before secularization occurred. However, within the effect of declining religious influence, these spheres have been differentiated from the religious norms, religion was confined to the private, it was grasped as a personal matter; politics, economy, science are having rules that are independent of religion. However, differentiation, the secularization at the institutional level, may not have taken place as a natural process. It might be the usual outcome of the result of secularization at the personal and social levels. But there is otherwise thinking that claims it is not a natural development but an ideological construction. (Calhoun, 2012: 339) In other words, politics, economy, and scientific studies have not gotten rid of religious norms in normal time flow, but there was human intervention, that these spheres have been constructed as differentiated-from-religious norms. Nevertheless, for Casanova, differentiation is the prominent characteristic of secularization, regardless that if it is a natural phenomenon or a constructed one. In other words, institutional secularization reflects secularization more significantly than the ones at personal and social levels. However, as Joppke claims, the declining influence of religion in public and individuals' lives is the logical result of secularization, it is not sensible to reduce secularization to differentiation. (Joppke, 2015: 140) If Calhoun was right about the claim that differentiation is not a natural development but an ideological construction, then

secularism could be seen as the advocacy of differentiation, and privatization of religion.

At this point, one may ask whether differentiation implies political secularism. To be clear, differentiation is not the institutional separation that distinguishes religion and politics only, but every sector in society. The economy would work out according to its own rules and mechanisms, science takes place on its own rules and mechanisms, and so do religion and politics. Thus, it implies a general secularization that surrounds every part of life. Even though Casanova explains the differentiation in terms of secularization, we can employ Casanova's argument that differentiation and privatization are the prominent characteristics of not just secularization but secularism as well. Even though secularism and secularization are different phenomena, secularism can be understood foremost in terms of secularization at the institutional level. Regardless of if it is a natural or a constructed development, secularism is the advocacy of secularization.

In terms of qualifying secularism as a comprehensive worldview, a brief look at the emergence of the term could help to illuminate my claim. Because one may argue that the ones who used the term secularism in the first place did help secularism in gaining an anti-religious feature.

1.3.The Origin of Secularism in the 19th Century: George Holyoake's Understanding of Secularism

Secularism was coined in 1851, in the book *Principles of Secularism*, by George Holyoake to give significance to a world that is not designed, conducted, and controlled by religion, Christianity in particular. The term secularism is drawing a world perspective, and its prominent categories are reason, nature, and commitment to the improvement of human life. (Cady and Hurd, 2014) Hence it is not sketching a world that is being ruled by religious categories. For Holyoake, secularism is the

field of study that is trying to flourish human welfare positively by focusing on the present moment. In other words, it is nothing to do with other-worldly considerations. Secularism was a social movement back in the 19th century in England. Accordingly, Holyoake witnessed serious counterattacks of the state and church against the people who were defending anti-theism or infidelity. This would make Holyoake consider developing a movement called secularism. (Rectenwald, 2013: 232) The significance of secularism was that it included epistemology, morality, and political propositions. Secularism is all about this world, the human well-being in this world, and the material improvement of concrete human life. Secularism is not concerned with any religion, transcendence, or spirituality. This definition indicates that secularism is not simply a political discourse, we can infer that Holyoake considers secularism more like a worldview, a different way of thinking than that of religion. Secularism is based on a strict division of the present moment and eternity; the things that we could observe and test in this world, and the things that we could not. Secularism is encompassing all the dimensions of the world and human existence as such. Holyoake detected the gist of secularism that living in this world would detach us from valuing the after-world and deity. Frankly, infidelity is not a mandatory proponent of secularism for Holyoake. However, religion and religious thinking were laid down as possible obstacles in terms of scientific knowledge and progression. (2013: 233) Thus, we might fall into a misunderstanding that it is a hostile position to religion by its nature. However, it is important to note that describing secularism that is not concerned with any transcendence is not involving any intrinsic hostility to religion, not necessarily. It is only dismissing the moral and institutional authority of religion. Holyoake did not want to establish an atheist society. The aim of secularism was a new scientific and moral system that is different from that of religion. On the other hand, it is plausible to say that even though it is not evoking an anti-religious standing, however, that is not recalling a religious-friendly position, either. In this sense, the term is suggesting to exclude certain forms of thought and practices from society and individual lives. (Cady and Hurd, 2014: 59) Nonetheless, secularism is

operating like an umbrella which includes every view in society that tries to flourish worldly well-being, unless they are in conflict with anything that promotes the wellness of humankind in this world.

One may come to the conclusion that reason, worldly well-being, and this-worldliness are the defining criteria of secularism. Anidjar enumerates the key categories of secularism which are human rights, international law, sovereignty, and democracy. (Anidjar, 2006) One may argue that, these keywords are the tools that help secularism's purpose in building a 'rational' world that was being considered tolerant, deliberative, and non-absolute about what is good and what is bad. Certainly, building a rational world is just a claim, i.e, a promise. In this sense, one may not argue that secularism is the guarantee for a more tolerant and reasonable world because secularism can cause a non-tolerant and absolutist world as well. However, it is secularists' claim that secularism is the only way to establish a tolerant and non-absolutist regime. The terms such as reason, worldly well-being, and tolerance which are comprising promises under secularism, and against religious views, are comprehended by secularists as value-free and objective terms. To put it another way, secularists reveal an understanding that secularism is the way and the only way to establish a democratic and tolerant regime. Recall that I have mentioned three versions (constitutional, political, and exhaustive) of secularism. Secularists treat secularism as a worldview, an ideology. Then, as an ideology, secularism for secularists would create a free, egalitarian, rational world. Secularists do not seem consistent because the application of secularism as ideology creates equality problems, ironically, as we saw in Turkey and France. As a comprehensive worldview, secularism might assert establishing an equal world. However, I do not think that secularism could succeed. People would face marginalization and discrimination. Because secularism has to defend its core that religious norms cannot rule. The equality that secularism could create would not and could not be egalitarian for both religious and irreligious people. What do I mean by that? There are some areas where religion and secularism would collide and thus, religious

people and irreligious people would encounter. For instance, the public service in a secular regime does not allow praying times. In terms of freedom of worship, a secular regime does not and cannot give people a break that they can go to pray. Because if it happens, the regime has to give people time, from each faith, according to their religious praying, in terms of establishing equality. However, this would be in conflict with the saying that rules cannot be made according to religious views. So, secularism could create equality in a peculiar way by not regulating the working hours of public service according to religions. Each person has been equated by not practicing their religious pray. For one thing, this is surely an equal approach, but it does not take into account the freedom of worship. At this point, I have to articulate that this is mandatory for a secular regime. In other words, in secularism, religious freedoms are not the first priority, and therefore people may not practice their religious duty freely. This is valid for three versions. In constitutional secularism, there might be certain differences in terms of freedom of worship. However, my position is that this is consistent with the negativity of secularism with respect to religions. It is consistent with the counter position of secularism to religion. That is why it is extremely difficult to argue that secularism could create a tolerant regime in exhaustive and political versions. In constitutional secularism, the level of tolerance to religious demands could change. I will investigate them later. Nevertheless, secularism cannot tolerate religious commands and people's religious wishes, and practices that could affect the political regime.

As Anidjar pointed out, we can understand that the significance of the key categories lies in that they are elucidating an intention of a more equal world. (Anidjar, 2006: 65-6) What I mean by intention is that a regime that does not violate human rights; the freedom of speech, the right to live, the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and in particular, a regime based not on divine sovereignty. Secularism is considered more rational, inclusive, free, and equal than a theocracy. In other words, a secular regime is considered superior to a theocracy, because it is believed that a secular regime could create a free and equal society

more effectively. However, one may think that this could not be easily possible. What Anidjar says is the exact opposite of secularists. Because he claims secularism serves inequality. It is serving mostly Christianity, the capitalist economy, and the modern nation-state, in a mechanism that creates a discourse of power which self-legitimizes itself as secular. (Anidjar, 2006: 65) Moreover, this self-legitimation forms a perception that a modern nation-state, a democratic regime is called secular means it is not concerned with religion and religious groups. Anidjar qualifies democracy, human rights, international law, or, popular sovereignty as clearly secular projects which do not reach equality yet. Thus, what we can infer from Anidjar is that democracy, human rights, and popular sovereignty may not be neutral, value-free, universal, generally-accepted terms that are solving our political problems objectively. These are becoming ideological tools in secularism's hands to lead people and societies in a certain direction about what our political regimes should be. As Anidjar pointed out, there would be the perception that a secular regime was tolerant of each view in society, inclusive that no single person would be excluded. However, recall that I mentioned above, in terms of freedom of worship, this perception does not reflect an accurate picture. If a person wants to pray during working hours by claiming that it is mandatory according to his belief and if he was not allowed, he could not realize his religious duty. From my point of view, this is not a problem for secularism. Because secularism has no such promise to ensure the realization of religious people's religious duties. On the other hand, this might arise the question of whether religious people are being hindered from their religious duties. Because it is not an example of the free exercise of religious freedom. Thus, one may argue that secularism might aim to form a regime of religious freedom and freedom of worship that everybody could practice accordingly, however, secularism cannot realize such promise. Because freedom of worship is not the chief concern of secularism. Even though we acknowledge that religious freedom and freedom of worship are the main purposes of secularism, there would be certain limitations on the implementation of worship. Religions could have space in secular regimes as secularism's permission. This might be

accurate for constitutional secularism in particular. Because, firstly, more than religious freedom, secularism, in practice, is trying to put irreligious people in a secure position before the institutional authority of religion, the religious people. Surely, this is not a subject of criticism. However, while securing people who adopted a non-religious worldview, secularism does not remove the probability of marginalizing religious people. This is inherent in secularism. Because the purpose is to ensure the prevention of any religion-related imposition on non-religious people. Secularism is rejecting the religious and transcendental views regarding the daily life of humankind. Therefore, I do not consider that it can come up with an equal and tolerant regime. Therefore, Anidjar has a point that secularism serves inequality. It does not serve religious people, if we talk about equality, we can argue that secularism might treat religious people with irreligious people equally only by taking away the religious freedom of the former.

Holyoake perhaps did not intend of using reason, and human well-being in-this-world, as ideologically loaded terms. His effort can be read as an alternative to the moral and institutional authority of religion by not siding with defending the anti-religious. On the other hand, there is another version of secularism that is defended by Charles Bradlaugh, the successor of Holyoake who was the leader of the national network of secular societies in England, which we can interpret as more anti-religious. Bradlaugh's understanding of secularism is more exclusive, propagating atheism explicitly, diminishing or even eliminating religion from both public and private spheres, and seeing secularization as progression. (Rectenwald, 2017: 52) Contrary to Bradlaugh, Holyoake did not intend to diminish religion and religious belief.

The logic behind secularism for both Holyoake and Bradlaugh is that they wanted to build secular societies to establish equality and freedom for the unbelievers and anti-religious people as well. Keddie refers that, in the 19th century, Holyoake and Bradlaugh had convinced the English Parliament to disgrace the blasphemy law and

remove the religious oath to give space for anti-religious people in government. Holyoake and Bradlaugh wanted to discredit the privileges of the Anglican Church, and religious people and struggled for the extension of rights between religious and anti-religious people. (Keddie, 2003: 15) However, Bradlaugh's position is conclusively anti-religious, he was advocating precisely that atheism is the proponent of secularism, in fact, secularism means atheism as well. (Rectenwald, 2017: 48) Holyoake did not hold secularism equal to atheism but acknowledged that secularism encompasses atheist people. On the other hand, for Holyoake, the elimination of religion from the public sphere was not the focal point of secularism. Even though Holyoake and Bradlaugh have different standings, as we looked at the first use of the term secularism in the 19th century, from my point of view, secularism has operated as a guidance for anti-religious people that moves them towards a more livable life in this world. At this point, we can deduce that secularism is not an end but a means to help to construct a state and society which was not organized by religious norms. Thus, any religion that claims political power would eventually be in conflict with secularism. If religious practices have been perceived by secular state power as against the secular norms, like praying at working hours, secularism might not provide equality in terms of freedom of worship. Because at its core, secularism has to defend the rule that no religious norms could prevail. Religious practices could be visible in the public political sphere as long as they are compatible with secularism.

Let me now briefly focus on the historical past of secularism since the prevailed times of Christianity. Later, I will look at the political developments in the 19th century.

1.3.1.A Brief History of the Concept of Secularism

Aside from the emergence of the term, secularism gained its meaning in relation to Christianity, and the institutional authority of the Roman Catholic Church. As much

as the term has been coined in the 19th century, the term secular has a much longer past. Its origin is the Latin word *saeculum* which means, in the pre-Christian time, used by Romans as the longest lifetime of human life. But in early Christian times, it means “this age”, or this-world space which connotes temporality. (Hashemi, 2009: 105) For the uses of present times, it is St. Augustine’s usage that secularism has gained of its anti-religious disposition. For Augustine, *saeculum* is the time of the earthly city, in contrast to the city of God. He has pointed out the differences between temporal, secular, and profane time against the eternal and divine time of the city of God. (Gorski, 2016: 51; Beaumont et. al, 2020: 293) What he meant by the city of God was the Church, which reflects the necessity of the guidance of Christianity. (Calhoun et. al, 2017: 25) The secular was not the opposite of the religious before Christianity, yet it is St. Augustine and after his reflections, the term has gained meaning in opposition to religion.

For Augustine, the city of God is what people have to give their most attention to, and it is the one that has moral superiority and this should have been taken into account. Because people were marked with the first fall. They always carry that mark which is the sign of the imperfectability of humankind. That sign would not be erased, and therefore, people are incapable to make our world and our lives better by reference to this-worldly grounded struggles. Because this world will perish eventually. On the other hand, the only thing that people could do is to prevail in a better world perspective, which means the guidance of Christianity, the Church. In other words, people can make the world better only by making Christianity prevail. (Calhoun et. al, 2017: 25)

According to Augustine, the secular has been linked to sin which is all practices and attitudes that aim at mundane satisfactions that consider asceticism unimportant because it requires patience, and sacrifice to build a better world. This perception would change exactly to the opposite, the secular comes up as the opposite of eternal, divine determinacy of reality.

On the other hand, Thomas Aquinas was more optimistic about this world than St. Augustine. Aquinas did not approach reason and faith as two entirely opposite faculties. However, he has divided reason and revelation. Accordingly, only God could be eternal, this world is temporal and would be eventually demolished. If there was any conflict between reason and revelation, Aquinas concludes that revelation prevails. If one gets into confusion, it is the revelation that should be looked at. But Aquinas did not trivialize reason. Reason represents this world, and this world is based on reason. To understand this world, to understand how we were created, we do not need to apply revelation because we cannot prove it by looking at the revelation. (Ağaoğulları, 2011: 232) In other words, revelation has nothing to do with the functionality of this world. And the reason has nothing to do with the other-worldly issues. (Cevizci, 2017a: 495) Thus, we observe a plain separation, a secular perception in Aquinas: this world has its own rules and reason is the leading agent of this world. The important thing is that Aquinas does not exalt faith before reason as Augustine did. Accordingly, he uses the word *saeculum* as temporal, or this world, which is consistent with Augustine's usage. Aquinas suggests that the secular is good, and this world is good, however, he has no hesitation that revelation prevails whatsoever. And revelation takes place of the reason, it supersedes the reason. (Kennedy, 2006: 30) From Aquinas, we can deduce that reason is not powerful to lead people in the right direction, reason may mislead humans. (2006: 37) The opposition between this world and the afterworld is being kept. However, the secular is not pejorative as St. Augustine perceived. The reason is the defining agent of this world, and it is not useless, it is not an impractical intellectual entity of humankind. Aquinas has indicated that engaging in the issues peculiar to this world could be a drawback for people that they could not focus on the other world. This perception does not sound like a positive inclination toward the secular. Nonetheless, Aquinas does not vilify the secular, and this world.

After Aquinas, the institutional authority of the Church and Christianity has been gradually weakened. The political powers were dissociating themselves from the

affirmation of the Pope. Surely, there was no explicit point that would conduce us to say that the secular has gained a positive meaning and the efficacy and the importance of religion for people has decreased. But from the 12th century to the 16th century, we observe the gradual retreat of religion.

In the 16th century, the term has gained its meaning as profane, or Godlessness. (Hurd, 2004: 237) Such perception as the opposite of the religious at that time has transformed into a context that has been giving more neutral, even positive meaning to secularism in the 19th century; under the influence of the French Revolution, in fighting with Catholicism, and the Roman Catholic Church (which would determine the context of French secularism) but mostly in the Enlightenment intellectual tradition. Such positive attributes of secularism will gradually become dominant. An absolute rationalism against revelation and faith, a conclusive advocacy of materialism that is suggesting managing the world by science, attribution a steady belief in science, a belief in the political ideal of individualism as the source of this-worldly happiness, an ideal of a liberal regime that has a purpose to liberate humankind politically, morally, and intellectually, etc. are the claims of Enlightenment tradition which have provided the intellectual groundwork of secularism. (Cevizci, 2017b: 27-42). In the 19th century, religion was considered as a biased, irrational way of life, as not promoting a tolerant, and open-minded understanding of the world. (Keane, 2000: 6) Secularism, conversely, was seen as a theory of life that has no reference to a deity, either in the present or in the future life. Such denial of reference to deity, it was claimed, connotes a more tolerant and free way of life. (Hurd, 2004: 238) At this point, a glance at certain historical incidents would help us to locate secularism as the organizing principle of the modern nation-state.

1.3.2.The Political Developments Before the Emergence of Secularism

The dominance of religion as the major organizational force was fading away within the effect of the industrial revolution, the rise of capitalism, urbanization, the diminishing of community life, the increased perception of an individual way of being, and the improvements in science. All these developments created an inclination to think that giving an explanation to the world from religion's perspective was not explanatory anymore. This would give rise to overvaluing human reason and espousing rationality as the triumph of human progress, the standard value that constitutes modern social and political life. Religion has been seen as a category that would more or less disappear from our world. Thus, the secular and the religious are reciprocally dependent categories that are being determined by each other. Nevertheless, we should ask with what developments secularism has emerged as a result.

Philpott claims that secularism has emerged out of the historical developments that would have been embodied as differentiation of the spheres, and the decline of religious influence on politics. (Philpott, 2009) The first step was the occurrence of the Westphalian sovereign-equal state system in 1648. The first result of the sovereign-equal state system was that the influence of the Roman Catholic Church decreased because the Papacy and the Pope had been seen as equals with the sovereign kingdoms. The second effect was the prohibition of intervention of the Church into worldly affairs which would diminish its role significantly. Third, it was the subordination of religion to the sovereign's will in each region. This is expressed in a certain way in the following: "*Cujus Regio, Ejus Religio*", means whose country, its religion. Religion was not devastated, but it has become dependent on the sovereign king's will. This dependence on the kings' will initiate

the process of denominationalism² in each state. The dependence on the Roman Catholic Church has been gradually broken. In England, Henry VIII confiscated the Church lands in the 16th century. In Italy, King Victor Emmanuel II took away all the control of the Church over the papal states in the 19th century. In France, beginning with the Revolution, the religious property has been confiscated. (Keddie, 2003: 18) Roman Catholic Church has been losing its power, and national churches were being established that have committed to their King's political will. The wars and the struggles between the kings and the Church would cause denominationalism that in each country, there would be a national Church which has differentiated itself from Roman Catholicism.

Fourth, the services that religious authorities have been conducting were in serious decrease. The Protestant Reformation was the driving force of this alteration. This was also the underlying force behind the individualistic way of being. The institutional link between a person and God, (or the Church) has broken. Before the 16th century, religion was the major force in Western Europe. The kings were subordinated to the Pope or the Church's will. They were not reflecting any independent will. However, the Protestant Reformation and the Wars of Religion would radically change the status of religion and the Church. The prolonged bloody and inconclusive religious wars would lead to the principle of toleration regarding religious beliefs. (Keddie, 2003: 17) There will be another output that religion would be conjoined with violence, and virulence, and that religious thought would not be suitable for a modern society. This would be more striking if we remember what the secular was believed to represent: tolerance, respect, and freedom.

Fifth was the rise of nationalism as a source of the new identity, and the emergence of citizenship as the basis of political subjectivity. Modern nation-states would

² A process that is referring to breaking away from the Roman Catholic Church and Catholicism in each country, which is the result of the collapse of feudalism, and the emergence of central absolutist kingdoms. The religion of each country would be based upon what the king has adopted as religion. For instance, Anglicanism in England.

necessitate loyalty to the nation in order to constitute citizens that have no religious or class reference. By constituting citizenship, modern nation-states would use education as a tool for how they are equipped with their citizens. Also, the nation would be the category of a new source of identity, and loyalty for people who were not correlating themselves with a religious identity. This would be the most significant effect on the settlement of secularism as a modern ideology and the principle of the organization of the modern nation-state. (Philpott, 2009: 187-8) On the other hand, the most dramatic incident, or the most pivotal development was the French Revolution which gave utmost importance to individual rights and freedoms. The bishops were being forced to give their loyalty to the kings, people were being transformed from servants to citizens. Everybody would be subject to the nation. Religion was not a constitutive principle anymore. The affinities were being cut off from the Church and the communities, and a new affinity was being established to the nation itself only. In this way, there began to develop an understanding that religion was the epitome of the premodern, irrational, intolerant, and dependent way of life. However, religion has been, at the same time, constituted as not just the irrational or the pre-modern, but as 'the other', or the enemy of the civilization. In France, a new regime has been set up in which Catholics re-establish their church under the state's control in 1801. Moreover, the tenacious popes and the strict fight over the power between the Church and the political power in France would end up in a solid anti-religious position which, also, determine the context of French laicism. All of these developments did not erase religion from the world but put it under state control. In French Revolution, the struggle was against the Church, and this anticlericalism filled the sense of being against any institutional organization of religion and personal piety. Because the republicans were strictly hostile to the church, bishops and Catholic intellectuals were definitely hostile to the republic. These mutual positions contributed to the laicite, or the political secularism in France becoming more aggressive over time. (Calhoun, 2012: 347)

By defining religion as the other of the secular, as a private, irrational, intolerant discourse, secularism determines the zone of the secular and links the secular with public authority, rationality, tolerance, and common sense, and this linkage becomes the source of its claim of moral superiority. (Hurd, 2004: 239; Wilson, 2017: 1079) We can connote that the underlying values behind secularism have arisen as tolerance, rationality, autonomy, reasonability, open-mindedness, and religious freedom. Calhoun points out that it is misleading to grasp secularism as the absence of religion. Secularism is rather the presence of religion, under the control of political authority that secularism detects religion's role and place. (Calhoun, 2012: 335) Secularism regulates, controls, and manages religion. (Iqtidar, 2012: 52) Secularism is the constant struggle between the temporal and transcendental world, incessant interventions in the relation of religion and politics. This means secularism determines and re-determines the correlation between religious activities and the secular public political sphere. Religion might be dead, or at least disappeared. Even if religion becomes visible, secularism would put forth religion's range of functionality. But in all situations, it is secularism that determines religion. As Hurd and Cady indicated, secularism is a strategy and a technique to control religion. (Cady and Hurd, 2010: 63) As the constitutive principle of the modern nation-state, it rejects the authority of any transcendental reference but does not aim to eradicate any sort of transcendence. It is not in the vision of secularism to secularize society in the constitutional sense. Yet, exhaustive secularism envisages the limitation of religion on people's personal lives as well. As Hurd explains, secularism entitles religion to an irrational, violent, and undemocratic discourse. Religion is entitled as the "other" of secularism. (Hurd, 2004: 237) Secularism, in the constitutional sense, wants to ensure that polity should be based on reason, not religious doctrines, or faith-based knowledge. Reason-based political society is the ultimate output that secularism wants to achieve in constitutional terms. (Sajo, 2014: 70)

The versions of secularism slightly depart from each other. I am suggesting that in all three versions, religion is controlled by secularism. On the other hand, constitutional secularism gives religion much more opportunity to have a role than political and exhaustive secularism. Nevertheless, secularism cannot share power with religion because it would be inconsistent with its own definition. And religions staying out of political power would cause the marginalization of religious people. Thus, even though the ideological disposition of secularism is barely noticeable in the constitutional version, the authoritativeness of secularism remains effective in all versions.

1.4.Conclusion

This chapter is composed of three sections. In the first section, I have presented the frames regarding the typology I am using in the study. The main element that distinguishes the three types of secularism is the level of scope which secularism affected. In the second section, I have discussed secularism ought to be considered with the terms secular, secularity, and secularization to support the argument that secularism is a fully comprehensive phenomenon which uses the epistemological category of secular, advocates of secularization of society and conceives the secularity as the normal condition.

In the third section, I investigated the origin and the emergence of secularism both as a term and as a movement. At the time of George Holyoake, secularism was not an anti-religious movement. However, considering the political developments like the establishment of the modern state, the emergence of nationalism, the weakening of the Church as a political actor, and the spreading of the Enlightenment's ideas as the reflection of the increasing significance of human reason; secularism has gradually become an exhaustive and authoritative phenomenon. I have argued that, aside from the fact that constitutional secularism is the least ideologically tense version and more defensible than other versions, secularism cannot let religion

play any role in society unless it wants to remain prevailed. Any argument regarding the accommodation of religion in a secular regime would not mean the co-existence of secularism and religions under equal conditions. Secularism controls and manages religion, not only in the public political sphere.

In the following chapter, I will address the debates regarding the authoritativeness of secularism and the confusion that would likely occur between political and constitutional secularism. Constitutional secularism might confront one crucial problem while religion is more active in the public sphere, and the consequence might be considered essential for secularism. The general definition of secularism as the separation of religion and politics is not sufficient and does not help us to comprehend the essence of secularism whatsoever. Moving from the separation thesis, I will argue the neutrality problems of secularism and how this would help me to defend my assertion that secularism is not only a political tool, not just an administrative tool, but a fully comprehensive, ideological, and authoritative discourse.

CHAPTER II

LOCATING SECULARISM AS AN AUTHORITATIVE DISCOURSE

In the previous chapter, conceptual framework of this study is introduced. The typology of secularism and its related sister terms are presented. Secularism is illuminated as both terminologically and as a movement. Moving from this background, in this chapter, I will elaborate the debates about the authoritative quality of secularism. This chapter is composed of three sections. The first section is about the perception regarding secularism in the literature, whether it is a political phenomenon or more than that. There will be a discussion about the possible permeability between political and constitutional secularism and how these versions are quite difficult to distinguish from each other. I will be moving from Andras Sajo's arguments regarding constitutional secularism and I will present my criticisms to him. In the second section, I will investigate the possible problem with constitutional secularism which might be called a dilemma. Recall that constitutional secularism is the least restrictive version of secularism. When religions become visible and religious ideas touch upon people in society, even though it is under the rule of secularism, a probability might occur that religions get highly influential and start to pose a threat to the secular nature of regimes. I will present my arguments peculiar to the prospect of how religious ideas could overtake the secular nature of the regime when restriction over religion is reduced. In the third section the separation thesis and its inefficacy in terms of defining secularism will be discussed. The aim of this chapter is to illuminate the authoritative and comprehensive character intrinsic to secularism. I will try to demonstrate that the literature has shortcomings in terms of comprehending secularism. Defending secularism more assertively in the constitutional version elevates its ideological tendencies and makes the authoritative character more evident, and makes it closer to political secularism. On the other hand,

constitutional secularism might confront the risk that pervading religious ideas getting politically assertive. And to avert it, the repressive policies toward religions might be tightened in the constitutional version. In terms of the separation thesis, far from determining the features of secularism, it detects a formal condition regarding how governments approach religious issues which do not signify any quality of secularism. In the following chapter, the subject matter will be discussed.

2.1.Current Debates on Authoritative Nature of Secularism

Recall that secularism is the constitutive principle of the nation-state, it is assumed that secularism is the best way to guarantee a neutral and equitable public debate. (Wilson, 2017) Nevertheless, secularism is a polysemic term, particularly when thinking together with the secular, secularity, and secularization. Secularism does not operate in a mere political context. However, keeping in mind the questions above, it is valid to say that secularism is being used mostly as a political concept, a governmental issue, that is understood as peculiar to the public political sphere only. Secularism is being approached as ‘political’ secularism. (Maclure, 2013: 2) This argument suggests that there is no secularism other than political. However, one may not easily agree with such narrow conceiving of secularism. It is argued that one of the versions of secularism is the politico-moral principle. (Bhargava, 1999: 488) Further, it is even claimed that secularism is just a political concept, it is the name of a political doctrine, not an ideology, it has no social, cultural, or ethical visions, and its opposition to religion is viable only in the polity. Akeel Bilgrami is a philosopher who studies the philosophy of mind and language, political philosophy, and moral psychology. Apparently, Bilgrami understands secularism as a political doctrine. It is a specific term which refers to an opposition against religion that is valid only in the polity. (Bilgrami, 2012: 90) In other words, in terms of secularism, Bilgrami suggests that the religious-secular opposition is meaningful only in the polity. He is not approaching secularism as a worldview, therefore, any assumption regarding religion in social, intellectual, or cultural areas would not be

relevant. (2012, 90) As Maclure, Bhargava, and Bilgrami indicated, secularism is generally a political tool in public administration. They are not conceiving secularism as a comprehensive worldview. In that case, secularism is considered as the ruling basis of public political order with which the policies should have been conducted accordingly. However, it is important to say that defining secularism as a political concept misses out, most importantly, the ideological character of the term.

In political sense, secularism can take different patterns in different historical experiences. There is a weak version of secularism that points out the practices in the UK, The USA, and a strong version that refers to the French Republican version. (Hashemi, 2009: 104) Elizabeth Hurd conceptualizes secularism as French laicism and Judeo-Christian secularism. Each refers to distinct qualities. For Hurd, French laicism is based on the Enlightenment critique of religion and it does not take a tolerant attitude toward religion. Religion was considered a private issue, and the public political sphere is set to be free from religion. Laicism sets itself as neutral and value-free while locating religion and religious actors as a value-laden category. Religions are understood as harmful, and irrational other. (Hurd, 2010: 140) In the Judeo-Christian tradition, religion is not approached in a hostile manner, instead, it is one of the elements which comprise civilization and culture. (Hurd, 2008) What distinguishes these two forms of secularism might be interpreted as historical experiences and different intellectual traditions which ensue different power relations, therefore different state-church practices, and different perceptions of religion. Two countries, France and the USA have two different traditions regarding approaching politics and religion.

Gunn points out that in the USA, the main principle was religious freedom while in France it was “laicite” which denotes restricting the impact of religion and the clergy over the state. While laicite was referring to the protection of the state from religion, religious freedom holds the belief of the protection of religion from the state’s intervention. (Gunn, 2004: 8-9) There are two founding values in these two

countries that are the main illustrative of the regimes: neutrality and equality. Both are being used with different meanings. In France, neutrality and equality, which connote laïcité, are being applied as the interdict of wearing ostentatious religious symbols in public schools. Whereas in the USA, for the sake of neutrality and equality, the political regime adopts a position that insists that children would be directed to articulate that the USA is “one nation under God”. Gunn refers to both laïcité and religious freedom that they are representing a political standing that respectful to non-believers, equating people by not categorizing them according to their beliefs. However, the approaches by the two countries take place distinctly in France, neutrality, and equality were being utilized against religion, in the USA, neutrality, and equality are the values that reveal the religious character of the nation. (2004: 18) This difference ends up in different secularisms.

We can infer from Hurd’s pointing out that laicism, in the French context, is a construction and production modality of a new subject of the modern nation-state. What is striking in this argument is that it is not describing a principle, rather, it is implying an ideological content. For Hurd, citizens were produced by the state, in association with the school, family, and media by controlling people, reinforcing people, and determining their attitudes. (Hurd, 2012) Laicism has to sketch a perspective on both the public and private by drawing their borders, inculcating a consciousness in people that made them alienated from religion, keeping religion out of the public sphere, equating religion to a personal issue, setting a system that religion was not involved in the public sphere, and establishing a religion-free space. Jansen takes laïcité not as constructive as Hurd did. She indicates that laïcité is not a positivist Enlightenment concept that has the purpose of being against religion. Accordingly, laïcité, in the French context, ensures each individual’s freedom to believe or not to believe. Jansen makes it clear that laïcité is in opposition to the institutional form of religion, the form that makes the law, that regulates social and political life, and that is the source of morality. However, traditionally, laïcité controls religion in France. To put it another way, even though

the complete separation is envisaged, the laic state does not isolate itself from religious issues. Moreover, the French state subsidizes the private religious schools in France which is not coherent with secularism. In this sense, Jansen refers to the laicite that comes as a form of a moderate kind of secularism. (Jansen, 2009: 594-5) However, when it comes to citizenship, the claim that laicite is a moderate type of secularism becomes invalid. As Hurd indicated above, the nation-state cultivates its citizens in a very strict way that the freedom of conscience would not be a concern. In other words, it would be logical to argue that the nation-state assimilates, and transforms individuals from their particular ideologies, and ethnic identities into the nation itself. However, perhaps it would be wise to argue that assimilation does not refer to the complete loss of personal identity. (2009: 596) In other words, a kind of a version of assimilation takes place in the public political sphere, and personal identity, ethnic dependencies, and private beliefs could be realized in the private sphere. To put it another way, religion is being conceived as a private opinion, and being legitimated as a private opinion only. This public/private division is the hallmark of laicite. Religion has to be invisible in the public sphere.

What Jansen has indicated is fitting to what I have located as political secularism. To put it another way, laicite is not a moderate version of secularism. Laicite is, most likely, the prominent pattern of political secularism. Laicite controls, regulates, and manages religion. On the other hand, Judeo-Christian secularism ostensibly reflects the 'religion-friendly' version of secularism. Yet, Hurd does not see such difference as significant. Hurd explains that Judeo-Christian secularism is based on the connection of the historical legacy of Christianity, Judeo-Christian cultural traditions, practices, institutions, and Anglo-Saxon formations of secularism. Religion, in this form, is accommodated in the public political culture. In Judeo-Christian secularism, religion is able to provide different aspects for conducting politics. Religion is not subject to a hostile manner, it was accepted as one of the elements that comprise the culture. (Hurd, 2012: 43) So, there is no friendly position to religion, but not an exclusionary outlook either. As we saw,

Hurd distinguishes secularism by historical, religious-cultural differentiation. Frankly, she rejects reducing secularism to an ideology, she does not express that she understands secularism as solely political, and does not share a conviction that it is an authoritative discourse whatsoever. Yet, she indicates that laicist people would sustain a disposition of an authoritative understanding of public morality which is reflecting hostility toward theology and gives the public political sphere an authoritative character. (Hurd, 2004: 243) According to Hurd's interpretation, it is not secularism but the laicist people who would make secularism an authoritative discourse. In other words, it is the people who defend a strict anti-religious public sphere that makes secularism authoritative.

Ahmet Kuru, on the other hand, categorizes secularism as passive and assertive by focusing on the state-church relations and political powers' disposition toward religion. (Kuru, 2007) Accordingly, in passive secularism, states are not concerned with the visibility of religion in the public sphere. On the contrary, in assertive secularism states act decisively to exclude religion from the public sphere and relegate it to the private sphere. In other words, states take a positive manner to restrict religion. Kuru articulates the situation of the state as "the agent of a social engineering project". (2007: 571) In assertive secularism the state conducts policies to defend the secular quality of the public sphere. At this point, I think it is reasonable to say that French laicism, or assertive secularism, operates as an ideology. Kuru is pointing out this issue by articulating the argument that there is a social engineering project. However, at this point, it is perhaps more appropriate, arguing that French laicism is not a distinguished type of secularism. Even though Hurd mentions it as 'the laic form of secularism', it implies acknowledging that France applied secularism extremely, assertively than normally it should have been. (Hurd, 2004: 243) However, secularism is not an extreme discourse. Thus, one may argue that French laicism, even interpreted as radical secularism, is, perhaps the most accurate and consistent reflection of political secularism.

David Buckley offers a different relationship between state and religious authorities based on “cooperation” that is called benevolent secularism which seems conceptually close to a ‘religion-friendly’ version of secularism. (Buckley, 2015: 443) Tariq Modood offers a model that religion is being accommodated in the public political sphere, integrating into the society based on identity politics which is called moderate secularism. (Modood, 2010) In that case, it is relevant to look at whether the state restricts or accommodates, or cooperates with religion. Because for both Hurd and Kuru, and as many argued, secularism is conceptualized under two types; on the one hand, radical, assertive, militant, ideological, etc. secularism; and on the other hand passive, moderate, or religion-friendly secularism. Kuru and Hurd reach a similar conclusion; even though they look at different phenomena to analyze. Yet, I suggest being critical of their views, because they are addressing the issue, not in terms of the constitutional, and ideological sense. They do not discuss secularism as a comprehensive worldview, but only as a political concept concerning how it is implemented: assertive or passive, radical or moderate. Further, these radical/moderate or passive/assertive distinctions remain so general to identify the types of secularism. Therefore, my typology of secularism, recall that I have referred to them as constitutional, political, and exhaustive, is much more explicatory. Besides, secularism is not only a political concept. I want to claim that secularism can be understood as the validity of this-worldly thought, acting upon the values, and guides that would lead humans to a more fulfilling social, cultural, and political life in this world, contrary to other-worldly ascetic thinking. Secularism as a worldview involves a politically satisfactory regime. Taking into consideration secularism in this way would create an opportunity to see that secularism has an ideological and philosophical preference and it is not confined solely to the political. It is the foremost public issue but is not limited to the public.

Recall that secularism has no conclusive definition, my suggestion can only be considered as a minor contribution to the literature. However, for my purpose here is to demonstrate the comprehensive and ideological characteristics of secularism,

any other attempt to define secularism that would not point out these characteristics would not be an accurate attempt. In other words, the views on secularism as it is a mere political concept would not properly touch on the core of the issue. I want to show that considering secularism as a mere administrative tool is wrong and such reductionism prevents us from understanding the ongoing tension between secularism and religious worldviews. I am suggesting that it is a requirement of honesty to defend secularism as a comprehensive worldview, no matter how authoritative it is, that has ideological and authoritative tendencies. Secularism is generally understood simply as a political concept, as a tool in terms of public administration. However, I argue that this is not a truthful argument. I have claimed that the ideological intensity of secularism gets weaker in the constitutional version, however, the authoritative dispositions are not. Because secularism is a comprehensive worldview, there might be confusion in interpreting political and constitutional versions. In the following section, I will deal with that.

2.2.The Flaws of Constitutional Secularism and The Conceptual Difference of Political and Constitutional Secularism: A Criticism of Andras Sajo's Views

In constitutional secularism, all legal regulations are based on non-religious fundamentals. This argument looks like a self-legitimization about the neutrality of the regime. However, all the positions advocating that secularism is a political project indicate that even in the constitutional version, secularism is still an authoritative, and exclusionary discourse. Michel Rosenfeld argues that there is a need for what he called institutional secularism that would support the scope in which secularism operates. Accordingly, secularism has to be protected by the constitution in order to pursue its aims. Rosenfeld considers that any discourse that has a religious basis ought to be excluded from the law and politics. Any contempt for secularism should be restricted. School education programs should be reorganized so that secular values could be inculcated effectively. (2014: 83) It is so problematic that Rosenfeld advocates these views under the title of what he called

‘ideological secularism’ while he has been conceiving ‘ideological secularism’ as not authoritarian and exclusionary discourse. He gives examples of fascism, Stalinism, and Nazism in terms of exclusionary and authoritarian forms of secularism. (2014: 89) Recall that at the beginning of the first chapter, I outlined that the exhaustive secularism, as a comprehensive worldview, is not equal to the Soviet Union’s extreme secularism. In other words, secularism is already an exclusionary phenomenon that does not have to be in a form of a Nazi regime. Thus, first, Rosenfeld’s view is inevitably exceeding the context of constitutional secularism. Because this view approaches the school as the modality of production of the citizens according to certain principles. As Baldi indicated, citizen construction and symbols like clothes are employed by the sovereign power to constitute the self and this is a regulative process of deciding the visibility of the subjects. (Baldi, 2017: 678) In other words, secularism has an agenda in all versions to a certain extent that the visibility and functionality of religions are determined. The problem in Rosenfeld’s view is that, as I elaborated earlier, in constitutional secularism, there is no such aim to build up a secular culture. Rosenfeld comprehends secularism as a totalistic discourse, however, his definition of secularism does not correspond to his comprehension. His warning about the need for a constitutional regime of secularism is not congruent with the constitutional version of secularism. Second, his distinction between ideological and authoritarian secularism does not seem accurate. Because such an assumption that secularism could be authoritative only in the forms of a Nazi or a Stalinist regime, and unless there is not one of them secularism requires protection is based on the understanding that constitutes secularism as an extreme discourse.

Jose Casanova suggests that secularism is simply the separation of secular and religious authority. Actually, secularism already holds a view about what religion is and what role religion ought to have in society. But for Casanova, secularism does not include an ideological view spontaneously. Casanova distinguishes two types of secularism: philosophico-historical and political secularism. The first one is based

on the idea that human flourishing is a linear, constantly progressive process and it has superseded religion. It is a phenomenon that we are living in today as the term secularity reflects. Actually, I have to point out that such acknowledgment of the linear historical constant development of humanity is not a fact, but a presumption. Religion did not fade away but was accepted as though it did. Political secularism, on the other hand, is based on an assumption that religion is a personal belief, a social power, and a form of understanding reality that should be excluded from the public political sphere completely. (Casanova, 2009a: 1051-2) For Casanova, political secularism wants to control and manage religion to conduct and maintain the public political sphere's secular characteristics. For him, secularism is not, and does not have to be an authoritative discourse. However, political secularism is prone to be authoritative.

Keane points out that the contradictory feature of secularism is political despotism which is more likely to be observed in political and exhaustive versions. What we can infer from Keane's point is that this political despotism may reveal the authoritative character of secularism. Therefore, Keane also suggests that violence and suppression have been observed in various attempts to establish secularism, like in France and Turkey. In other words, secularism may not be naturally more tolerant, and peaceful than religion and faith-based systems. (Keane, 2000: 14)

András Sajó was a former judge at the European Court of Human Rights who specializes in the legal studies field. As Sajó asserts, secularism has no certain standing toward and among constitutional values. (2014: 67) To put it another way, even though we can name several values, there is no clear indication concerning which one is the foremost. Moreover, there is no clear indication about the implementation of how these values will be defended. For instance, equality, religious freedom, and freedom of speech are some of the most important values. But which one, and to what extent, is indispensable for constitutional secularism? For instance, is political support at a discourse level to a religious community a

violation of state neutrality? Can a religious practice, pray, that includes insulting homosexuality and homosexual people will be interpreted as the free exercise of religion? Or, insulting religion or reviling a sacred person will be considered freedom of speech? How do we standardize such cases? Sajo gives an example to illuminate the controversy. In the "No driving on the Sabbath" debate³ in Israel, for the non-believers, that day has no meaning, they want to drive their cars. But this attitude might be offensive to religious people. Sajo claims that the violation of a divine command of that day by driving might be inconvenient, but not more offending than the intrusion into the life of a non-believer. Sajo points out that if a person is not allowed to drive on that day, this might be physically troubling, however, if "No driving on the Sabbath" is not officially recognized, no such tangible harm would happen to the believers. On the other hand, by not driving, people might lose their job. This is surely a much more prominent impact than the emotional harm to the believer. Because by losing their job, people might be devoid of any financial income. In terms of the consistency of secularism, one may argue that Sajo has a point to claim that no official recognition of "No driving on the Sabbath" might not be a concern. Because the emotional impact is not relevant to secularism. Nevertheless, this instance illuminates that secularism establishes political equality by not giving equal opportunity to religious people with non-believers. In other words, the chief concern for secularism is not religious freedom in terms of free exercise. Secularism approaches equality by conceiving the secular as standard, normal, and the religious as the other, marginal. Thus, even though it is coherent for secularism, in all three versions, not to be concerned with religious people's emotions, this cannot hide the fact that religious activities in a secular regime are repressed to a certain extent. This is epitomized in the authoritative character of secularism. Religious people were setting equally with non-religious people by being deprived of the right to celebrate that day. As Casanova suggested, religious people would be met hospitable way as long as they are ready to

³ The Jewish Sabbath Day, it is prohibited to drive a motor vehicle because it is asserted that it is violating certain Jewish laws. It is a reminder to commemorate that God created the world in six days and rested on the seventh day. The only exception is a life-threatening emergency situation.

acknowledge the secular norms. (Casanova, 2009b: 146) In other words, religious people have to adhere firmly to secular norms, even in constitutional secularism, to be a part of the public political sphere. (Lanczi, 2010: 86) Sajo claims he was constitutionally defending secularism. However, his arguments are coinciding with the authoritative aspect of secularism revealed in the form of repressing religious activities to a certain extent, which even in the constitutional version does not vanish. Sajo claims reason-based polity is being protected by secularism contrary to the social disorder that is based on religious dictates. (2014: 70) At this point, one may argue that equating religion with a social disorder is based on pure prejudice. He basically equates religious thought with emotions and arbitrariness. Nevertheless, Sajo has preferred a secular life by attributing undesired qualities to religion and claiming that secularism protects the order. From my point of view, a life choice that has been based on a secular life is not the concern in this study, however, doing it by attributing religions chaotic features does not seem coherent with a scientific argument.

I want to argue that, Sajo is grounding his argument on the basis that religion is antithetical to being reasonable, and to creating reasonable politics. He indicates that religious people could be hurt, and felt hurt, but it might not be worrying for the state, because non-believers' disadvantage is more striking, causing more negative concrete outcomes. Sajo claims that depending on a divine text is not reasonable for autonomous individuals. Such claim insists that religious people cannot be autonomous. The way Sajo conceives secularism is blurring the typology that I am employing in this study. Moreover, Sajo employs constitutional requirements and claims an assertive secularism, and this suggests the worldview aspect of the term. However, my typology is effective because the ideological tendency of secularism gets waned. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, constitutional secularism does not reflect an ideological inclination as much as political secularism and does not pose an extensive categorical discrimination against religion in the public sphere. In that case, it is wise to remember that I am

not making a contextual distinction; both constitutional, and political secularism are relevant to the public political sphere. Yet, the difference is that constitutional secularism does not function as ideologically as exhaustive and political secularism does. The official non-establishment of a religious institution, and the neutrality of the state toward any religion, are the two main components of constitutional secularism. Yet, there is a disputable issue at stake with these components. Recall that in the beginning, I have described constitutional secularism. The foremost defining quality of secularism and the most important feature of constitutional secularism is that governments cannot make laws according to a religion, or a religious group's wishes. This is where its authoritative aspect emerges. That disallowing religion to have power means there have to be certain restrictions which would cause burdens or marginalization on religious people. For instance, you cannot use a religious reason in the policy-making process. You may not realize your religious duty in your public service because it is confronting with secular order of the regime. You cannot establish a political party and run it on the claim of constructing a theocratic regime. Because secularism should preserve its essence. Thus, you may have to look for different political alternatives for yourself even though that alternative would not be congruent with your worldview. As Lanczi suggested, democracy's chief mission is to provide a suitable environment for people from diverse ideologies: the public sphere. (2010: 87) However, secularism employs certain principles, and moral values such as equality to justify its actions, and implements these values in a certain way. People argue, agree, disagree, and come up with a solution. The ground rules that the debates and the solutions would be built on are according to these principles and values. Therefore, even though constitutional secularism is less intense than political, and exhaustive secularism, it keeps an authoritative and exclusionary side. This is what signifies my argument that secularism is a protective and restrictive discourse at the same time.

Sajo attempts to defend secularism constitutionally, however, his views are compatible with what I have described as political secularism. He ascribes a great

value to reason, completely rejects revelation as an epistemic category, and believes that this is the way to establish a peaceful order. However, equating reason with a value-free, objective category and religion with emotions, and basic instinct is a simple characterization that could be refutable by looking at two world wars in the 20th century. Sajo might be reasoning from the secularization theory which asserts once societies modernize they become secular, and what Casanova refers to as a historical myth of secular democracy. (Casanova, 2010: 25) Because the claim that religion is so prone to be more confrontational and violent than secularism, and that the religious conflict did end up in the secularization of the state and societies can be understood more like a conviction rather than a historical fact. Thus, Sajo's claims are more fitting into the comprehensive feature of secularism. Constitutional secularism does sketch an outline to protect the regime from all the extremes, including the secularist one. What this 'secularist extreme' entails is the militant advocating and propagating of a secular way of life and a strict anti-position to religions in society. Constitutional secularism pursues the institutional distinction between religious, and political authority, and diminishes the negative stance toward religions as much as possible without compromising the secular character of the regime. Contrary, Sajo's claims involve a negative stance toward religions and revelation. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret his views under the constitutional version of secularism. Rather, his views reflect the comprehensive and authoritative characteristics of secularism.

One of the criticisms that Sajo makes is that religion treats people not as rational beings because it has collective control over them. However, both exhaustive and political secularism have collective control over the citizens by making them members of the nation-state and by conditioning them in certain attitudes and forms of thinking. Because secularism, in exhaustive and political forms, pursues the aim of cultivation of a secular citizen. On the other hand, constitutional secularism is not interested in public secular culture. Hence, Sajo's claims are not compatible with defending the constitutional version of secularism. On the other hand, his

criticism regarding the collectivity of religion that it does not value the individual reason does seem very disputable. Because his understanding of secularism has collective control over the people as well in the process of establishing the secular culture, and claiming that religion is an irrational discourse.

As a comprehensive and authoritative discourse, three versions of secularism expose a consistent standpoint. However, when religion is less restricted in the secular regime, it is safe to argue that there might occur an impasse in constitutional secularism. First, constitutional secularism is not immune from the ideological aims of secularism. Yet, the purpose of a constitutionally secular state is not to establish a powerful, uncompromising public sphere. Therefore, the constitutional version seems to be more inclusive. This point is where it is consistent with the logic of secularism. Yet, this ostensible inclusivity of constitutional secularism might be an illusion, and this is where a likely impasse arises. Recall that I had mentioned secularism is the constitutive organizing principle of the modern nation-state. Ahdar criticizes that calling a principle 'constitutional' means the extension of the application of the principle to the constitutional frame. (Ahdar, 2013: 410) To put it another way, Ahdar claims if secularism is an ideology, a comprehensive worldview, that means it is fully determining every aspect of daily life. In terms of that, Ahdar has a point that calling it constitutional does not make secularism out of its authoritative context. Constitutional secularism is in a position to be more permissive to religious views, and less authoritative than political secularism. The comprehensiveness of secularism is reduced, and the strict position of secularism toward religion gets weak. Nevertheless, maintaining the secular character of the regime, the secular ground is protected. Religion can occupy more place and undertake more influential roles in the social and political life in the constitutional version of secularism, however, religion could not be unrestricted in terms of being a social and political actor in society. Because when religion claims more power and more effectiveness, that would be ensuing a claim on political power. In this situation, secularism logically abstains from allowing religion such power in the

public political sphere that would lead religious actors in society to claim theological sovereignty. When there is a considerable challenge to the constitution from religions on gender equality, for instance, there would be no neutrality in terms of approaching that challenge. (Lerner, 2013: 616) Recall that I have mentioned the values and the moral ends of secularism. If there is a confrontation by the assertions of religious groups to the moral ends, a secular regime, it does not matter in which version, defends the secular ground in the constitution. Because constitutions set rules, and make decisions about the structure and operation of the state. (2013: 616) The issue at stake with religion is that because religion is an all-encompassing and guiding-life discourse, constitutions cannot abstain from regulating or controlling religions. (Hirschl and Shachar, 2018: 432) Because of this holistic nature of religion's vision of humans lives; as constructing people's life in this world by giving them purpose, and filling them up with meaning, religions might threaten the sovereignty of the state. In the constitutional domain, the state cannot keep its legal authority unless this threat from religion is precluded. (2018: 433) That means political powers have to choose a form of a regime, a secular regime that is holding the power over religion. And by holding political power, religions are being subjected to restrictions on visibility and functionality in the public sphere. Recall that I have suggested the main purpose of secularism was not religious freedom, or freedom of worship in particular. Keeping in mind that, it is safe to argue that the neutrality feature of secularism falls into the void. This is also the most compelling point for constitutional secularism. Because when religion pursues the aim of becoming an ultimate authority in law, no constitutional order could approach it impartially. (2018: 435) In other words, faith-based provisions can be judged before the secular law if these provisions are in precise contradiction with what the secular regimes protect. Thus, a religious symbol might be forbidden in public service because religions might assert symbolic importance at state institutions by being visible which could be interpreted as against the secular structure of the regime. (McCrea, 2016: 697) This is a sort of consistency for secularism to avoid being self-contradictory. However, this consistency might have

an impact such as marginalizing religious people. If the provisions pose no contradiction or threat, the state could be indifferent. Thus, the secularization of society, or that people are being pious, are not concerns for constitutional secularism. Constitutional secularism has to maintain controlling religion to avoid the impasse.

There might be considerable suggestions that are worth mentioning that could eliminate the challenge from religions to secular constitutions. Lerner suggests that constitutions which adopt a permissive approach to religion often allow devolution; for instance, family issues are regulated by religious laws. (Lerner, 2013: 619) This is implying sharing sovereignty which might raise doubts regarding the functionality of secularism. I have indicated that in constitutional secularism, it is expected that the state has to be totally indifferent to any religious issue in the legal context. However, there might be certain situations in that this indifference would not be plausible. Once religion is allowed to hold the power, there might be extensive requests from religious groups. For instance, the state could not be indifferent to the invocations to a restriction on certain groups of people based on religious claims. Religious groups could propose forbidding sexual intercourse without marriage. Anti-abortion people could make a request to ban abortion with no exceptions. If religions hold the power and are effective in the public sphere extending the limits that secularism envisages, such legal requests would encompass the public political arena. In such situations, the state cannot be neutral, rather it has to choose a side, and defend the most valid values that would be best for people in this world. In constitutional secularism, the regime might take into consideration the demands of banning abortion on a secular ground. However, secularism might resist a demand for a ban from a religious basis. Because distinguishing secularism as a constitutional version does not mean the values that secularism holds are out of the constitution's interest. Therefore it is sensible that the UK Court of Appeal ruled that it is a proportionate action to restrict a person's religious freedom because of her resistance not to serving homosexual couples.

(McCrea, 2016: 702) That person does resist serving according to her religious belief, however, that belief cannot be legitimized in the public political sphere. Because secular public service does not operate as recognizing different religious beliefs. This is, again, a consistent execution of public service. However, one may argue that such conduct of public service might have a message to religious people to give concession from his belief to enter public service. As long as entering a public service is one of the basic rights, this indirectly requested distinction between the person's religious belief and public service might have an impact on religious people such as estrangement.

It is substantial to understand that the rules that have been written in constitutions are reflections of the principles which have been derived from values that give a regime its character. In other words, it is the values that are the source of principles that determines the rules. (Zhou, 2019: 891) For instance, if the value is the freedom of speech, the principle might be as: "every person is free to express his thought." or "nobody gets any harm because of the articulation of his thought." The rules get more detailed. Hence, if a person expresses his opinion regarding a sacred person of religion, it is understood as freedom of speech unless the speech contains or implies an assault on a person or targets certain groups. On the other hand, if religion became influential in the public sphere, religious groups could attempt to narrow down the scope of freedom of speech, entirely to forbid any expression regarding religion and religious symbols. Recall that I have defined secularism as a worldview that maintains the purpose of humanity's material well-being in this world. This definition suggests that a constitution based on this purpose of secularism ought to mirror the values that would help humans reach wellbeing. Another inference is that secularism is not in an affirmative position to transcendental, faith-based values and rules. Thus, the secular state cannot make laws based on religious grounds. If secularism promises the wellness of people by providing equality and liberty, then it is clear that the state ought to defend equality and liberty. This is what makes secularism a worldview. Thus, the secular state is

not expected to have the motive to allow the practices that would undermine the secular nature, like the religious groups' demands on freedom of speech, or to ban the demands that have been aimed at constitutionalization which have not faith-based fundamentals. That is why neutrality is not feasible, and the flexibility of constitutions in such situations would not be compatible with what secularism promises.

As Lerner suggests, constitutions that work out flexible and permissive to religious demands generally conduce to the freedom of religion which may imply explicit or implicit state support to religious groups that might break the promise of equality. (2013: 640) To support this argument, an interesting finding might be helpful. It is feasible to observe in countries that adopt a "positive" approach to religion or utilize the religious basis discourse, like Modi's India, AKP's Turkey, Trump's America, and Putin's Russia, the public political sphere is surrounded by religious rhetoric; besides, rhetoric transforms into a demand of greater control of constitutional agenda by religion. (Hirschl and Shachar, 2018: 441) Hence, the secular character of these states diminished. Considering these instances, it would be safe to argue that sharing sovereignty or constituting a dual legal system cannot be functional because both religion and secularism have comprehensive views regarding the wellness of people; the meaning of life, the purpose of a human in this world, the way to get the knowledge, etc. This might be interpreted as indicative of the argument that if secularism backs down from being the legal authority, religion would replace it. Besides, a dual system would create a break which means that secularism relinquishes to be a worldview. For instance, the saying 'family issues are ruled by the person's religious belonging' means to divide the family from all other areas in life and to acknowledge that social, and political well-being does not include family. Surely, this view is not congruent with a worldview perspective of secularism. Thus, even though Lerner suggests that more study is required in this area, one may argue that, a dual system would not be a

solution to the probable dilemma of constitutional secularism when religions become an influential actor in society.

Replacing religious freedom with freedom of conscience would not set a sustainable ground as well. As conscience is more general ground for both religious and non-religious people, Laborde refers to a disaggregation strategy that it is a way of regulating religion in law by not giving religion any specific status, but claiming to protect religious activities and practices, general liberal rights of belief, expression, conscience and so forth would be sufficient. (Laborde, 2015: 594) Laborde claims that the disaggregation strategy does not give religion special protection, or any exemptions because religion is considered one among many other life-meaning-seeking discourses. Here, I do not consider giving religions any exemption or special status before the law would resolve the problem of exclusionary aspects of secularism as well. However, that Laborde suggests her disaggregation strategy would be religion-blind, and the implication that this blindness would be a way out for religions before secularism does seem disputable considering the comprehensiveness of secularism. The reason why Laborde contemplates the religion-blindness might be to provide a better ground for religious freedom and freedom for non-believers can be considered that she understands secularism as a political position, a relationship between the state and religions. (Laborde, 2013: 165) Laborde's approach to secularism is minimalist, as she already pointed out, that neglects the worldview aspect of secularism. She suggests that religion could not be the legal basis for justifying laws because it is divisive and contentious. Accordingly, officials should justify laws fundamentals to the secular ground and they should execute restrictions on religions. (2013: 167) At this point, her arguments are bringing us back to the confrontation of constitutional secularism. As I have elaborated above, constitutional secularism is considered the most defensible version of secularism in terms of being ideologically the least intense one. Constitutional secularism, also, gives a great amount of opportunity to religions in the public political sphere. The only rule, and what makes constitutional

secularism a version of secularism is the exclusion of religion from the process of law-making. Moreover, what makes constitutional secularism still an authoritative discourse to a certain extent is the requirement to maintain this exclusion. Laws can be inspired by religious arguments, but the reason ought to be tangible and serve the purpose of the temporal goodness of people. It is substantial to remember that while a religious reason could be an inspiration for a law, there should be a concrete earthly cause behind the law. Laborde does not understand secularism in this way for sure. However, she conceives religion as unstable and thus, conceives restraint of religion as a necessity. Because according to Laborde, religion has a comprehensive scope but secularism does not. (2013: 174) Laborde considers that the state ought not to force people into any comprehensive view. In constitutional secularism, there is no such imposition from state to society. As it is mentioned above, constitutional secularism does not have any vision regarding the secularization of society. I have already suggested that the compelling challenge for constitutional secularism, in terms of claiming equality and liberty better than a religious ground, is the contradiction, or opposition, of the reason behind religion and secularism. At the level of law, and decision-making, if religion becomes the source then the regime would not be a secular one anymore. This is the reason why I am suggesting secularism ought to protect itself and be restrictive of religion. Laborde consciously reveals this contradiction and acknowledges the restriction toward religion. However, her understanding of secularism is based on a distinction; illiberal and liberal secularisms. Even though her suggestions regarding the secularization of society in constitutional secularism seem accurate, Laborde misses the point that the necessity of protection would still have an exclusionary impact on religions. Comprehending secularism as a mere justificatory indicator, a principle seems quite shallow. Thus, Laborde's justificatory secularism concept is not setting a persuasive ground for the probable impasse of constitutional secularism. At this point, clarification might be required. There might be other formulations that religious and secular could coexist entirely equally. However, it is highly likely that constitutional secularism would have serious difficulties in laying

the ground for both religion and secularism to coexist under completely equal terms.

The common definition of secularism as the separation of religion and politics, or the church and state, could be employed for constitutional secularism. Nevertheless, this definition has certain problems. I have offered a different definition for secularism and thus I think the separation thesis is not explanatory for defining secularism. Now, I want to look at the separation thesis and its problems that why it is not properly defining secularism.

2.3.The Insufficiencies of The Separation Thesis

The general definition of secularism as the separation of religion and politics is displaying an institutional and formal situation about the state before religion. However, this formal definition does not illuminate much about what I suggested as authoritative and comprehensive qualities of secularism. For the exhaustive and political versions of secularism, the separation thesis may not be considered the convenient definition. Moreover, for the constitutional version, the separation thesis might still be considered lacking in the clarity to define secularism.

Casanova builds political secularism on two principles: separation and regulation. (2009a: 1061) Accordingly, there should be no institutional religious establishment that is officially recognized by the government, and governments should not intervene in religion. Because it is established as everybody has religious freedom, freedom to believe in a religion, freedom to exit from religion, and freedom of criticizing religion. Hence, religious freedom is one of the fundamental values of a secular regime. At this point, the separation principle can be interpreted strictly, and an official establishment of a religious institution would not be allowed. However, recognition of a religious institution does not illuminate anything regarding the quality of secularism in a regime. What peculiarly matters is how states approach

the presence of religion and religious people, in the public political sphere. In other words, the establishment of a religious authority does not necessarily show that the regime is not a secular one. Contrarily, no official religious body does not mean necessarily the exclusion of religion. Separation does not determine the degree of secularism and whether the regime is secular.

Laegaard refers that secularism is a political view and separation of religion and politics is mandatory. (Laegaard, 2013: 127) What makes secularism authoritative or moderate is not the presence of some official religious establishment. Separation is not a sufficient indicator of secularism. Thus, it is not an explanatory definition that secularism is the institutional separation of religion and state. We can argue that the separation of religion, or church, and state is constitutionally mandatory for a secular regime. In other words, the institutional separation of religious and political authorities is a constitutional necessity, however, secularism is more than institutional separation. Even though institutional separation is a crucial component of constitutional secularism, it does not indicate anything peculiar to the characteristics of a regime. Constitutional secularism is not composed of formal regulations like the official recognition of a religious institution, only. In other words, a regime could have recognized a religion officially, and might not be making laws according to that religion, or any other religion which makes that regime still secular. What is intended for constitutional secularism is the complete distinctiveness of the state from religious issues in law, policy, and discourse levels, and the maintenance of this distinctiveness. Political secularism intends to emancipate the public political sphere from the influence and norms of any religion. Exhaustive secularism, on the other hand, aims at a society that has been “cleansed” from the effects of religion, a political regime that has not been conducted according to religion, and individuals who put their mundane interests before spiritual ones. Separation is focusing only on whether recognition of an official religious establishment or not. Thus, we cannot have clues about secularism from the separation thesis.

Fox asserts that for deciding whether a state is secular or not we should look at its constitution to see whether there is separation or not. Accordingly, separation provides a neutral political power toward religion that states give no preference to any religion, and do not restrict its visibility in the public political sphere whatsoever. (Fox, 2011: 385) Thus, perhaps, it would be plausible to consider secularism through the combination of separation and neutrality. On the other hand, one may ask how a formal institutional separation creates a neutral government. In other words, the general definition of secularism as the separation of religion and state does not explain much, for political and exhaustive secularism in particular. A formal separation or an establishment of a religious institution does not indicate such an obvious link between institutional separation and neutrality. Fox has a point that any religion is not preferred, however, one may question Fox about the impartial government. One should be suspicious with respect to Fox's view that separating the religious and political authorities create neutral governments. Because one may not think that secular means neutrality and secular regimes provide neutral political powers. In all three versions of secularism, no impartiality is concerned. Religion's visibility does not depend on whether there is separation or not. A religion's influence and visibility in a secular regime depend on the version of secularism. Only in constitutional secularism, religion can be more visible and more influential than the cases of political, and exhaustive secularism. However, a secular regime has to be exclusionary toward religion to protect itself from the assertive demands of religious groups by limiting religion in the level of law-making in the constitutional version.

Fox, already, found out in his research that countries that have entitled to developed ones did not have the separation of religion and state, properly. This information has a further message: Even one of the most democratic countries such as Italy, Spain, and Germany did not have the separation of religious, and political institutions. (Fox, 2011: 396) This implies that a democratic, free, secular regime may not require a strict separation of religious and political institutions. Therefore,

this finding supports my claim that separation is not an illustrative definition of secularism. If we go back to Casanova, there is a regulation with separation that qualifies secularism. Regulation refers to the capability of secularism in the management of religion, and society's position on religion. The regulation also has clarity about the neutrality of the state. I have described that secularism has an intense ideological tendency; neutrality connotes an impartial, unrelated, distinct state in law, policy, and discourse levels. At this point, it is not feasible for secularism to be neutral. The purpose, the ostensible aim is the neutrality of the state, however, in practice, it does not operate in that manner. Ahdar points out, secularism operates in a similar manner to atheism in practice. (2013, 421) In that respect, I have already stated that secularism does not mean atheism. Ahdar interprets it very strict way. However, we might be cautious before eliminating the possibility of secularism operating close to atheism. In other words, in exhaustive secularism, we may observe an inclination to atheism-like secularism. On the other hand, political and constitutional versions of secularism are not interested in propagating atheism. Nevertheless, a preference for secularism, this-worldly concerns over religious concerns, and the exclusion of religious reasons from the law-making process might be considered to create partiality between people because of their different worldview fundamentals.

Cecile Laborde identifies laicite basically in three strands: neutrality, autonomy, and community. (Laborde, 2018: 162) Recall that I have mentioned laicite as the proper instance for political secularism. Laborde refers to laicite which the chief proponent is the institutional separation of the church and state. The separation envisages the public/private distinction, which means religious freedom is guaranteed in the private sphere, and religious influence on the policy is eliminated. Laborde suggests that this would be understood as a form of state neutrality. This is where I have an objection. The non-establishment of a religious institution and the free exercise of religion in the private sphere cannot occur through separation. Laborde indicates that when the privileges of the Catholic Church were removed, equal treatment for

believers and non-believers is established. However, I do not consider this an eventual outcome. When the Catholic Church is deprived of its privileges, and no official establishment of any religious institution is ensured, there would be no adequate indicator that the state would be neutral. The institutional non-establishment would be complemented by the individualization and privatization of religion, according to Laborde, and after this process, the neutral, non-discriminatory public sphere would be plausible more effectively. Because citizenship requires the free reason of humanity, the autonomous rational will, and the conquest of reason. Any obstacle; religion or tradition, would be relegated to the private sphere. Religion's assertive claims on the public political sphere should be kept out. Aside from the arguable question: of why religion would be hindering the use of reason, or why secularism is not considered to be an obstacle to the use of reason, Laborde's argument does not illuminate the issue. Contrary, to her views, I can infer that *laïcité*, in other words, political secularism, is an exclusionary discourse relying on the assumption that religious freedom is not the first and foremost value. As I mentioned above, citizenship is a constructive process through which citizens would be brought up so as to adapt to the republican secular values. Particularly in exhaustive secularism, there could not be religious views of a citizen that they could manifestly defend in the public sphere. In political secularism, citizens' religious views are not desired to be heard, thus they are mostly restricted. In the constitutional version, as I elaborated in the previous section, there is no restriction over religions in the public sphere, however, to preclude the prospect of religions getting politically assertive, there might be certain restrictions as well. In that case, the neutrality of the state is not likely. As Laborde refers to, *laïcité* was like a religion, a faith that is non-transcendental and non-clerical. The only values of *laïcité* are the human reason, individualism, and rationalism. (2018: 166) Recall that I have defined secularism's purpose as the worldly wellness of humankind. This purpose entails constituting a way of life that is different from that of a religious one and protecting this way of life from the impacts of religion. This purpose is more salient in exhaustive and political versions of secularism.

Therefore, neutrality is off the table. In the constitutional version, this purpose is ensured by keeping religious reasons out from the law-making process.

As a good example of the exclusionary aspect of exhaustive secularism, school is the most important institution for a regime to be labeled whether it is secular or religious. Secularism mobilizes the schools by nurturing the citizens. In other words, education is a tool to bring up citizens whose loyalty is not to a religion but to the nation-state. So, school is bringing up secular citizens. Bergamaschi and Blaya pointed out that individuals must abandon their private opinions because they argue that such private adherences would be in conflict with the “universal interpretation of egalitarianism”. (Bergamaschi and Blaya, 2020: 759) They argue that the French nation is founded against religion, and education is the pivotal tool that preserves the non-religious national identity and inculcates this identity in people. To defend the egalitarian implementation, the ban on ostentatious religious symbols is being advocated for the reasons that defend the neutrality of the education system, and religious fanaticism. Etienne Balibar points out that the school is the place of transition to the public space. In other words, the school transformed individuals by detaching them from their personal beliefs and ideologies which would ease people get into the public political sphere. To put it another way, citizenship is constituted as the purification of people from private ideologies. Balibar suggests that this is a violent process because people would have been ripped off their personal private beliefs. On the other hand, he indicates that the school has to give individuals the means that they can build up their ideologies and represent them ‘without actually being political’. This means people may have private beliefs in the private sphere, they cannot claim their private beliefs in the public political arena. According to Balibar, the expectation for the school is to execute the neutralization between public and private spheres. (Balibar, 2004: 357) Balibar’s views put forth the function of the school. That ‘without being political’ means individuals establish their personal beliefs non-politically, non-publicly. How is it feasible? In exhaustive secularism, the school would educate the

children on non-religiosity, but children still are able to cultivate personal, religious beliefs that have no public agenda. That does not seem plausible. Surely, in the constitutional version, the scope of education may not be that comprehensive. In political secularism, the school may undertake a similar function as in exhaustive secularism. However, constitutional secularism might reveal a problem regarding the proper function of the school.

When the state does not interested in cultivating a secular culture and religious ideas may circulate around society, the proper place of the school may raise questions. If the school is not an ideologically loaded place to construct the citizen in the constitutional version of secularism, how the curriculum would be arranged? For instance, if there is no intention on teaching non-religiousness to children, how the religious education would be outlined? The subject matter here is not whether the state should teach children religion or not. In a secular state, there is no such mission of the state. As long as the state is secular, there could not be religious classes in the official curriculum. However, in constitutional secularism, the state does not execute anti-religious education policies as in the exhaustive and political versions. This does not mean that schools could teach religion. If private schools are allowed to teach religions, and people are allowed to send their children to these private schools, there might be certain problems. For instance, if children have been taught to believe that the system is corrupt and needs to be changed, how do people graduating from these private schools treat the secular people and the secular state? If these schools teach children that loyalty should be to the religion, not the state, and if the state is in conflict with the religious rules they believe in, they should not obey the rules, what would be the consequences? These instances might be considered what I have called the ‘probable dilemma’ of constitutional secularism in the previous section. If governments do not intervene in education, there would be conflicts between people that would eventually threaten the existence of the regime. A group of people believe in to overthrow the regime with force, according to their beliefs. And the state has to protect the right to live. At this point, to avert

the probability of this happening, the curriculum should be determined with certain restrictions on religious teaching. This means that the political authority should eventually intervene in the religious curriculum. That is not an ideological intervention, but a necessary, and authoritarian one. Because the right to live in this context outweighs religious freedom. Nevertheless, this intervention does not erase the fact that this is an authoritarian act. From my point of view, this act is essential for a secular regime as well. Consequently, the function of the school made it clear that the aim of neutrality is impossible. Certain ideologies and beliefs could be transitive, or peculiar to the public only. However, such beliefs as changing the regime with force are not dependent on the public/private divide. The political authority has to act up to protect its people's right to live. This is definitely an intervention in a religion's internal teaching. Nevertheless, to keep the secular quality of the regime, this intervention is essential. Therefore, constitutional secularism, as well, is an authoritarian and restrictive version. Religions are not that free in each version. By free I am not suggesting that religions should not be limited by any measure. Contrary, secularism is failed to provide ground for this sort of extreme religious claims and secular claims to argue reciprocally. Thus, because of secularism takes a side, one may argue that neutrality is not something that can be expected of secularism.

Laborde's reference to Catherine Kintzler, a neo-Kantian French philosopher and an educationalist, and a republican expert on laicite, tells us that neutrality is off the table. Accordingly, Kintzler suggests children should be taken away from their families, and traditional communities, because social structures set apart individuals from liberties. (Laborde, 2018: 168) Kintzler's suggestion might be congruent with political secularism. Nevertheless, how come cutting off all the bonds that the child has with his family would be conceived neutral? How come this application would not be conceived as not authoritative? For this logic, families, traditional bonds, and communities are representing an authoritative inclination and deprive the children of their liberties. If we follow its logical result, then we would have to argue that

children should not be raised by their families, but by the government dorms. Even though we acknowledge that Kintzler's suggestion might be consistent with the ideological comprehensiveness of secularism, however, it does not seem conceivable in terms of pediatrics. We witness, praising human reason, on the one hand, and relying on the ability to find out the right path for each individual on the other. Accordingly, children should not learn anything regarding religion, because their families would inculcate all the "inappropriate" things into the minds of children which did not suit secularism. Kintzler is suggesting the "emancipatory" character of education which is quite disputable. However, referring to French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser's ideological apparatuses of the state would be helpful to see the function of the school, to understand the "emancipation" Kintzler has suggested. (Althusser, 2014: 62-3) If we adopt Althusser's conceptual evaluation regarding school for our purposes in this research, school emerges as an apparatus far from being impartial, and Kintzler's arguments fit well. School is the place of constructing the citizen, inculcating the republican secular values into the children. In other words, the school could be considered the proper apparatus for secularism to build up a worldview in children. What we can infer from this is that Kintzler defends one worldview, republican secularism, against the other ones. Neutrality is not the subject matter here. Moreover, if we remember that I have qualified laicite as the best example of political secularism, Kintzler's suggestion is congruent with what I am suggesting regarding secularism in this research: the exclusionary and authoritative aspect. That Kintzler's argumentation is in the context of political secularism, and also consistent with exhaustive secularism, should not mislead our insight toward the constitutional version of secularism. Because, as I explained in the first chapter, the three versions of secularism are not distinguished from each other by context. Constitutional secularism is contextually regarding the public political sphere as political secularism does. The difference is the decreasing level of secularism's ideological tendency and authoritativeness. Because constitutional secularism has no interest in people's being pious, or the secularization of the society, there might be difficulties to talk about citizen

construction. On the other hand, even constitutional secularism has to limit religions to maintain the secular quality of the regime. As I understood, Laborde does not oppose Kintzler's understanding of laïcité, as a comprehensive constructive discourse. (2018: 169) She praises individual autonomy and human reason which individuals must have in a democratic regime with which they can question the intrusions of theocratic or traditionalist views. On the other hand, Laborde does not qualify secularism as a comprehensive worldview and thus does not consider the possibility of the intrusions of secularism, especially the ideological and political versions of secularism.

Since the political and exhaustive versions of secularism are intensely discriminatory, constitutional secularism might fail to be an inclusive alternative to other versions. Even though constitutional secularism is more libertarian toward religious people, secularism maintains its hegemony as the constitutive principle of the modern state. I have already shown that this is a consistent condition for secularism. This condition is the reason that constitutional secularism might face a dilemma peculiar to religions' public visibility and the increased influence in the public political sphere.

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter is composed of three sections. In the first section, I have presented the current debates regarding the nature of secularism. The prevalent approach to secularism is to comprehend it as a political principle, an administrative means. However, I have shown that this approach is limited and misses the worldview aspect of secularism. In the second section, I have laid down my criticisms of András Sajó. His understanding of secularism is more compatible with political secularism, and the reflecting the authoritative aspect of secularism. What is questionable in Sajó is that he is defending secularism as a constitutional means, a way of constituting an egalitarian and free regime, however, his arguments reflect a

worldview aspect of secularism. Sajo is questionable in his criticism regarding religion as well because what he has ascribed to religions could be observed in secularism as well.

I have illuminated constitutional secularism more by investigating the probable confrontation with religions. That religions become an actor in society might cause a problem, a dilemma, for secularism in the constitutional version. Because as the constitutive principle of the state, secularism rules religions, and determines the amount of religion's place in the public political sphere. I have argued that any religion that has been given freedom in society pervades and would have an impact on people. This impact would ensue in assertive religious requests, like participating in the law-making process with their religious agenda. I have stated that if secularism relinquishes determining religion's place in society, especially in constitutional secularism, there would be an existential crisis for secularism because religions are comprehensive in that they give life a meaning, their followers a mission, and this has clearly a political dimension. This is what the dilemma is. I am suggesting that constitutional secularism has no agenda to give religions that much power. Religions can be an actor to various degrees under secular regimes, yet, religious groups cannot claim sovereignty, and religious-based laws are not allowed. This is the restrictive and authoritative aspect of secularism which is to be a consistent discourse. Thus, constitutional secularism restricts the freedom of religious groups to avoid the dilemma and to maintain the secular character.

The third section is about the separation thesis and the alleged neutrality of secularism. I have indicated the inefficiency of the separation thesis to define and qualify secularism even though there are scholars who advocate otherwise. The formal separation of religious and political authorities does not shed light on anything peculiar to the feature of a regime. I have argued that even for the constitutional version, separation is not a sufficient indicator. On the other hand, secularism is not an impartial discourse. That the state is being 'agnostic' regarding

religious issues does not mean that the state has no standing toward the actions that violate human rights. I have mentioned certain instances that the state could not stay indifferent because religious-based ideas might jeopardize the fundamental of the secular regime, and it is on secular state's responsibility to prevent anything that would change the secular essence of the state.

Yet, there are certain endeavors to curb the strict comprehensiveness and authoritativeness of secularism. The reason is mostly the resurgence of religion which means a more assertive, fundamental religious worldview's vivid presence in the public sphere, and demands from political power. In the next chapter, firstly, I will investigate the argument that secularism is in crisis due to the resurgent religion, and religiously pluralistic societies. I will argue for the validity of the crisis claim. The inclination both as a response to this resurgent religion and the search for non-authoritative secularism seems to aim eliminating the comprehensive and commanding quality of secularism and open the public sphere to religious arguments. Secondly, I will analyze two endeavors that intend to make secularism more inclusive, less commanding, and more participatory. I will investigate Political theorist Rajeev Bhargava's 'principled distance' concept, as an alternative that is more sensitive to rights than political secularism. After that, I will focus on German philosopher Jürgen Habermas's construction of post-secular society, as an alternative to constitutional secularism. Whether these alternatives and the probability that they could offer to alleviate the authoritativeness of secularism and become a more egalitarian and inclusive option without giving up secularism altogether will be the subject matter of the following chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE QUEST FOR NON-AUTHORITATIVE SECULARISM

After elaborating on the distinction between political and constitutional secularism, and laying down the authoritative and exclusionary qualities of secularism in the constitutional version, we should look at the endeavors which offer alternative visions without giving up secularism altogether, while acknowledging that the comprehensive and authoritative aspects of secularism could cause problems. Is non-authoritative secularism possible? This is the question that I will look for an answer to in this chapter.

As a result of immigration and the ensuing religious diversity, the relationship between religion and politics, mostly in ‘western’ countries, has become a subject of contestation. (Bader, 2003: 3) There is even an argument for a contemporary crisis of secularism. (Scherer, 2010) This new development has revealed a new situation that secularism could not have been approached in the same way as before. After 9/11, there is increased attention to the ‘resurgence of religion’ which needs to be evaluated carefully. One might argue that the resurgence of religion is associated with the failure of the secularization theory. In other words, religion did not fade away for good as the theory has envisaged. Thus, the position of religion in the public political sphere and the number of religious components in political speeches, and secularization have become the subject of scholarly interest. (Müller, 2017: 1) It is argued that while the discourse of the ‘resurgence of religion’ challenges secularism, the fact that societies have become religiously diversified has unveiled a necessity that the secular relationship between the state and religions; (which ostensibly has been detected as the separation of religion and the state, and the privatization of religion), should be addressed in a disparate way. I will investigate this calling for a requirement for a new approach to secularism. One

might give credit to the argument that the challenge is against the secular rationale that determines the criterion of accepting ideas in the public political sphere. As I already covered in the previous chapters, secularism determines the amount that religion could occupy in the public political sphere. Such determination works out according to a criterion of reciprocity: only the opinions that could have been understood and accessible by everybody would be valid and could be claimed in the public political sphere. (Smith, 2014: 536) As defended by public reason liberalism, the coercion of political power, the laws could be justified only for reasons that are expected to be endorsed by everybody. (Vallier, 2011: 261) This criterion of understanding labels an argument a reasonable one. Any argument that could not have been accepted as conceivable by everybody cannot be claimed in the public sphere. Religious arguments are deemed to be inconceivable because that religious arguments are not expected to be accessible by everybody. The challenge of the discourse of the ‘resurgence of religion’ could be understood as against this criterion of reciprocity. Because when religion becomes more active in society, and religious ideas based on religious rationale pervade in the air, how is the public to be shaped? This is pertinent to secularism altogether, and constitutional secularism in particular. Is secularism really in crisis? This will be the subject matter of this chapter.

In the first section, I will cover the arguments directed at secularism in crisis discourse and the validity of these claims. After that, I will focus on Rajeev Bhargava’s concept called ‘*principled distance*’ which stripped secularism from a generic approach and suggests a contextual, or situational approach which means implementing secularism case by case, depending on the relevant circumstances. In the third section, I will examine Jürgen Habermas’s offer as the post-secular reason which requires both religious and secular people to review their standpoints before one another in the public sphere. Habermas’s suggestion resembles what I have outlined as constitutional secularism. I will investigate the possibility that his theoretical consideration might ease the assertive claims of religious actors. I will

discuss whether these endeavors could be successful to lay out a non-authoritative version of secularism by providing a more egalitarian and inclusive alternative to the political and exhaustive versions have sustained in the past.

3.1.The Revitalization of Religion and The Crisis of Secularism

Before claiming that secularism is in crisis, it is worth investigating whether this is a valid interpretation. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, it is argued that religious diversity has become the foremost issue in secular regimes in Western Europe, and this new situation disclosed the incapability of secularism. (Turner, 2007: 123) Such argumentation is based on a perspective that has been grasping secularism as a means for the statecraft. In other words, the view that sees secularism as a governmental tool suggests that secularism is in crisis because societies were transforming, and becoming religiously active and plural, and secularism could not come up with proper solutions to the problems which have been allegedly caused by diversity. Recall that, in the first chapter, I have indicated that secularism is not only a tool but a comprehensive worldview whose purpose is to constitute a better life in this world independent from religions and all transcendental commands. I have also suggested that the relationship between secularism and religion is not static. In other words, secularism manages and controls religion and determines the extent that religion could occupy in society, again and again. It is a constantly ongoing process. What we can infer from this suggestion is that secularism is regulating the level of the activity of religion, let alone secularism is about being separated from religious issues. This quality of secularism is effective for three versions altogether. Thus, I have claimed in the second chapter that the separation thesis is not sufficiently defining secularism. However, as the way Turner has pointed out in the literature, seeing secularism as a political tool is devoid of a holistic approach, and thus misses the point that secularism already includes the management of religion. Therefore, the claim that secularism is in crisis is

associated with the perception of secularism which comprehends it as a governmental tool.

Another deficiency of understanding secularism as a governmental tool ensues a misperception that secularism is a vague term which might also indicate the crisis argument. (Bader, 2010: 9) The literature is rich in terms of qualifying secularisms: passive and assertive, radical and moderate, strong and weak, etc. I have mentioned some of these terms. Although, these endeavors to explain the characteristic of secularism might be confusing, I have sketched a typology for secularism to comprehend the essential characteristics and to make the term as obvious as possible. However, secularism is not a particular political ideology. For instance, you can adopt a liberal or a socialist worldview to build a political regime that serves the best interest of people, to live a satisfactory and more meaningful life here in this world, and both are interpreted under the umbrella of secularism. Secularism does not indicate which one, liberal or socialist, you should choose because both ideologies are secular, and both could serve the earthly wellness of people. Secularism could not be criticized as incapable because secularism is not a political ideology, but I have suggested and defended in this study that secularism is inclined to be a worldview. There is a difference. From my point of view, this is not the reason for secularism to be a vague, or fuzzy concept. Bader's criticism that secularism is a misleading concept might be based on the approach in the literature that does not succinctly explain what political secularism or constitutional secularism is, but only ascribes secularism as a political project, a governmental tool which divides religious and secular authority. He argues that it is not clear which values, or principles secularism stands for. As I mentioned earlier, secularism is not adopting a liberal or socialist worldview, and it is not expected to do so. Secularism does not have to be a liberal discourse, either. Stephen Macedo refers to the core beliefs of liberalism and one of them is the centrality of freedom. (Macedo, 1992: 204) Secularism aims to free people from the authority of religion, this is salient mostly in exhaustive and political versions. However, getting rid of

religion's commands does not signify a form of liberalism simultaneously. Secularism and liberalism are two different units of analysis. In other words, secularism does not necessarily connote a liberal political regime. For instance, toleration might be considered as ought to be a central value of secularism and it would be intelligible given the fact that religions are not inclined to give much space to toleration. But there is no necessity intrinsic in secularism that it is a discourse of liberal toleration. However, this does not create an ambiguity because secularism has no such promise to establish a liberal regime. Thus, criticizing secularism from the angle that it is not compatible with liberalism is one thing but claiming that this would cause ambiguity which might lead to the crisis about secularism is another one. Criticizing secularism as it is not a liberal ideology does not correspond to the crisis argument. Because this implies that if secularism becomes a liberal discourse, there would be no conflict. This does not seem like a conceivable argument. The reason for the conflict between religion and secularism is the different grasping of the world, human happiness, and different approaches toward reason.

Bader is apparently looking for a detailed program in secularism and when he could not find it, he perceives secularism as a term that tells a lot of things and does not tell anything at the same time. He offers a minimalist conception of liberal-democratic constitutionalism which is a minimalist moralism as well that covers civic and political rights as well as equal respect and individual tolerance. (2010: 10) From this way of thinking, Bader suggests secularism does not clarify which rights or principles it is defending and that causes uncertainty. However, secularism does not promise to give a list of principles and how they ought to be implemented. Secularism is a discourse which constitutes itself mostly contrary to religion, as a worldview, not as a particular political ideology. Secularism could be effective in putting either individual or community to the center of the discourse. The reason that I have classified secularism as a comprehensive worldview which is prone to be an ideology is that in the exhaustive and political versions of secularism, the

counter position to religion is too strong, and to maintain this powerful position against religion, secularism comes up with more counter-arguments to religions' comprehensive commands and this dimension of secularism creates its authoritativeness. Determining which dress people are allowed to wear in public, what food they are allowed to eat, which activities they are allowed to do, and how they should execute a public conversation, which epistemological source they should take seriously makes secularism comprehensive, and closer to being like an ideology. At this point, ideology is not referred to as a negative indicator. The consequence of operating like an ideology has negative impacts for religious people as I have indicated in the previous chapters. The reason for criticism of secularism in terms of its ideological inclination is these negative impacts which cause exclusionary effects. Therefore, criticizing secularism's comprehensiveness and claiming that it is a vague term are two different debates. Thus, one should argue that, Bader's criticism seems a bit unfair.

The scope of secularism is not being handled with great care, instead, secularism is approached as a taken-for-granted concept. This attitude corresponds to the misleading conclusion about secularism that it is in crisis because of the 'resurgence of religion' phenomenon. However, secularism has already a response to religion's effectiveness in society which I have investigated in the constitutional secularism section in the previous chapter. If this response could not have been considered a plausible way to solve the problems that have been triggered by the 'resurgence of religion', then there is a need for a new discourse or a policy, and this is completely another debate. To be clear, positioning itself against religions, secularism adopts an attitude against the commands, and values of religions. It is a comprehensive discourse, especially in exhaustive and political versions, because the secularization of society is defended, the secularity of the state is defended, and it rejects revelation and any other transcendental form as the source of reaching knowledge and instead, locates reason as the chief category to observe and understand the world. In constitutional secularism, the comprehensiveness of

secularism gets weak but it is still an authoritative discourse for the most part. Hence, secularism does not indicate if the regime is liberal or not. Moreover, from George Holyoake's writings, we can deduce that it is aimed secularism that people become reflexive, and autonomous, to think and criticize the social reality without any intervention. This aim would necessitate reflexivity, personal autonomy, and individuality which are liberalism's values. (Macedo, 1992: 223) Yet, this does not mean secularism overlaps with liberalism, not necessarily. Thus, comparing secularism and liberal-democratic constitutionalism, or more generally with liberalism, is not convenient. From the argument of secularism is in crisis, Bader's criticism of secularism does not look well-founded.

Recall that I have argued how secularism, in three versions, implements equality, and freedom of worship in public service. By not regulating the working hours according to a religious time, secularism indeed restricts the freedom of worship, and I have claimed that this is compatible with secularism's rationale. When religious actors suddenly become assertive, secularism employs its principle and limits the range of how these actors could conduct. However, there were political developments that have been displaying religious actors' political ambitions, indicating that secularism may not be the way to deal with such assertive religion. The Danish cartoon affair, Salman Rushdie incident, questions relating to Islam and terrorism, the instances such as the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978-79, the civil war between Communists and Islamists in Afghanistan in 1978, the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91, 9/11 terror attacks in 2001 on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the US have indicated religious actors' assertiveness, willingness to use violence to get political ends, and aim for more political power. Political desires of religious actors, and using violence as a political tool would change the game, might overthrow secularism, and establish theocratic regimes. Based on the malaise toward modernity, secularization, and humiliation toward their lifestyles, removing certain groups of people, religious groups in particular, from political decision processes might actually help to explain this resurgence of religion. (Riesebrodt,

2000: 283) However, the desires of these groups would be an existential threat to secularism. If religious actors attack secular institutions and violate the constitution by violence in constitutional secularism, the precedented precaution would be increasing the restriction on religion's legitimate area in society, and leveling up the intensity of secularism which would make the regime inclining towards political or exhaustive secularism. Yet, the discontent with this response of secularism and its implication to the crisis reveals a requirement for a new discourse. In other words, the violence threat pushes the question of a different solution that would eliminate the violence of religious actors. The defenders of the crisis argument are implying that religious actors were not crossing the line that secularism drew between public and private realms, and they were welcoming the space that secularism has left themselves before, however, it is implied that this welcoming has changed and the crisis emerged. One should, rather consider interpreting this phenomenon as a symptom of the intrinsic conflict between secularism and religion rather than a crisis of secularism. Because since the beginning, secularism constructed itself against a religious mindset. The possibility of conflict between secularism and religion is permanent. Therefore, the discourse of the resurgence of religion is theoretically not a brand new phenomenon, but a politically probable prospect which is intrinsic to secularism. Nevertheless, knowing the motives of the resurgence of religion might help in grasping how serious the threat that it poses to secularism is.

Scott Thomas suggests that Pentecostalism and Evangelical Christianity are on the rise, also more people claim that Islam is more important in their lives. (Thomas, 2010: 94) The indicators for Pentecostals and Evangelical Christians are to believing the ultimate authority of the Bible, and the necessity of proselytizing Christianity to non-Christians. For Islam, more women wear the veil, more men grow beards, and more Muslims attend Mosques more often. (2010: 95) Given these facts, it is conceivable to expect that more religious imagination would encompass people's intellectual and daily lives and this could affect the political

arena. Religious actors could start to claim institutional power, and religious-based opinions would need to find their reflection in the law-making process and laws as well. Then, it is highly likely to erupt a conflict at the institutional level in the regime. Because the attack of religion is to the secular rationale. Recall that the main opposition of secularism is to the institutional establishment of religion. In that case, the conflict would end up establishing a theocratic regime. If so, what would be the proper approach between secularism and religious actors without falling into conflict? In other words, how could secularism be modified? In the following section, Rajeev Bhargava offers a distinct type of implementation of secularism that is called principled distance. I will investigate Bhargava's conception and evaluate whether principled distance could be a grounded and plausible solution in the face of the resurgence of the religion.

3.2.Prospect of Contextual Secularism: Rajeev Bhargava and The Concept of Principled Distance

Rajeev Bhargava offers a solution to ease the strict ideological nature of secularism and tries to illuminate the promise of secularism as being neutral and treating believers and non-believers impartially. But before looking at how Bhargava conceives secularism in terms of equality and freedom for both religious and irreligious people, let me look at his views about the separation.

Rajeev Bhargava is a political theorist who studies political theory, multiculturalism and secularism, and identity politics. He identifies secularism basically as contrary to the social and political hegemony of institutionalized religion. According to him, secularism is a normative doctrine. It is an administrative tool with an ideological meaning rather than solely a neutral principle. (2013: 20) Bhargava takes secularism as political secularism. He claims that secularism requires the separation of religion and politics for certain reasons. First, it is in order to make sure an egalitarian system because the underlying reason is to promote equality between all

religions, believers and non-believers. Second, it requires separation because the autonomy of individuals should be strengthened. The underlying value is personal autonomy. Third, neither religion nor politics could dictate and shape the human mind. Fourth, the separation is necessary because the division of powers of representative institutions must be ensured to prevent the intensification of political power in one agent. The other reason for the necessity of separation is the coercive character of the state. And finally, Bhargava points out the problem of the clash of ultimate ideals from different views. To secure basic goods, and to live a decent life, all the ultimate ideals must be excluded from the state and religion. Because religious or this-worldly ultimate ideals could cause suffering, to sacrifice from living a decent life in this world. (1999: 489-91) Therefore, for Bhargava, separation is necessary. At this point, one could say that Bhargava's arguments imply his inclination toward the constitutional version of secularism by rejecting the worldview aspects of both religion and secularism altogether. However, Bhargava does not leave both sides as they were. Thus, one may ask how is it possible to remove the ultimate ideals from religion. To live in accord with a rules book that determines what is good and what is bad could be considered the basic indicator of a devout life. Eliminating the ultimate ideals might connote telling religious people that 'do not live entirely according to your belief'. Nevertheless, Bhargava suggests that both secular and religious people ought to back down from the comprehensive understanding of their beliefs. Let alone the feasibility to stop being devout in life, Bhargava's suggestion might be considered too demanding that would alter the life of people. Therefore, it is not a version of constitutional secularism. Bhargava tries to set secularism apart from its worldview basis. Bhargava takes separation as the solution for the state to stay away from religion, and people's autonomy. So he deals with secularism as a formal principle of governance. On the other hand, he does not give up the ideals of secularism altogether. Nevertheless, one may argue that the separation of religious and political institutions is not capable of providing those aims that Bhargava pointed out. Because separation is just a formal regulation. However, according to Bhargava,

separation is important even though it does not indicate anything regarding the culture of secularism in a country other than formal regulations.

Bhargava points out that political secularism requires three levels of disconnection between religion and politics: the level of ends, the level of institutions, and the level of law and public policy. (2009: 89) Accordingly, states with the established institutional religious body would have some degree of connection with the levels of ends, law, and policy. If there is an established religious institution, it connotes that the political power might use the religious body for political gains. For instance, the female dress code is a controversial topic and the center of secularism debates. For Bhargava, if there is an officially recognized institutional religious body, then the political power might inflict something about how men and women ought to dress in public spaces which is an imposition of a will on people. This would have been observed in the laws and public policies. This would cause inequalities and violations of the freedom of individuals. Because there would be the coercive force of the law that constrain people about their paths of living in this world based on a religious view. On the other hand, states with no religious establishments would have no connection with the three levels whatsoever. Actually, this does not seem to be an accurate argument. I mean not necessarily but the states with no religious establishment as well would cause constrain on people's dress. As in most European countries, particularly in France, women with headscarves are a problem because it is grasped as a threat to France's secular unity, and identity. (The Guardian, 2016) France has no religious establishment and articulates in its constitution that it is a secular country. Bhargava does not conceive secularism as including the management of religion, and this led him to think that if the connection between the official religious body and political power has been cut out, then secularism would have no impact on religion. This seems to be inappropriate reasoning and therefore it would have misleading consequences. At least at the level of ends, whether there is a recognition of an official establishment of a religious institution or not may not make any significant difference.

In terms of the law and public policy level, states may take different stands. They may completely exclude religion from the public political sphere and intervene without any restriction. This sort of implementation is not looking for the religious freedom of individuals, therefore they intervene in the religious community's own practices without any measure for justification and fail to indicate how religious practices would violate one of the fundamental values, like toleration of differences or religious equality. According to Bhargava, this is a rights-based implementation, which is called one-sided exclusion. This is an example of an exhaustive secularism that comprehensively encompasses the public political sphere. The second view can be called mutual exclusion: in this model, religion and secularism coexist like total strangers. They are not allowed to get into their own issues. Thus, not only religion is excluded from the state, but the state is also excluded from religion as well. Bhargava describes these two stands as the republican and liberal conceptions of secularism which we observe the first one in France and the latter in the USA. (2009: 92-93) At this point, he argues that the actual purpose is to protect fundamental rights; religious freedom, and equality between the believer and non-believer, and secularism is the proper mean to do it. In this way, secularism can be understood as a second-order principle, not an end in itself. For instance, states cannot impose any law on their citizens about how they wear, or what they believe. Therefore, we can conclude that, according to his arguments, states with an established institutional religious body do not show secular characteristics. On the other hand, Bhargava suggests that secularism in the Soviet Union, or Kemalist Turkey, and France too, is not motivated by protecting and promoting fundamental rights like religious freedom, equality, and personal autonomy. These are the historical instances that we can call secularist secularism, and seeing secularism as the end in itself. Thus, Bhargava is against this sort of secularism as well. States cannot treat some of their citizens as secondary or privileged because of a religious or secular belief. He asserts that states should take a stand to eliminate secularist views in government which is called "principled distance".

Bhargava further argues that there must be a separation between state and religion at the levels of ends and institutions. Yet, at the level of public policy and law, the official attitude ought to be contextual and open to interpretation. (Modood & Sealy, 2022 :5) This is the first component of what he called “principled distance”. It is not an absolute position that rejects religion as an irrational category, it accepts the situation that people may have transcendental beliefs and this may require social practice and public visibility. Religion could be employed as an identity as well. Principled distance does not lead to prioritizing these beliefs and practices, but it acknowledges their possibility of existence. The second component of principled distance is treating people or groups as equals. (Bhargava, 2009: 103-5; 2012: 78-9; 2013a: 34-6) What does this mean? Bhargava points out that some religious groups might seek exemptions from the requirement of the law. The Muslim headscarf is the most prominent example. For instance, Muslim women want to wear a headscarf in public service. They claim it as a requirement of their belief, but the regime of secularism forbids them to wear any ostentatious religious symbols in the public political sphere. This is accurate for exhaustive and political versions. For constitutional secularism, the state might employ such a restriction, or not, on a religious symbol which, in both cases, I would interpret as a consistent implementation. Bhargava says principled distance may respond to this demand based on the context. It does not reject or affirm automatically. It refuses categorical decisions. This is a situational and contextual interpretation. States could allow Muslim citizens to wear the headscarf in one country and do the exact opposite in another country. This is the differential treatment in which Bhargava finds the essential idea of principled distance. There is no strict line between state and religion. On the other hand, the principled distance could be applied to protect fundamental rights, it could be ineluctable to intervene in religious practices in such conditions. The difference between the principled distance from one-sided exclusion is the measure of intervention. From this way of argumentation, Bhargava indirectly admits that secularism determines the range of religion. If it becomes necessary, secularism could interfere with religion’s internal teachings or practices,

which discards the ascribed impartiality of the state that would have been ensured by the separation of religious and secular institutions.

The idea of principled distance is affirmative for secularism as a means to promote fundamental values, basic rights, and liberties of the citizens which imply the worldview aspect of secularism. Bhargava considers secularism as the context-sensitive way of implementation. He is criticizing liberal secularism in the following way: when people want to act on their religious rationale, liberal secularism entails that, if people's religious rationale is not justifiable for every person in society then, they must abandon their religious-motivated action which would unveil the problem of equal respect. Because people would have to put, perhaps, their conscience, and morals aside to get in line with other members of society, because their actions are not justifiable for everybody. (2013b: 83) This would imply an authoritative characteristic, not a ground that everybody can agree on to debate, discuss, and decide. What Bhargava suggests as a way out from this is a contextual understanding of secularism. He points out that the values, religious freedom, and equality of citizenship should be elevated and states could intervene in a religious practice when there is a violation of religious equality and religious freedom. However, he does not provide a standard regarding how the values like equality, religious freedom, or respect for differences could be interpreted. Bhargava indicates that to support equality, the state might support certain religious practices. At this point, he refers to the religious minority groups, for instance, the Muslims in Europe. States might support certain practices of Muslims and forbid some others. (2013b: 84) However, if Muslim women want to wear a headscarf in the public political sphere and in public service as well, keeping in mind the fact that it is a visible religious sign, when does it become against secularism? Or, in his own words, who decides what is right and properly secular? Surely, a constitutional secular regime might give permission to religious symbols in public service, everybody already could prefer their dress in accord with their religion in the public sphere. This is not against the essence of secularism as constantly constitutes itself

and religion. However, his answer is that the decision of what is properly secular must be taken with the participation of all sides that were being affected. (2013b: 88) All the relevant agents should gather, discuss and decide. Thus, in the headscarf debate, state officials and Muslim women, or the agents that represent them, will come together and have a debate on what creates a contradiction with secularism and what does not. And this might include the definition of secularism as well. They might discuss what is properly secular, and which practices could be understood under secularism. Moreover, state officials would be in touch with religious groups, and minority groups to understand and discuss the practices that they were claiming as their identity, or cultural, traditional legacy. These are the suggestions for policy and decisions in contextual and situational approaches. One could point out that what Bhargava offers is exceeding the limits of secularism that have been conceptualized in this study. Accordingly, Bhargava defends a participatory deliberative process for every party in society to define and determine their positions. This approach goes beyond the rule-maker characteristic of secularism; on the other hand, Bhargava still embraces the idea that the principles could be maintained by secularism. Under constitutional secularism, people could gather and discuss, and participate in the policy-making processes as well. However, Bhargava does not indicate anything peculiar with secularism being the constitutive agent.

Recall that I have mentioned the limits of constitutional secularism in the previous chapter. For instance, you cannot establish a political party, participate in the democratic process and advocate a theocratic regime. That is the limitation. On the other hand, according to Bhargava, people could deliberate and decide what actions would be permitted under secularism by themselves. Even though it does seem like the basic action of popular sovereignty is that people make the rules, there is a limit that indicates what is secularism and what is not. This limit is the institutional authority of religion. People can decide any activity such as making rules is open to be based upon a religious rationale. However, this cannot be considered a secular

regime anymore. Bhargava does not advocate the secularity of society, but the secularity of the state which he believes is the assurance of the neutrality of the state. For instance, what we could infer from Bhargava, the state could permit religious praying during public service hours in one situation, and forbid it in another situation. And this is being defended by Bhargava as providing equality. However, if people decide to ban abortion in a deliberative process, then it might not be a problem for Bhargava. One may argue that, it could be legitimate because the majority could agree upon it, but regulation could not be evaluated as a secular one. Thus, presumably, the participatory deliberation is inconsistent with the ideals that Bhargava stands for because his theoretical scope is too relative. Without giving up secularism altogether, he defends a mixture that promotes and protects basic rights and freedoms, and the ideals of secularism. This mixture could trigger the question of whether secularism is still prevailed without being the constitutive agent, or how the ideals and the deliberative process could be conducted. On the other hand, given the importance of the participatory deliberative process, it is questionable whether in his mind is a constitutional version of secularism.

Bhargava ostensibly refers to a standard that if a political speech made some people feel offended, or excluded, then it violates equality and equal citizenship, and thus, secularism. However, to adapt it to the headscarf issue, if a government policy dictates people not to wear any visible-religious symbol in public, and if this made Muslim women feel excluded, then it is intelligible to say that this policy is violating secularism. Under such circumstance, the standard for evaluating what is coherent with secularism and what is not is the feeling of being offended and excluded. He points out contextual-based secularism, thinking by the situation is an alternative to the conflicts that could not be disentangled by a general *a-priori* rule. But if secularism is a normative doctrine, which Bhargava does consider as it is, it should set forth some form of administration “better” than others, and to endorse this claim, there should be some sort of clear principles. For Bhargava, the principle is to protect basic rights and values. However, he suggests people decide the

measures regarding basic rights and freedoms. In that case, Bhargava seemingly has a contemplation in his mind associated with the protection of basic rights and freedoms, yet it is the people who would make the decision. This is inconsistent. Perhaps, it is safe to argue that Bhargava fails to display how his offer is not authoritative and still secular. The reason that I have claimed that constitutional secularism is still an authoritative version of secularism for the most part, and it has to be that way was that the regime has to protect certain rights and freedoms not according to religions and draw certain lines before religious arguments, which makes the regime not impartial, either. Bhargava suggests the separation of religious and political institutions, yet he does not indicate how political power could protect this separation. Thus, the principled distance concept might not be considered a constitutional version of secularism. As a normative doctrine, he should have indicated certain points instead of letting people decide even the definition of secularism. Thus, from my point of view, his alternative approach fails to show the possibility of a non-authoritative version of secularism. The deliberative process is too open to reach any conclusion. Thus, the deliberative process might be the weakest part of his theory. Bhargava's solution to the resurgence of religion is to reduce the comprehensiveness of secularism. Even though the principled distance does not show comprehensive characteristics, it is a way too relativistic approach toward secularism that even categorizing it as secularism might be contentious.

A prevalent response of secularism to a more visible and pretentious religious discourse in the public political sphere is to prompt a more protective and exclusionary attitude. However, this approach would not appease the religious insurgency. Bhargava offered a rights-based and context-sensitive approach to secularism. Current incidents in India might help to understand as an example of the strictness of secularism and its position before the more pretentious religion. Accordingly, in Karnataka region, wearing a headscarf in classrooms has been banned and the high court upheld this decision. Consequently, the decision gave

rise to protests by Muslim students and parents as well as counter-protests by Hindu students. (Al Jazeera and News Agencies, 2022) The reason for the Karnataka high court's decision is that they qualify the headscarf as not an essential part of Islam. By interpreting this way, the court intervened in a religion's internal teaching and make a decision about what is essential for religious practice and what is not. This is what I have described as secularism's determination of drawing a scope to religion which might be understood as an expected response from a secular state before a persistent religious activity. Moreover, the court's decision does elevate counter-protests as well. Hindu groups suggest India is a Hindu Nation and the ban ought to be widened in more regions. (Al Jazeera News Agencies, 2022) This is a good example of the conflictual nature of the secularism-religion relationship.

Within the 'resurgence of religion' phenomenon, it is disputable that religious identity is taken as the defining element of a nation, such as 'India is a Hindu Nation' as the above incident, or 45% of Americans consider 'The U.S. should be a Christian Nation'. (Pew Research Center, 2022) On the other hand, German philosopher Jürgen Habermas refers to the resurgence of religion as being observed all around the world, and it is prone to generate national or ethnic conflicts, and these two instances justify Habermas. (Habermas, 2006: 1) Thus, a resurgent, persistent religion challenges secularism and calls for possibly a new discourse. In the following section, I will focus on Habermas's post-secular alternative to the resurgence of religion.

3.3.Making Constitutional Secularism More Open: Jürgen Habermas and The Deliberative Process in The Public Sphere

Recall that I have indicated the challenge of the resurgence of religion to secularism is to the secular rationale. Religion is given a priority to be the basis of political representation and justification. (Modood, 2011: 134) Religion is not only desired to be visible but become the fundamental of a regime. Habermas indicates that the

constitutional freedom of religion could be the appropriate response to the challenge of religious pluralism. (Habermas, 2006: 4; 2019: 118) Accordingly, the constitutional freedom of religion could diminish the potential conflicts between different existential opinions of believers, believers of different denominations, and non-believers. Habermas suggests that the secular quality of the state is mandatory to guarantee equal freedom of religion but this is not a sufficient condition. The parties should negotiate the different perspectives, secular and religious perspectives, and be eager to learn from the other one's experience. Where the line between the negative freedom of the ones who need protection from religious implementations and the positive freedom of the ones who want to pursue a religious life ought to be determined by both parties. And to realize this learning process, what we need is tolerance in front of rival worldviews. Habermas wants religious and secular people to understand each other in deliberative participation. Apparently, Habermas defends the maintenance of the secularity of the state, however, he does not back up the commanding quality, or may we say the authoritativeness of the secular state. Instead, he indicates that deliberative negotiating and a probable ensuing consensus between these two representatives of rival worldviews should be ensured. (Habermas, 2008: 22) However, the more important thing is deliberation, not consensus. In other words, getting interaction with people who are not like us, and listening to them is the key feature of his theory, not the outcome of deliberation. Maeve Cooke suggests a different interpretation. Accordingly, deliberation is a process that participants were looking for the single right answer. (Cooke, 2007: 228) To find that answer, they should acknowledge the possibility that if their position could not be held acceptable, or just denied, they may have to change or modify their views, approaches, etc. Modification and change would happen, but the single right answer is not the required output, not necessarily. This way of interpreting the subject would lead Habermas to defend the truth of secularism. However, he suggests otherwise.

There are two necessary components of public deliberation: firstly, the equal participation of all parties. Habermas unequivocally lays out the fact that people make laws that would make themselves both subjects to them and owners of them. Given this fact, all sides have to be in the conversation process equally. This implies that religious people ought to grasp secular people as their equals no matter what they believe or do not believe, and vice versa. Secondly, the epistemic dimension that people acknowledge that there would be rationally acceptable consequences of this negotiation. (Habermas, 2006: 5) This consequence is not the single right answer as Cooke suggested. Rather, this means the following: I have to be prepared to argue, presenting ideas in an understandable manner, and the outcome may not be in favor of what I am defending, and I have to accept the consequence. Habermas indicates that I have to accept this outcome because it is a rational consequence of a rational debate. As the self-determination process of this law-making, citizens should respect each other, listen to each other, and be fair and unbiased toward their perspectives. According to Habermas, citizens should give each other good reasons for their proposals. This is not a legal, but a moral necessity to come to a rational-based agreement. This is required for religious and secular people to coexist in a respectful manner in an inclusive civil society. (Habermas, 2008: 23) There is a moral obligation that this negotiation process cannot be operational if a religious party imposes its religious-based arguments onto the secular party or vice versa. For instance, in terms of abortion, Habermas does not indicate a direction that citizens should have followed. Instead, people should argue and articulate their reasons with each other as equal citizens so that the arguments become intelligible for the other party. For instance, a pious person may wish abortion has been banned. He has to articulate why he wishes this ban and the reason could be like 'because it is a sin', or 'because it is just wrong'. Instead of just saying it is a sin, he could explain why he believes it is a sin and why this ban ought to be realized. He could say, for example, that abortion is a violation of the baby's right to live, or it is an obstacle to human proliferation, etc. That person could think of abortion as a sin, yet he has to give a clear, understandable,

proper reason for his choice so that people who do think abortion is not a sin could come to terms. In other words, other people have to understand clearly why he believes abortion is a sin. As it is clear, religious reasons are not confronted with an impediment, however, a religious reason should be articulated to the people who do consider dissimilar ways. Thus, you may consider abortion as a sin, and you can express your thought as a sin, yet, to ensure a sufficient ground for arguing, you have to be more comprehensible. In this case, as Cooke emphasizes later, Habermas does not seem like praising a single right answer that would come out of the deliberation process. Habermas does not request religious people to change their religious-basis views. He understands accessibility, intelligibility, and the secular synonymously. Yet, religious views are not subject to an essential change, and secular ones are as well. This mutual receptive relationship between citizens is setting a distinct way of policy-making than political, and exhaustive secularism has envisaged.

Thomassen argues that Habermas employs a theoretical distinction between political and ethical reasons. For political reasons, there is room for difference, be that religious one. Including the religious other into the secular legal system, religious people have to tolerate secular people and vice versa, and religious people have to accept the common ground 'proviso' for setting the rules. (Thomassen, 2006: 443) In other words, there has to be a consensus between parties on the rules that only the ones that reflect the common interest would be enacted. People from different perspectives on the understanding of the good have to acknowledge that each understanding of the good is equally worthy and relative to one another, and none of them would prevail in a pluralistic society. Such set of deliberation processes rejects the comprehensive-based and commanding-inspired way of constructing the public the political sphere. However, the quality of the regime is still secular which Habermas put forth as it is a way of implementing the constitutional freedom of religion confronting the resurgence of religion in an

impartial manner. James Gordon Finlayson suggests that to better understand Habermas's conception, we should take a glance at his theory of democracy.

Basically, there are two elements that comprised his theory of democracy: the formal public sphere, and the informal public sphere. The formal sphere implies where decisions are made, such as parliaments and courts. The informal public sphere denotes civil society where ideas circulate around and even 'extreme' conversations take place, be they religious or secular. The crucial point, as Finlayson indicated, that we infer from Habermas is these 'extreme' or crazy opinions in the public sphere surround the political system but do not capture the political system. (Finlayson, 2018: 6) These ideas would have gotten the shape of the common interest of citizens and then become a law that everybody could comply with. Because the significance of the law lies in the intelligibility of everyone. This means that I can express my religious statements in an understandable manner to other people, and somebody else can express a secular reason in the same way in the public sphere. However, there seems a problem with this background. Even though that religious reasons could storm out in the public sphere with secular counterparts is not exclusionary to any party of society, but in the law, or in Habermas' terms the formal public sphere, the secularity of the state implies that religious reasons are not allowed to be a source of the law. As Finlayson indicated, religious reasons remain outside of the political system. (2018: 8) In other words, there is a filter that determines what could be counted as a valid source for the political system. However, "only secular reasons count" does not mean Habermas aims to change religious reasons altogether as Cooke highlighted. Because "only secular reasons count" does not mean religious reasons are insignificant, or not worthy. Habermas approaches religious reasons as potentially contributing to discursive process. Nevertheless, going deep with what Habermas suggests as the state being secular might be helpful for qualifying his conception as constitutional secularism or not. For Habermas, the term 'secular' denotes a neutral common ground on which people with different beliefs and non-believers could

reach an agreement. Aside from the fact that earlier I have argued that secularism does not correspond to neutrality, Habermas utilizes the secular distinct from the 'laicist' standpoint which advocates states refraining from adopting or restricting any religious view. (Habermas, 2006: 6) On the other hand, the secular for Habermas evokes an impartial approach toward religious and state institutions. Thus, Habermas invokes the secular as different from what he calls laicist demand, or we could say secularist demand, and give priority to the notion of impartiality. Accordingly, because the secular reflects a neutral perspective, secular reasons could facilitate the development of an inclusive approach around people from different faiths and non-believers which religious reasons are incapable of doing. It is safe to argue that Habermas gives importance to the principle of separation and qualifies this principle as secular. His views on secular reasons and his belief that to achieve a better argument people need to gather around a secular reason is keeping the secular quality of a regime and reveals the barrier to religious reasons which I have outlined in the version of constitutional secularism. Hence, one may question if Habermas contemplates a constitutional version of secularism that is not secularist as a counter-response to the resurgence of religion. To give a better answer, we need to elaborate more.

Habermas indicates the difficulty of transforming religious ideas into secular characters. A pious person does not comprehend his religion in terms of transcendental issues only, but as a comprehensive discourse that surrounds every part of life which includes political issues. In other words, a pious person's religion may not allow distinguishing his existence as a political being from a religious being. Because the comprehensive religion of a person already includes a vision of what is politically accurate and what is not. (Habermas, 2006: 8) Therefore, Habermas gives credit to the predicament of how a pious person could divide his religious and political views. Any person could express his conviction, be that religious, in a free manner in civil society, but in the formal sphere there has to be a change in formulation. Cooke indicated that if there is no change, the whole point

of deliberation becomes futile. (2007: 229) Yet, what Habermas did is to give space to religious people so they could interact with other fellow citizens in civil society and have a chance to be influential in the process of law-making. Therefore, I do not think that it is a futile attempt. This is a chance for religious people because the law eventually would represent the common ground on which each party in society. This implies that religious people could agree upon the secular reason or secular people could agree upon the religious reason which the latter is highly unlikely. Surely, Habermas assumes that religious citizens would acknowledge such a discursive basis. By acknowledging that, they wittingly relinquish to claim any religious-based policy in the law. According to such perspective, one may argue that there is no indiscrimination toward any party, especially religious people because the final law would represent the collective interest which includes not only secular people but religious people as well. On the other hand, one may still assert that considering the comprehensive character of religion, it is questionable that religious interests would have been represented properly ever because ultimately the law would be in a secular character. Because the center of the regime is secular, the game maker is secular. (Thomassen, 2006: 451) Moreover, it is not highly likely for secular people to accept a religious-based argument in a political frame, even if the religious statement is on the secular ground, either. Nevertheless, it is still an appropriate argument even though Finlayson has indicated that criticizing Habermas because he attributed the quality of accessibility and intelligibility to the secular may be a proper but not a fruitful objection. (Finlayson, 2018: 10) Because Habermas already stated that the secularity of the state, and therefore the formal public sphere, is necessary but not a sufficient condition to deal with implementing constitutional freedom of religion.

Habermas is precise about the extent of secularity which he insists on being limited to state institutions only. In other words, the extension of secularity to civil society which implies altering the regime into a political or maybe an exhaustive version of secularism is not defended at all by Habermas. He is absolutely aware that it would

be wrong to assume and expect from religious persons that when they cast vote they should take into account the secular considerations because it would reveal an unawareness pertaining to what requires a sincere religious life. (2006: 9) To be consistent, a devout person follows the path that his religion requires him to do as a political being. Habermas points out that if a devout person accepts the secular language of the law, in other words, the secular character of the formal public sphere, there might occur a conflict between his comprehensive life and what he confirms as rules that would govern himself. Still, even with this recognition of the probability of a conflict, Habermas maintains his consideration that only secular reasons count, and there has to be a separation between politics and religion. He puts forward a necessity that pious people could consider their religious worldviews reflectively and associate them with secular views. Such a condition might be realized but may not be applied to every instance. For instance, a pious person who defends the ban on abortion might give a secular reason to support his view rather than saying it is a sin. On the other hand, in terms of freedom of speech, a pious person may not find an appropriate secular reason to avert any utterance toward a religious symbol or God that is not acceptable to him other than because it is a sin, or it is inappropriate. Under such circumstances, Habermas points out that it should be allowed if they cannot find a secular reason, they could use religious language in the informal public sphere. However, still it is not changing the fact that no matter how they are allowed to express their thoughts in a religious language, the formal public sphere has to be secular to maintain the impartiality of the state, according to Habermas. At this point, Habermas could be criticized in terms of his view on the association of secularism with impartiality. Put political, and exhaustive versions of secularism aside, in constitutional secularism, the regime becomes less restrictive, and less authoritative, but still, not impartial as presented to be. Secularism maintains its worldview disposition even in constitutional secularism by not providing permission for religion to be a constituent of the law because religion is not grasped as a ground that everybody could gather around. I am not suggesting an ideological partiality, but a constitutional secular state cannot confirm religious-

based or revelation-based claims as a source. The intelligibility quality that Habermas has referred to, denotes the non-partiality of secularism because even though religious claims must be understandable, they cannot be legitimately defended in the formal public sphere. You cannot assert that extramarital sexual intercourse should be forbidden by reference to the reasons such as it is a sin or wrong. Contrarily, there is no such imposition on secular reasons as to be understandable to religious people because it is assumed that they are already understandable. All Habermas has achieved is to urge secular people to quit their secularist approach, and be more open, and considerate of religious arguments. Thus, Habermas is right that the secularity of the state is not a sufficient precaution for the resurgence of religion. However, I think his insistence on the secularity of the state's denotation as impartiality is deeply questionable. Therefore, Finlayson might be right in his criticism toward Habermas as he ascribed intelligibility to secular may not be fruitful, nevertheless, the criticism touches upon a crucial point. If the formal public sphere, the parliament, the courts, and the law-making process are opened to religious arguments and if the restriction sets free for religious reasons, this means laws might be formed on a religious basis. As I argued above, secularism and institutional religion are two conflictual and power-demanding discourses. Habermas consistently stands for the secularity of the state because it is not an expected compromise to give religion a space in law. In other words, such compromise might eliminate secularity entirely. And that giving religious discourse the ability to be a source of the law implies that the response to the resurgence of religion would be to give political power to religion which the resurgence discourse already claims for it. However, as the question in this chapter is the prospect of non-authoritative secularism, it would be conceivable to claim that giving religion power in law causes a secular regime might lose its secular quality altogether. Thus, Habermas is consistent with the logic of secularism. On the other hand, Habermas's solution might be perceived as the unfeasibility of non-authoritative secularism. Surely, he does not ask religious people to convert their religion or to approach their faiths suspiciously, but religious people have to change their language and adapt

their manner to be a part of the public debate and political system. Contrary, while being conscious of the difficulty of reaching a consensus and not rejecting the possibility of conflict between secularism and religion as two different sets of imaginaries regarding the world, Habermas points out the power of participation to the discussion of all parties in society and emphasizes the strive for a better agreement. However, there is one condition which gives Habermas's formal public sphere an authoritative character. According to Habermas, there are three social facts that religious believers have to acknowledge. The legitimate presence of other faiths, the position of modern science as possessing the monopoly over knowledge, and presuppositions of liberal democracy: egalitarian law and universalistic morality. (Finlayson, 2018: 13) These three social facts are also the limits that secularism could tolerate religion.

Habermas points out that religious people have to find a way to approach other faiths, they have to think reflectively about their beliefs and the other beliefs that claim the truth. Surely Habermas does not imply religious people adopt a skeptical way of thinking about their own beliefs. Rather, without quitting loyalty to their faith, they need to find a way to cooperate, to get in touch, and to argue with other people from other faiths or with non-believers. The epistemic monopoly of science as rejecting revelation and other transcendental sources of knowledge ought to be accepted by religious people. This is perhaps the most difficult and ostensibly unfeasible one. Accordingly, people should look for ways to draw a delicate line between their dogma and this world's knowledge. However, accepting that modern science is the way to learn and to know about the world and revelation is not, might cause an identity crisis for religious people. People may have different positions regarding modern science and revelation. Some people might accept revelation and not completely reject modern science. A religious person might accept the superiority of revelation and adopt an instrumental approach to science at the same time. However, one may argue that accepting the only way to learn the knowledge of this world is modern science rejects the availability of revelation in people's

lives. Because when they accept the religious ruling and this becomes the defining condition of their identity and life, it might be difficult to change it. For instance, a devout person believes in a rule which commands the obligation of preventing the bad. And he believes that extramarital intercourse is bad. On the other hand, he would listen to Habermas and acknowledge that modern science has nothing to do with how wrong extramarital intercourse is. In a public debate, one party claims people could be in a relationship with anybody, and he claims that extramarital affairs should not be forbidden. How is it possible for him to argue without contradicting his own belief that extramarital intercourse is bad and he has to prevent this from happening, at least by rejecting it? By not rejecting the three facts Habermas advises him, he becomes vulnerable to an identity crisis and also he realizes the situation that he has to compromise his faith. Even though Habermas is cautious about the difficulty of something like this, he pursues setting the ground according to the secular. Lastly, Habermas suggests that religious people should accommodate egalitarian law and universal morality within their comprehensive religious doctrines. (Habermas, 2006: 14; 2019: 134) The argument that these three social facts that Habermas has outlined signify a burden over the religious people is worth investigating. Because Habermas also urges secular citizens to relinquish their secularist understanding of modernity. The secularist perspective has to be taken away and instead, a position that indicates an intention to be eager, willing to cooperate, and thus keen on learning, at least understand, from a religious perspective should be adopted. According to Habermas, the process should be based on reciprocity. Religious people should not deny the entrenched institutional existence of secular knowledge, and secular people should be willing to learn from religious traditions or practices. Thus, Habermas denies the objection that there is an asymmetrical burden on religious people over accessible language. A person who supports the abortion ban based on the reason that it is a sin because it is violating the fetus's right to live could defend his claim in the public political sphere. As it is seen, the underlying reason could be the belief in sin, however, there

has to be an explanation for why you believe it is a sin. Compared with Habermas, there is a more resilient approach toward religion in the public sphere.

Habermas seemingly offers a constitutional version of secularism which is more open(inclusive and welcoming) toward religion, but still, his suggestions concerning post-secularism carry authoritative essence. Paul Weithmann, on the other hand, contemplates more open approach toward religion in the public sphere which might give us an insight. Paul Weithmann opens the door wide in the public sphere for religious arguments to play constitutive roles. Accordingly, he suggests that citizens could employ religious arguments in the public political discussion, they could count on their comprehensive religious worldview, and there is no legal or moral obligation for them to make their arguments understandable to other fellow citizens. (Weithmann, 2002: 3) Weithmann refers to people could use their religious doctrine in a political discussion and express it in a religious language but they have to declare the reason they consider would justify their religious thought. (Weithmann, 2002: 121) However, this is different from what Habermas's indicated as translation into a secular language. Because according to Habermas, people owe each other good reasons that they have to be accessible, and understandable to everybody. On the contrary, Weithmann does not suggest such a reciprocal civil responsibility. People who state a religious argument in public do not have to offer an accessible reason. (2002: 124) According to Weithmann, disagreement between people from different perspectives is reasonable. In other words, the collective interest of society does not have to occur as everybody concurred on a certain policy in a certain language, be that secular. However, there is a requirement that people who decide to use a religious reason in a public political argument have to follow which is to give a justifying reason to other people on why he offers that religious reason other than anything else.

One might question the difference between this justifying reason of Weithmann and Habermas's accessible language. There is quite a similarity in that for Habermas you cannot claim your religious-based political choice without telling people the

reason why you support it and for Weithmann, you have to give the reason behind your religious position as well. Hence, they both require people to engage in argumentation in an open, explanatory manner toward one another. Here, Weithmann makes a distinction between public political discussion and voting. (2002: 126) The requirement that pertains to the public political discussion is that you should persuade the other party. To advocate your own view, you have to give cogent reasons to ensure that the other side stands with you. However, voting is a completely different activity which does not necessitate everybody else's persuasion. Thus, Weithmann points out that people could utilize religious reasons while voting and they do not have to offer the justification for why they rely on that religious reason and what makes this decision justified. For instance, a person could vote against abortion. He does not have to explain the reason why he is opposing. He might consider this is as an act of persistence to God and there is no obligation on him to clear his position. On the other hand, before voting when he discusses with his fellow citizens it would be fair if he offered convincing arguments. He is allowed to use the same religious reason that he would utilize when voting. However, it would be efficacious to tell other citizens the justifying reason behind his decision. There might be good reasons for banning abortion and yet, these reasons are better to be addressed to others. Nevertheless, Weithmann suggests that knowing our political position while voting is not a duty of responsible citizenship. (2002: 129) This is where Weithmann differs from Habermas. In other words, it would be precious if I know why I cast my vote against abortion and the reason behind why others vote against abortion. My fellow citizen could persuade me with his decision on the topic. But it is not a duty for others to tell me the reason for my opposition to abortion. To tell the justifying reason for my religious position might be an obligation for myself to be consistent, not for others. I could think an extramarital affair is a sin and advocate that it should be forbidden, and vote accordingly. This is an unreasonable situation for Habermas. Because Habermas employs reasonableness and accessibility as being understood by everybody from each belief and non-believers no matter what is the opinion. According to

Habermas, disagreements would be unleashed in the public political argument. Contrary, Weithmann suggests that the disagreement between people from different faiths ought to be received as reasonable, and no need to be resolved, not necessarily. The disagreement might be undesirable, but what people vote for might not be what we contemplate about our political regime. However, still, this disagreement is reasonable because Weithmann does not employ the duty of citizenship as Habermas did.

Weithmann refers to those religious organizations which could facilitate people's realization of being a citizen. In other words, I could look at the church's functions in society and this could affect my understanding of being a citizen. I could start taking responsibility for being affected by the church's activities. Weithmann calls it realized citizenship, which embraces religious institutions and circulates religious ideas in, both, the formal and informal public sphere. This is the point where Weithmann's scope becomes more open to religions. I could use my experience of observing the church's organizations when voting, others do not have to know my reason. At least, Weithmann does not employ such an obligation. In terms of Weithmann's theoretical consideration, religion could be more efficient in society, religious ideas could be influential at the policy level extensively. Because Weithmann does not avert employing religious doctrine in voting, against the formal public sphere of Habermas. This is the other part where Weithmann differs from Habermas. The justifications for people who would utilize religious reasons when voting could be varied. A person could be content about a religious organization's operations, or a religious person's actions, or basically rely on a sacred text. No matter what, religious reasons are allowed. That citizens genuinely believe a particular reason is correct for the measure, be that banning abortion, is sufficient to be considered to carry on the responsibility of citizenship. (2002: 133)

The reasonability of disagreement is depending on the situations when reasonable people argue and conclude different outcomes. Weithmann indicates that the important thing about the reasonability of disagreement is how people come to

those different conclusions. The highlight that Weithmann makes about the disagreement is that religious actors' implementations over the public good, such as offering services in coordination with the political powers, might actually help citizens realize their citizenship, and people could take this into consideration when voting. They could remember these services. People could value religious actors' services as socially valuable. Secular people could decide according to entirely different incidents, they may not be affirmative toward religious organizations, etc. This is what makes disagreement reasonable. (2002: 138) Moreover, Weithmann embraces the disagreement and clarifies that trying to eliminate the disagreement would not be pleasant. Because to realize elimination, the only tool that is capable of doing it is the state power which is repressive and not desirable. Thus, disagreement is a natural outcome of public political discussion.

In comparison, while Weithmann is giving importance to the justification that people should express the reasons behind their religious motives for themselves and not each other, one may argue that the key term that Habermas draws attention to is deliberation. For Habermas, the final draft of the law represents a common interest, including every party in society, which means the conflicts might be overcome, better approaches could have come up with better arguments. In Weithmann's contemplating, disagreements are on the table even after the law was enacted. This is the difference between Habermas from Weithmann.

Habermas sets the formal public sphere on a secular ground, however, religious reasons could affect the secular law as they are welcomed to make contribution. For doing that, secular people would have to be less anti and more open toward religious ideas. Secular people should take an agnostic approach toward the truth claim of religion, not an exact opposition. However, even not denying the possibility of occurring a conflict, assuming religious people would come to terms with secular people on a secular ground, and binding this assumption on a reciprocal responsibility, Habermas could not go far more than relying on the

capacity of people to cooperate. He highlights the prominence of preserving the integrity of both secular and religious people and does not put his consideration on the fundamental claim of splitting public and private. (McGhee, 2012: 72)

Habermas sketches an inclusive approach that might repel the violent and extremist aims of religious actors by locating speech and listening and the possibility of affecting the law for religious groups in the center of the political system. This way, religious people would be involved in the public political debate in which the exclusionary part of secularism is aimed to be overcome. By talking and listening, and arguing with others, the zealotry of religious views is expected to be rasped. In that case, religious persons were not being asked to change their religious views or to adopt a secular perspective. Thus, the aim is not the transformation of religious views. Because that would be an inconsistency for Habermas. He already conceded that religion did not fade away as secularization theory has foreseen. The secularist understanding of the linear and irrevocable process which eventually ensues in the vanishing of religion is what Habermas also advised secular people to transcend in a self-reflective manner. Therefore both secular and religious people have to adjust their mentality according to this new social reality that Habermas called 'post-secular society'. (Habermas, 2008; Monti, 2013: 230) Religious and secular are equal truth-claimers in this post-secular society. Post-secular reason constructs the public reason as not on the basis of sole secular reason. This is an inclusive reason that secular and religious have been confronting each other in civil society as equals. The probable problem that might occur which Habermas might not think it thoroughly is this: once religious ideas are allowed to be expressed in the informal public sphere, it does not matter whether in a secular language or a mere religious language, it comes with a concession. (Jedan, 2010: 325) This concession might be the demand of religious law. Habermas sets a limit to such demand which I think makes his post-secular alternative still a secular character while Weithmann does not deny such demand. However, the reason that Weithmann's position is

questionable is that how such a regime would be sustained, and how religious laws and secular laws would be implemented together, is not clear.

Recall that I have indicated the possible dilemma of constitutional secularism in the previous chapter. If secular reason stops being determinative, and religious ideas could be expressed in the public sphere in a free manner, that would reveal a rift for secularism because those religious ideas might have an impact on the formal public sphere of Habermas, or more directly people might request religious laws. By telling my fellow citizen my religious reason, I could persuade them that the system should be based on divine laws. It does not matter whether I have to express it in a secular form or a mere religious form. When they concurred with me, the law may not be in a form of religious fashion, but the outcome would imply that religious-motivated laws could be enacted. Sonia Sikka makes a distinction between the religious arguments which are ready to endure the consequences of public deliberation that their religious arguments might not get the support from non-religious people and the ones that are of characteristic of conversation stopper. (Sikka, 2016: 101) Accordingly, religious arguments in which in a form of, “because the Bible or Qur’an says so,” might be excluded because that way of argumentation would have no intention to be a part of deliberation. The problem here, for Sikka, are the ones that claim the epistemological authority in its form which would preclude any debate in the public sphere. (2016: 102) It is not open to dialogue. However, as the opposition of secularism to the institutional authority of religion shows, the breaking point of the translation of religious reasons into proper secular ones is the religious ideas that are being accepted by their followers as infallible revealed truths. (2016: 109)

The significance of this debate concerns how these infallible revealed truths could get in a secular form, or convince the ones who support such ideas to get in touch with secular perspectives. In other words, the possibility of non-authoritative secularism concerns how the absolutist discourse of religion could be integrated

into the political system without changing the integrity of religious, and secular people. I have doubts about the feasibility of such secularism because the integration of epistemologically authoritative religious claims into the formal public sphere of Habermas is not illuminated. Rather, these are still excluded from the debate. However, it is important to note that the authoritativeness of secularism is toward the absolutist religious claims, not to the ones that are prepared to engage in public deliberation already. Nevertheless, whether the religious claim is conversation-stopper or not, the impact of religious claims in law could disrupt the secularity of the state which is signified by the separation of religion and politics. To abstain from such an incident, I have suggested that constitutional secularism has to be restrictive and exclusive to a certain extent, which is compatible with the definition of secularism as the incessant management of religion. Because eventually, the circulated religious ideas such as the affirmative position on banning abortion, regulating the working hours according to a religious timetable, forbidding homosexual people's rights, forbidding extramarital sexual intercourse, etc. would have an impact on the law. Habermas takes a prominent step by involving religious rationale in public political debate. However, the consequences of such invitation might have not been considered thoroughly. In that sense, I do not think criticizing Habermas as he has put an unfair burden on secular people by suggesting them to consider their secularist cognitive stance in a self-reflective way is plausible as Lafont did. (Lafont, 2009: 135) Secular reasons are acceptable in the formal and informal public sphere, Habermas only suggests criticizing the approach that understands secularist mentality as superior to other ones. He is not privileging religious people in this endeavor. Treating Habermas as he is not fair to secular people is an unfair criticism because religious people have their burden as they have to change their cognitive discourse as well.

The mutual learning process of Habermas that he contemplated between secular and religious people in the informal public sphere is a probability. In other words, it does not mean they have to learn from others, or Habermas' articulation that

religious arguments have to be taken seriously does not mean secular people have to accept religious arguments. One should argue that, what Habermas's aim is to curb the strictness and comprehensiveness of the secularist mentality. You can argue for your secular and religious views in the informal public sphere and, but just not be extremist. That is what could be inferred from Habermas. He does not suggest secular people back down from their secular worldviews, or exclusion as Lafont argued. (2009: 136) Because it would not be intelligible by suggesting the secularity of the state at the same time with excluding secularist mentality. On the other hand, Lafont has points about the feasibility of Habermas's post-secular contemplation into reality. Surely, a secular person could not agree with a religious person over the issue of homosexual marriage, or they have strict differences over creationism because a religious person bases his argument on revelation, and a secular person makes it on reason. Yet, "taking seriously" does not suggest reaching a consensus; rather, constitutes a situation, a space where people from different worldviews could interact, listen, and talk with each other. In other words, assuming that only people who share the same background or culture, who share the same set of thoughts, or who share the same worldview could talk to each other and are willing to talk to each other might be a mistake. (Waldron, 2012: 859) Seeing the process of public deliberation and talking with an all-or-nothing approach might lead us to the consequence that Lafont has suggested. The important thing about this deliberation is not about reaching a consensus about anything, but at least, a chance of getting to know the other party's mindset. I think Habermas's attempt is valuable, and even the difficulties, should be given credit. (Ungureanu & Monti, 2017: 523) The reciprocally strong anti-perception between religious fundamental and secularist mindsets could confront face to face and might have a chance to listen to each other, perhaps to have an impact on forming their opinions in post-secular space without relinquishing their religiosity or secularity. (Cooke, 2007: 232) However, Habermasian post-secular model gets restricted on the limits of secularism.

The applicability of Habermas' post-secular alternative is not about the moderation how societies consists of. In other words, the problem is not about whether there are so many radical atheists and radical religious people in a society. (Aguirre, 2013: 654) Once you accept the fact that our societies are plural, multi-religious, and multi-cultural, then the search for moderation in a given society is preposterous. Contrary, the question that the integration of religious fundamentals who claim a theocratic political system and secularists who claim a regime of exhaustive secularism in a non-authoritative manner is the subject matter. What we can infer from Habermas is that the only solution is to give up the comprehensiveness of lifestyles; for both secularists and religious fundamentals. Other than that, I think Habermas extended the secularity of the state as much as he could. His post-secular society and secular state are not comprehensive characteristics. However, in his three postulations, the superiority of science as the sole source of knowledge, in particular, is constituting a restrictive set before religious people. Thus, even though it is a post-secular reason, I want to argue that it is the constitutional version of secularism, perhaps an extended and more inclusionary version of constitutional secularism than I have outlined in this study.

3.4.Conclusion

This chapter is composed of three sections. The major question of this chapter was the probability of non-authoritative secularism in the face of a resurgent religion. The first section was on the claim that secularism is in crisis, because of a politically assertive religion. I have claimed that the origin of the crisis discourse might be related to the perception of secularism as statecraft. Other than that, I have opposed Veit Bader's argument that secularism is an ambiguous term which generates a vulnerability in front of the resurgent religion. I have indicated that secularism is not overlapping with liberalism, secularism does not have to be a liberal discourse, and therefore comparing them is not convenient and insightful for the crisis argument. I have argued that secularism has a probability of creating an

internal conflict, and the reason would be the desire of religion to be an institutional power. This always has the possibility which could render secularism in conflict. This is because secularism is the opposition to the institutional authority of religion. Hence, today, there is a contradiction between religion's political desires and secularism. Nevertheless, this seems to be an intrinsic problem in secularism. For this reason, I have tried to argue that conceiving the resurgence of religion as causing a new crisis in secularism is a bit of misperception.

In the second section, I investigated Rajeev Bhargava's response to suggestions concerning the resurgence of religion. His concept of principled distance offers a rights-based and contextual approach to secularism. However, I have indicated that Bhargava includes people in participation that are related to the interpretation of which actions could be promoted and which ones would be precluded. However, it is not clear whether this process of participation would depend on the promotion of the ideals of secularism. Basically, he stands for the separation of the state and religion. States observe the situation and act up accordingly, concerning whether they will promote and protect that certain religious practice or forbid them. Bhargava has no problems with states interfering with religious teaching. Under these circumstances, even a little bit relativistic, Bhargava suggests a type of secularism that is more assertive than the constitutional version and less comprehensive than political secularism. Nonetheless, one may conclude that his suggestion indicates that the restrictiveness of secularism is normal.

In the third section, I investigated German philosopher Jürgen Habermas's post-secular reason that he contemplated as a response to a pretentious religious presence in the public sphere. Habermas acknowledges the failure of the secularization theory (and its concomitant expectations) and approaches religion in an embracing manner. Democratic pluralistic societies could benefit from religion's contribution, and thus, he draws the line of secular limitation between civil society and the official lawmakers. The religious reason could be effective in civil society

by being justified in a secular language, if possible. Habermas gives credit to the devout life that under unfeasible circumstances, and concedes that religious reasons could be reflected in a religious language as well. This approach of Habermas has its own horizon. Habermas does not open a debate about the status of modern science. Religion's contributions could not be taken seriously in terms of the truth regime. As much as revelation is the source of religion, this would reveal a problem for religious people. On the other hand, secular people have to consider (as a duty of democratic citizenship) their secularist standpoint self-reflectively. Thus, Habermas tries to meet these two poles in the middle by reducing their comprehensiveness. However, his post-secular society needs a secular state. Habermas leans on the separation as a necessary precaution to guarantee the impartiality of political power. I have already criticized the assumed relationship between secularism and impartiality. Other than that, his secular state and post-secular society prove the difficulty of non-authoritative secularism. Habermas indicated that the authoritative quality is an obligation to be consistent and to remain secular, in constitutional secularism as well.

CONCLUSION

In this research, the major question to be analyzed: is secularism is an authoritative discourse that is a comprehensive worldview which is exclusionary to religion? The analysis of this research has threefold: Firstly, what is to be understood from the term secularism is examined. Thus, in Chapter I, the origins of the term in the 19th century, and the political developments that have paved the way for secularism since the religious wars in Europe are presented. The three versions of secularism are succinctly accounted for. The definitions pertain to three versions are presented. To better frame the concept, the relations with the sister terms are put forward. The secular, secularity, and secularization, and how they are related to the comprehensive quality of secularism are investigated. This background has shed light on my theoretical understanding of secularism as a comprehensive worldview. The anti-religious position of secularism is addressed. The formal separation of religion and politics is investigated. In this respect, the differences, both in extent and in meaning, between the versions, the political and the constitutional versions of secularism are investigated by reference to the literature. In indicating the worldview aspect of secularism, the debate in the 19th century, between the sides, the one which George Holyoake led and the other one which Charles Bradlaugh led are presented. To lay down the opposite standing of secularism toward religion, the meaning of the term since Christianity is examined.

Secondly, the significance of the authoritativeness of secularism is to be pointed out. The different definitions of secularism and thus, the different understandings of secularism are presented. I gave my attention to the general disposition in the literature as seeing secularism as a political principle, the formal separation of religion and politics. Terminological differences such as assertive secularism or strong secularism do not properly address how secularism operates as a worldview. This is because there is no sufficient concentration on Holyoake's and Bradlaugh's

purposes in the 19th century, also the current application of secularism. The most crucial part of indicating the authoritative inclination of secularism is to clarify the position of religion in the constitutional version. The debate is presented in reference to mostly Andras Sajo's arguments. The blurification between the political version and the constitutional version in Sajo's understanding is addressed by pointing out the restrictive and exclusionary qualities of secularism. Sajo sketches constitutional secularism more like the political version. He puts forth the protective attitude of secularism that is more appropriate to political secularism. The necessity that constitutional secularism has to exclude certain angles of religion is examined. The denial of the possibility of an institutional authority of religion is the key point for secularism.

The attribution to religion that it is irrational, a pre-modern discourse that the secular state should be protected from is the worldview basis of Sajo's claims. Contrary to religious assertions, the secular state has to restrict the range of functionality of religion. In this respect, my point of view suggests that Sajo is consistent, he displays the characteristic of worldview. On the other hand, his grasp is not congruent with the constitutional version of secularism. All the points that he made related to the reason that it is an objective term, does not contain any subjective value, but could not match with the religious mindset and implying that religious reason could not be rational, is the outcome that the epistemic superiority of secularism over revelation. The definitions of three versions, of constitutional secularism as well, are examined and suggested that the constitutional version of secularism has also authoritative characteristics and an exclusionary attitude as well. This is not overlapped with Sajo's defense, but constitutional secularism employs this knowledge regime in the law that, religions could not be the fundamental of law. Religious politics are not allowed. Because once it is allowed, the secularity of the state could transform, the secular regime could change. Certain examples are presented to illustrate that if the restrictions are lifted, this would have affected the public political sphere. To avoid such an incidence, the management of

religion is utilized and it is suggested that secularism determines religion's ability in the public sphere.

The visibility of religious symbols is not an off-limit for secularism as long as it is consciously allowed. In other words, the secular state might endow permit religious groups that they could display their ostentatious religious symbols in the public sphere, even in the public service, even though I suggested that it is highly unlikely for public service. To pursue this secular quality, the secular state implements certain rights with secular glasses. Particularly, freedom of speech and freedom of religious worship are at stake. The practices might spill over the public sphere and might have an impairing effect on the uniform shape of public service. The decision depends upon the political power, however, the assumption about the irrationality of religion prevents the implementations of religious practices.

When the comprehensiveness of both secularism and religion is understood, the claim that the dual law system in which religious people are subjected to religious law is put forth. I have asserted one of the characteristics of secularism is that it is the constitutive principle of the modern nation-state. It is implied the unity of the law. I have against this suggestion because, from my point of view, a dual law system that constitutes their subjects differently cannot be applied in a nation-state context. This claim is significant and also forms the point of the conflictual relationship between religion and secularism.

To analyze the impartiality issue for the worldview aspect, the separation of religion and politics is examined as an insufficient indicator of secularism. The formal separation does not indicate the versions of secularism, even whether it is a secular regime or not is not understood by looking at separation. The degree of secularization, the established secular culture is important in qualifying the secularity of a particular society and the state. Separation does not give us the ability to assess. It is presented that the meaning that has been attributed to the

separation is based on the inaccuracy, that the disposition to define secularism as the institutional separation.

In Chapter III, the endeavors that aim to give a better alternative than secularism are examined. The reason for that endeavor is related to the argument that secularism is in a crisis because of the recent resurgence of religion. I have presented my claim that secularism already holds the potential for internal conflict because secularism is a truth-claimer and power-demanding discourse as that is religion. Veit Bader's qualification of secularism with vagueness is a bit unfair criticism in terms of crisis. Secularism has no ambiguity that would cause a crisis. The problem with the recent resurgence of the religion phenomenon is how states should respond to the religious plurality without using repressive state power. Thus, the problem is not a new one. However, understanding secularism as the institutions' separation ascribes a static relationship between secularism, and religion and when the religion does change its role, the system goes into crisis. This reading is based on the misperception regarding secularism.

The first endeavor is the principled distance concept of Rajeev Bhargava. Bhargava avoids leaving secularism. What he has done basically is to make secularism more sensitive to rights. Put it in other words, there might be certain religious freedoms that could be supported. However, the underlying reason is still secular. Bhargava includes the relevant parties in the discussion to determine the basis for the implementation of secular rules. However, he does not open a debate about basic rights and freedoms. In other words, one may argue that the participants would have no such role to determine how rights and freedoms would be implemented. Thus, it seems that Bhargava employs secularism in a different manner than political secularism in terms of restrictiveness. There might be a conflict between the secular reason and the outcome that the participatory process produced. The criterion that would determine what is allowed and what is not is the feeling affected or offended. How this could generalize and shape as a rule is not clear. Thus, Bhargava seems to

have a version of political secularism in his mind that people have roles to affect the outcome. However, Bhargava's principled distance is disputable. Bhargava does not indicate anything pertinent to a modification or reconsideration regarding the ideals of secularism. The uncertainty of how emotionally affected religious people would adhere to the ideals of secularism seems a weak point in his model. On the other hand, Jürgen Habermas's post-secular society is more compelling than principled distance.

Habermas is more realistic in his understanding of religious life and the probable reflections in the public sphere. He takes more steps than Bhargava's secular model and constructs the participation more conveniently. Religious reasons could be influential in civil society, they could affect the law in a secular language. The willingness to talk to and listen to people from religious and secular worldviews might open the door for interaction. Habermas is not standing for a single right answer that would solve problems. Instead of that, the post-secular society might be read as an attempt to provide a better argument for public visibility of comprehensive worldviews. Because the assimilation of the religious or secular comprehensive views is not addressed. Other than that, Habermas still embraces the idea that separation is necessary for the neutrality of the state. However, this may not be a point of criticism because he also points out that this is not sufficient to guarantee the neutrality of the state. Habermas indicates perhaps the necessity of an authoritativeness of secularism as well by drawing a barrier in the formal public sphere before religious claims. The most challenging fact that Habermas laid down as a necessity to accept for religious people is the superiority of modern science. This is what makes his post-secular model still has a secular reason. This is also the decisive factor of the discussion in civil society. Thus, the quest for non-authoritative secularism might be a futile attempt. However, as this research pointed out, secularism has a strong disposition to be a worldview and has authoritative characteristics that would eventually fail to provide egalitarian and inclusive scope for a democratic process. People who have certain comprehensive beliefs need to

translate them into a language or adopt a secular viewpoint that they might possibly not endorse without hesitation. This might be a criticism point for Habermas.

In this study, I presented my criticisms toward secularism in terms of authoritativeness and restrictiveness, and the assumed impartiality. I stated that the authoritativeness of secularism is a necessary quality to protect the secularity of the regime. However, I argued that the authoritativeness of secularism cause inequalitarian, and exclusionary consequences. This is the reason for my criticism. Religions that have been referred to in this study are the ones that depend on revelation, and the ones which would need the authority of political power. Therefore, the conflictual characteristic of secularism with religion is extensively these sorts of religions. I presented my claim that secularism is a worldview that has the inclination to be an ideology. That secularism is a worldview suggests partiality against a religious worldview. Thus, the attribution of impartiality to secularism is another criticism.

The three versions that have been presented in this study indicate the necessity to distinguish between the different implementations of secularism. I think the constitutional version is the most defensible one than the exhaustive and political versions. Bhargava tries to give room to religious people in public discussion, however, his model is still strongly secular. Paul Weithmann opens the door for religions even more and gives them a constitutive role. However, the uncertainty of Weithmann's model is quite similar to the dual law system as how this will work out is not clear. Habermas, contrarily, comes up with an appealing alternative. Thus, the post-secular reason is a valuable attempt. It is perhaps an extended and more inclusionary model of constitutional secularism. However, further researches pertaining to the conditions that religious and secular co-exist equally without any burden for either side are necessary.

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APPENDICES

TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Seklerizm, din ve devletin ayrılması řeklinde tanımlanır. Fakat bu tanım, seklerizmin karakteristięini ortaya koymak aısından yetersiz bir tanımlamadır. Ayrılıęın devleti, yani siyasi otoriteyi, dinler karřısında tarafsız yaptıęı savunulur. Tarafsızlıęın normatif bir ilke olarak dini rejimlerle ynetilen lkelere gre seklerizmin saęladıęı bir stnlk olduęu varsayılır. Bir dięer deyiřle, seklerizm ve tarafsızlık aynı anlama gelen kavramlarmıř gibi kullanılır. Bu alıřma ise farklı bir seklerizm tanımı neriyor. 19.yzyılda İngiltere’de George Holyoake, Anglikan Kilisesi’nin buyruęuna gre yařamak istemeyen ve genel olarak dini bir hayat tarzını benimsemeyen insanlar iin ulusal bir aę kurdu. Holyoake, Charles Bradlaugh ile birlikte parlamentoda dini yemin edilmesinin deęiřtirilerek inansız insanların da parlamentoda temsil edilmesi iin İngiliz Parlamentoosu ile mcadele ettiler. Bradlaugh daha din-karřıtı, dřmanlık diyebileceęimiz bir pozisyonu savunuyordu. Fakat Holyoake, seklerizmi bir dine inanmayan insanlarla inanan insanlar arasında eřitlik kurmanın yolu olarak gryordu. Seklerizm bu haliyle hem ateist insanlar hem de Anglikan Kilisesi’nin buyruklarını reddeden her insanın dindar insanlarla eřit bir řekilde var olabilecekleri ve kendi yařam řekillerinde var olabilecekleri bir dnya grř olarak ortaya ıkmaktadır.

Bu alıřma, seklerizmin dnya grř gibi iřlemeye ok elveriřli bir kapsamlı doktrin olduęunu ne srmektedir. Bu tanım seklerizmi sadece dini ve siyasi otoritenin birbirinden ayrılması olarak gren tanımın tesine geiyor. Seklerizmi bir dnya grř gibi iřleyen kapsamlı bir doktrin olarak tanımlamak; seklerizm ve dinin birbirine karřıt kategoriler olduęunu, seklerizmin tm ařkın, te-dnyacı grřelere karřı olduęunu, ama zelde seklerizmin dinin kurumsal otoritesine bir karřıtlık ierdięini, ve seklerizmin dini devamlı olarak kontrol altında tuttuęunu

imler. Sekülerizm, insanların bu dünyada mutluluğu yakalamasını amaçlar. Mutluluğu, tatmin edici bir hayatı öte dünyada yakalamak için bu dünyada acı çekmeyi savunan dini olsun olmasın bütün görüşlere karşı olmayı, içerir. Sekülerizm bu dünyayı kendine temel alır. Amaç insanın bu dünyadaki iyiliğidir. Dolayısıyla öte dünya ile bağlantılı bütün olgular sekülerizmle karşıtlık ilişkisi içerisinde. Burada öne çıkan en önemli olgu vahiydir. Sekülerizm vahyin karşısına aklı koyar. Aklı kullanarak, bu dünyadaki esenliğimizi ertelemeyerek, buradaki maddi hayatımızdaki somut iyileştirmelere odaklanarak yaşamak, sekülerizmin temelidir.

Bu çalışma, sekülerizmin ufkunu anlayabilmek için sekülerizmin otoriter bir söylem olup olmadığı sorusunu araştırıyor. Farklı tanımlardan yola çıkarak sekülerizmin sınırlılıklarını bulmayı amaçlıyor. Sekülerizm, kapsamlı bir doktrin olarak, devletin sekülerliği, toplumun sekülerleşmesi, ve aklın vahye olan üstünlüğüne dayanarak bilginin sekülerleşmesi olarak tanımlanabilir. Çalışmada, bu üç bileşeni daha iyi yansıtabilmek için sekülerizmin, kardeş terimler olarak da adlandırılabilir üç farklı kavramla birlikte düşünülmesi öneriliyor. Bu kavramlar; seküler, sekülerleşme, ve sekülerite. Ek olarak bu çalışmada sekülerizm üç farklı versiyon üzerinden ele alınıyor. Sekülerizmi seküler, sekülerleşme ve sekülerite ile birlikte düşünmek ve farklı versiyonlar üzerinden kavramak, sekülerizmin otoriter bir söylem olup olmadığı sorusuna cevap verme çabasında dünya görüşü niteliğini daha iyi kavramamızı sağlar. Farklı versiyonların özelliği sekülerizmin ve dinin farklı yoğunluklarda birbirlerine göre nasıl pozisyon aldıklarını daha iyi anlayabilmektir.

Sekülerizmin en kapsamlı ve yoğun bir şekilde dünya görüşü özelliğinin en baskın olduğu, bir diğer deyişle devletin sekülerliğinin yanında toplumun sekülerleşmesinin de amaçlandığı ve dine herhangi bir yaşam hakkı tanınmayan version kapsamlı sekülerizmdir. Bu versiyonda hayatın en alanı seküler kurallarla kuşatılmıştır. Dinin özel alanda var olabileceği ve sadece özel alanla kısıtlanması

gerektiğini, ve kamusal alanın sekülerin alanı olduğunu varsayan versiyon siyasal sekülerizm versiyonudur. Dine en geniş alanın bırakıldığı, kamusal alanda dini aktörlerin var olabildiği, dini argümanlarını tartışabildikleri ve fakat dini argümanların yasa yapımı düzeyine çıkamadığı versiyon anayasal sekülerizm olarak anlaşılır. Anayasal sekülerizmde siyasal otoritenin dini bir söylem kullanması, dini grupları gizli veya açıktan desteklemesi, herhangi bir dini gruba mali yardımda bulunması yasaktır. Dini semboller kamusal alanda görünebilir, dini pratikler kamusal alanda gerçekleştirilebilir. Fakat dini gruplar bir siyasal parti kurup dini bir rejim için faaliyet gösteremezler. Dini temelde kanun talebinde bulunamazlar. Bunlar, sekülerizmin anayasal versiyonundaki sınırlar olarak karşımıza çıkar. Anayasal sekülerizmde devlet bireyin ve toplumun sekülerleşmesi ile ilgilenmez. Siyasal ve kapsamlı versiyonlarda ise toplumun ve bireyin sekülerleşmesi savunulur. Siyasal sekülerizmde dini sembollerin kamusal alanda görünürlüğü kısıtlanır. Dini tartışmalar sadece özel alanla sınırlıdır. Kamusal alan, sekülerin egemenlik alanı olarak kurulur ve korunur. Öte yandan kapsamlı sekülerizmde ise dine böyle bir alan hiç tanınmaz. Buradan hareketle bu çalışma sekülerizmin, aynı zamanda, otoriter bir söylem olduğunu iddia ediyor. Bu versiyonlarda dine çizilen sınırlar sekülerizmin otoriter yönünü öne çıkarıyor. Diğer yandan, sekülerizmin dini kontrol ettiğini de aklımızda tutarak, her bir versiyonda dine karşı olan pozisyon yeniden belirlenir. Bu ikili ilişkide sekülerizm kurucu ve belirleyici olandır. Genel anlamda aşkın bütün düşüncelere karşı olmakla birlikte siyasal iktidarın kurumsal otoritesini talep edecek bir dine karşı sekülerizm çok daha etkili bir karşıtlık ilişkisi kurar. Diğer bir deyişle, örneğin anayasal sekülerizmde devlet başörtülü bir kadının kamu hizmetinde başörtüsüyle istihdam edilmesini engelleyebilir. Burada zorunlu olarak engeller demek yerine engelleyebilir denmesinin sebebi, sekülerizmin dine karşı kurucu ve belirleyici pozisyonuna atıfta bulunmaktır. Eğer bu kişinin ve giydiği kıyafetin seküler sistemi değiştirecek emellerinden şüphe duyulursa devlet bunu engelleyebilir. Dolayısıyla, sekülerizmin ve dinin birbirlerini karşılıklı dışlaması, birbirlerinin işine karışmaması gibi bir durum söz konusu değildir.

Din, sekülerin egemenlik alanına girmeye çalıştığı her anda sekülerizmin kısıtlamalarıyla karşılaşacaktır. Çalışmada, bu yaklaşımın sekülerizm açısından tutarlı ve gerekli olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Diğer bir taraftan bu gereklilik, sekülerizmin temel hak ve özgürlüklerle olan ilişkisinin sorgulanmasını gerektirebilir. Özellikle anayasal versiyonunda sekülerizm, dine sağladığı etkinlik alanı ile seküler sistemi koruma arasında bir denge kurmak zorundadır. Bu dengenin dindar insanları da içine alan, insanların ibadet özgürlüklerini yerine getirmesi lehine değil, devletin seküler yapısının korunmaya yönelik olacağı argümanı tartışılmıştır. Literatüre yapılan atıflarla, özellikle Andras Sajo'nun görüşlerinden yola çıkılarak teorik çerçevesi oluşturulan anayasal sekülerizm, bir dünya görüşü ve kapsamlı doktrin olarak işlemeye devam eder ve dolayısıyla dine karşı belirleyici ve kısıtlayıcı pozisyonunu korur. Sajo'nun seküler devleti savunmak için ortaya attığı argümanlar, bu çalışmada anayasal sekülerizm başlığında çizilen çerçeve yerine siyasal sekülerizm versiyonuna daha uygun düşmektedir. Fakat bu durum, sekülerizmin anayasal versiyonundaki pozisyonunun daha serbest olduğunu, bir diğer deyişle dini kontrol etmediğini imlemez. Tam tersine sekülerizmin, özellikle anayasal versiyonunda dinin kamusal alanda diğer versiyonlara göre daha serbest olması nedeniyle dini kontrol etmesi gerektiği iddia edilmiştir. Kamusal alanda serbest bırakılan dini gruplar dini tartışmalar düzenleyebilir, dini kıyafetlerin ve sembollerin görünürlüğü engeline takılmadan kamusal alanda var olabilirler. Fakat dini argümanlar talepkar olmaya başladıkları, yasa düzeyinde dini temelde temsiliyet istedikleri zaman, sekülerizmin müdahale etmesi gerekir. Burada talepkarlığı açıklamakta fayda var. Her dini görüşün yasal zemin talep edeceği iddia edilmiyor. Ancak bazı görüşler sekülerizmin kayıtsız kalamayacağı şekilde iddialı olabilir. Örneğin, evlilik dışı cinsel ilişkinin günah olduğu gerekçesiyle yasaklanması talep edilebilir. Kamusal alanda serbest bırakılan dini argümanlar, yasanın karşısına böyle bir taleple gelebilirler. Bir başka örnekte, kamu hizmetinin dini saatlere göre düzenlenmesi gerektiği iddia edilebilir. Bu durumlarda seküler devletin dinin hukuk kaynağı olmayacağı temeline dayanarak bu görüşleri reddedeceği söylenebilir. Fakat sadece reddetmekle bu taleplerin

önünün alınamayacağı da iddia edilebilir. O halde, seküler devletin bu argümanların nasıl tartışılacağına da müdahale edebileceği, ve hatta müdahale etmesi gerektiği iddia edilebilir. Bu çalışmada savunulan görüş, sekülerizmin bu müdahaleyi yapması gerektiğidir. Çünkü, sistemin seküler kalmaya devam etmesi isteniyorsa tutarlı olmak için bu müdahale zorunlu hale gelir. Örneğin, anayasal versiyonda çocuğunu devlet okuluna göndermek yerine dini bir okula göndermek isteyen bir aile, seküler devletin müdahalesiyle karşılaşacaktır. Çünkü, dini okulda seküler sistemin aleyhine verilecek bilgiler, ilerleyen zamanda dini okuldan mezun olan öğrencilerin seküler sisteme düşmanlık beslemesine, hatta sistemi yıkma girişiminde bulunmasına yol açabilir. O halde, anayasal versiyonda dahi sekülerizmin, dini okulun müfredatına müdahale ederek verilecek eğitimin içeriğini değiştirmek anlamında belirleyici ve otoriter olduğu tartışılmıştır. Diğer yandan, seküler devletin bu müdahalesi kişinin dini eğitim alma hakkına bir müdahale olarak değerlendirilebilir. Diğer örnekler düşünülürse, kamu hizmetinin dini saatlere göre ayarlanmaması sekülerizmin tutarlılığı anlamında gereklidir. Fakat, insanların ibadet etme özgürlüğüne bir müdahale anlamına da gelir. O halde bu çalışma, sekülerizmin temel hak ve özgürlükleri gerçekleştirebilecek bir rejim olma açısından kısıtlılıkları olduğunu iddia etmektedir.

Sekülerizm eşitliği, insanlara ibadet etme özgürlüğünü vermeyerek sağlamaktadır. Elbette, dini özgürlükler kişinin bir dinden çıkmasını da içerir. Fakat seküler rejim, inançlı olmayan insanların dinin zorlamalarına karşı korunmasını esas aldığı için bu çalışma ibadet etme özgürlüğüne odaklanmıştır. Seküler devletin seküler insanları dinin zorlamalarından koruması bir eleştiri nedeni değildir. Fakat bunu yaparken dindar insanların dini ibadetlerini yerine getirmelerinin önüne getirilen sekülerizm açısından haklı engeller, bir dışlama ve eşitsizlik sorununa neden olur. Buradan hareketle sekülerizmin tarafsız değil taraflı bir söylem olduğu ve taraflılığın da kapsayıcılık ve eşitlik açısından probleme neden olduğu söylenebilir. Dinin ve devletin birbirinden ayrılması şeklindeki tanımın yetersiz olması bir yana, bunun devletin tarafsızlığını garanti altına alacağı söylemi de çalışmada eleştirilmiştir.

Sekülerizm dini ve devleti ayırırken en önemli dayanağı, ayırımın devleti tarafsız kılacağını garanti etmesine yönelik düşüncedir. Buna göre, sekülerizm siyasi otoritenin dini gruplar karşısında tarafsız kalacağını imler. Ancak bu tarafsızlık argümanının, sekülerizmin kapsamlı bir doktrin olduğu düşünüldüğünde bir varsayımdan ibaret olduğu ve gerçekleştirilmesi pek de mümkün olmayan bir varsayım olduğu anlaşılır. Sekülerizmin dine karşıtlığı; dinin kurumsal otoritesine, vahyin üstünlüğüne olan inanca ve buna bağlı bir yaşam anlayışına karşıtlık olarak nitelenebilir. Sekülerizmin tarafsızlık gibi bir sözü veya vaadi olmadığı, George Holyoake'un argümanlarına bakarak anlaşılabilir. Sekülerizmin bir sosyal hareket olarak en önemli iddiası, dindarlar ve inançsız insanlar arasında eşitliği kurmaktır. Burada İngiltere'de Anglikan Kilisesi'nin ve genelde Roma Katolik Kilisesi'nin baskılarından kurtulmak isteyen, Kilise'nin buyruğundan farklı şekilde hayatını yaşamak isteyen insanların Kilise'nin buyruğuna göre yaşayan dindar insanlarla aralarında siyasi düzlemde bir eşitsizlik kalmaması amaçlanmıştır. Buradan çıkacak sonuç, sekülerizmin seküler ve dindar insanlara eşit mesafede veya tarafsız olacağı değildir. Çünkü halihazırda seküler insanların bir zorlama ile karşı kaşıya kaldıkları düşünüldüğünde korunması, savunulması gereken grubun sekülerler olduğu ortaya çıkar. Elbette bu savunma dindarlara karşı zorunlu olarak bir düşmanlık noktasına gitmez. Fakat sekülerizmin önceliğinin ne olduğunu göstermesi bakımından bu nokta önemlidir.

Modern ulus-devletin yönetim prensibi olarak sekülerizm, artık dini temel alarak yönetmez. Bu noktada dinin çoğunluğun veya azınlığın dini olması önemli değildir. Modern ulus-devletin öznesi seküler yurttaşlardır. Dolayısıyla dindar insanlardan buna uymaları beklenir. Dindar insanların uygulamaları, ibadetleri, argümanları seküler sistemi ortadan kaldıracak nitelikte olduğu anda artık orada insanların ibadet özgürlüğünden bahsetmek mümkün olmayacaktır. Bu durum aynı zamanda sekülerizmin özgürlüklere bakışı konusunda da bize bazı bilgiler vermektedir. Çünkü sekülerizm liberal bir söylem olarak veya özgürlük söylemi olarak ortaya çıkmamıştır. Elbette Kilise'nin zorlamalarından kurtulmak isteyen insanlar için

özgürleşmeden bahsedilebilir. Ve fakat, bu özgürleşme, dine karşı insanların dinden kurtarılımları anlamında bir özgürleşme olarak sunulduğunda tam da dünya görüşü anlayışını besleyen bir içerik kazanır. Din, bağımlılık, irrasyonellik, ilkelik gibi kavramlarla nitelenirken seküler olan özgürleştirici bir içerik kazanır. Bu çalışma tam da bu nedenden dolayı sekülerizmin bir dünya görüşü olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Dolayısıyla buradaki özgürlüğü toplumdaki her kesimi kapsayacak olan bir özgürlük olarak nitelemek zordur. O halde, sekülerizmin tarafsız ve kayıtsız kalacağını iddia etmek de kapsamlı bir doktrin olma niteliğiyle bağdaşan bir yaklaşım olmaz. Gil Anidjar, belli kavramların sekülerizm açısından ideolojik bir şekilde kullanıldığını; evrensel, objektif, ve tarafsız olarak sunulan sekülerizmin aslında bir dünya görüşü olarak bu kavramları kullandığını ifade eder. Özgürlük de bu kavramlardan biridir. Sekülerizm özgürlüğü seküler insanların dinden özgürleşmesi olarak kavrar. Fakat özgürlük, bir dinden çıkmayı içerdiği gibi bir dine dahil olmayı ve dini bir hayat yaşamayı da içerir. Sekülerizmin ufku, dindar insanların ibadet etme özgürlüğünün seküler sisteme bir tehdit olmaya başlaması durumunda belirir. İbadetler ve hatta kamusal alanda dini tartışmalar da kısıtlanabilir veya tamamen yasaklanabilir. Sekülerizm açısından bu kısıtlama müdahalesi tutarlıdır. Ancak kapsayıcılık açısından sorunludur. Kamu hizmeti örneğinde de tartışıldığı gibi sekülerizm eşitliği de merkeze seküler olanı koyarak sağlar. Bir diğer deyişle dini ibadet etme özgürlüğünün sağlanmasıyla değil, insanların seküler sistemin kurallarına uyması sağlanarak, hiç kimseye dini özgürlükler anlamında bir ayrıcalık tanınmayarak eşitlik sağlanır. Bunun nedeni de sekülerizmin farklı dinden insanların ibadet etme özgürlüğünü garantiye alma noktasında belirleyici unsur olarak seküler kuralları temel almasıdır. O kural da devletin dini bir anlayışla ve dini kurallarla yönetilmemesidir. Dolayısıyla kişinin dini ibadet etme saatinin seküler devlet için zorunlu olarak önemli olmadığını belirtmek gerekir. Tutarlı bir söylem olarak sekülerizm bu kısıtlamayı getirmezse her bir kişinin farklı dini talebini değerlendirmek zorunda kalabilir. Bu durum da anayasal versiyonda temel özellikler olarak sıralanan siyasi iktidarın herhangi bir dine ve dini gruba açıktan veya kapalı olarak destek vermesi ilkesi ile çelişir.

Sekülerizmin dini kontrol etmesi, dinin içeriğini belirleme anlamında bir kontrol değildir. Neyin dini olup olmadığını sekülerizm belirlemez, fakat dini öğretiyi veya pratikleri sekülerizm kendi açısından yorumlayıp uygulanıp uygulanamayacağını belirler. Sekülerizmin belirleyici pozisyonu bundan ibarettir. Dolayısıyla her bir kişinin dini talebini değerlendirmek zorunda kaldığı bir pozisyon sekülerizmin sınırlarını aşar. Böyle bir durumdan kaçınmak için de kişinin mesai saatleri içerisinde dini ibadetini yerine getirip getirmediği sekülerizmin sorunu olmaz. Yine de bu durum, ibadet özgürlüğü yönünden dindar insanlara bir kısıtlama getirdiği gerçeğini değiştirmez. Dolayısıyla kamusal alana ve hukuka yönelik talepkar dini argümanlar ve pratikler karşısında sekülerizm tarafsız ve kayıtsız kalamaz.

Sekülerizmin neden olduğu bu dışlama ve eşitsizlik sorununa çözüm bulmak için sekülerizmin modifiye edilmesi gerektiğini savunanlar kadar sekülerizmden tamamen vazgeçmek gerektiğini iddia edenler de vardır. Bu çalışmada sekülerizmden vazgeçmeden sekülerizmi farklılıklara daha duyarlı hale getirmek için Rajeev Bhargava'nın ilkeli mesafe kavramı araştırılmıştır. Sekülerizmi ve dini daha eşit şartlarda bir araya getirmek için sekülerin kurucu rolünü minimuma indiren Jürgen Habermas'ın post-seküler modeli incelenmiştir. Fakat öncesinde dinin 1990'lar ile birlikte daha da görünür ve talepkar olmasıyla sekülerizmin krize girdiği argümanı tartışılmıştır. Sekülerizm en başından bu tarafa bütün aşkın, öte dünyacı düşüncelerle, özellikle de kurumsal otorite talep eden dinlerle çatışmalı bir ilişki içerisinde. Krizin yeni çıktığı argümanı yerine en başından beri zaten çatışma potansiyelini içerisinde barındıran bir söylemdir sekülerizm. Sekülerizmin yeni krize girdiği argümanı, sekülerizmi din ve siyasetin ayrımı olarak gören siyasal bir ilke olarak anlayan görüş ile aynı çizgidedir. Halbuki kapsamlı bir doktrin olarak sekülerizm bu çatışmayı daima içerisinde barındırır. Bu çalışmada kriz yerine çatışma terimi tercih edilmiştir. Çünkü sekülerizmin vaat edip de gerçekleştiremeyip krize girdiği söylemi, sekülerizm ve dini stabil bir ilişki içerisinde kurar. Din ona verilen alanın dışına taşmayacaktır. Fakat bu yaklaşım, sekülerizmin karakteristiğini kavramaktan uzaktır. Sekülerizmin dinle olan

çatışmacı ilişkisine çözüm öneren yaklaşımlardan ilk olarak ilkeli mesafe kavramı incelenmiştir.

Rajeev Bhargava sekülerizmin kapsamlı niteliğini eleştirirken, sekülerizmin tamamen bir kenara bırakılması fikrine sıcak bakmaz. Yapılması gereken, sekülerizmin her durumda dine karşı olan pozisyonundan vazgeçmek, sekülerizmi haklara duyarlı hale getirmek, bağlamsal ve durumsal bir sekülerizm uygulamasını inşa etmektir. İlkeli mesafe kavramı da, bu bağlamsal ve durumsal pozisyon almaya işaret ediyor. Bir diğer deyişle, belli bir durumda sekülerizm dini bir pratiğe veya düşünceye izin verebilecekken aynı pratiğe bir başka durumda veya bir başka ülkede izin vermeyebilir. Bhargava burada hangi ölçüyle bu farklı uygulamanın sürdürüleceğine yönelik net bir cevap vermiyor, sekülerizmin ideallerinden bahsediyor. İdealler konusunda ilk olarak eşitlik, dinden çıkma ve bir dine dahil olma özgürlüğünü içinde barındıran dini özgürlük, ayrımcılık yapmamak, ve farklılıklara saygı akla gelebilir. Fakat Bhargava sekülerizmi kapsamlı bir doktrin olarak ele almadığından bu idealleri gerçekleştirme konusundaki sınırlılıklarını da hesaba katmaz. Dolayısıyla aslında sekülerizmin ideallerine göre farklı bağlamlarda farklı uygulamalar anlamındaki ilkeli mesafe konsepti, uygulama konusundaki sorunlara cevap verememenin yanında bağlamsal hale getirilmemiş olan sekülerizme göre de daha belirsiz bir konsepte dönüştürülmüş gibi görünür. Bhargava katılımcılığı önemseyerek sekülerizmin politikalarından etkilenen insanların, sekülerizmin tanımı da dahil olmak üzere, bir araya gelerek tartışmalarını ister. Burada koşul etkilenmiş olmaktır. Sekülerist politikalardan etkilenen insanlar bir araya gelecek ve konuşacaklar, sekülerizmin tanımı dahil hangi davranışların seküler çatı altında kategorize edilebileceğini, hangilerinin farklı muameleye tabi tutulabileceğini ve dolayısıyla bir esneklik tanınabileceğini tartışacaklardır. Bhargava'dan anladığımız kadarıyla burada belirleyici olan, inanan ve inanmayan arasındaki eşitlik, kişisel özerklik ve dini özgürlüktür. Bu noktada Bhargava, kurumsal bir dini kurumun varlığına da dikkat çeker. Örneğin yerleşik bir kilisenin varlığı devletin seküler olmasına engel olarak yorumlar. Genel olarak

Bhargava, sekülerizmin kapsamlılığı, genel uygulamaları, ve ağır basan dünya görüşü niteliği azaltıldığında dindar insanlara karşı daha duyarlı bir modele dönüşeceğini düşünür. Halbuki, sekülerizmin kapsamlı olma hali azalsa bile uygulamaları insanların tanımlamaları, tartışmalarına göre değişecek bir söylem değildir. Bahsi geçen örneklerde seküler bir devlet tepki vermek zorundadır. Örneğin dini özgürlüğü genişletmek adına kamu hizmeti saatinde ibadet etmek isteyen bir kişiye izin veremez. Dolayısıyla Bhargava'nın çabası sekülerizmi ciddi bir değişimden geçirmiyor. Bağlamı ve durumu belirleyecek olan idealler sekülerizmin halihazırda uygulamaya çalıştığı idealler olduğu için ilkeli mesafe yaklaşımı anayasal sekülerizm ile siyasal sekülerizm versiyonları arasında bir yere yerleştirilebilir. Sekülerizm ile dinin bu karşıtlık pozisyonuna daha verimli bir alternatif Jürgen Habermas'ın post-seküler modelidir.

Habermas, iddialı ve talepkar dini argümanlara karşı ve dini çoğulculuğa karşı verilebilecek en uygun yanıtın dine anayasal özgürlük tanımak olduğunu belirtir. Habermas hem sekülerist hem köktendinci insanlara kendi konumlarını yeniden düşünmeleri ve farklı bir pozisyon almaları konusunda uyarır. Düşüncelerinden vazgeçmeleri istenmez, ancak ötekine karşı olan tutumlarının değişmesi gerekir. Sekülerist insanlar dindarların varlığını kabul etmeli, dinin ölmediğini ve dinden yararlanılabileceğini kabul etmelidirler. Aynı şekilde dindar insanlar da farklı dinlerin ve dini argümanların varlığını ve hakikat iddialarını kabul etmeli, modern bilimin vahye olan üstünlüğünü kabul etmeli, ve evrensel ahlak ve eşitliğe bağlı olmalıdırlar. Burada Habermas iki kampa da belli bir yük yükler. Bu, artık sekülerin dine üstün olmadığı, seküler ve dinin eşit olarak yan yana durduğu bir post-seküler toplumdur. Habermas, bu post-seküler toplumun tepesine dinin ve siyasetin ayrımına dayanan, minimal diyebileceğimiz bir seküler devlet yerleştirir. Bu devleti hala seküler yapan unsurlar, din ile yönetmemek ve modern bilimin vahye olan üstünlüğüdür. Habermas iki farklı tartışma seviyesi belirler. Resmi kamusal alan ve resmi olmayan kamusal alan veya sivil toplum. Resmi kamusal alan ile kastedilen yargı, ve yasa yapım düzeyleridir. Yani bir bakıma Habermas'ın aklında anayasal

sekülerizm benzeri bir model vardır. Fakat bu çalışmada tanımlanan anayasal sekülerizmden farklı bir modeldir bu. Çünkü seküler devletin anayasal versiyonda dine vereceği alan olabildiğince daha da genişletilmiştir. Habermas dini tartışmanın sivil toplumda yapılabileceğini belirtir. Ancak insanlar dini gerekçelerin arkasındaki nedenleri bilmelidirler. Dolayısıyla dini argümanı sunarken nedeni de anlatılmalıdır. Resmi kamusal alanda ise dini argüman seküler bir forma bürünmelidir. Habermas bunu sivil toplum için de önerir ve fakat eğer kişi bir temel bulamıyorsa dini argümanını seküler bir forma sokmadan da anlatabilir. Resmi kamusal alanda ise saf dini temelde bir argüman yerine bunun seküler bir forma büründürülmüş şekliyle savunulabilir. Dini nedenlerin seküler dile çevrilebilirliği sorunu bir tarafa, Habermas dindar bir yaşamın neyi gerektirdiği konusunda bilinçli bir pozisyon çizer. Buna göre, dindar bir kişiyi inancı, onun dini kimliği ile siyasi kimliğini birbirinden ayırmaya ve dolayısıyla inandığından farklı bir siyasi tutum takınmasına izin vermeyebilir. Buna göre kişi dini iddiasını sivil toplumda gündeme getirir, insanlara anlatır, tartışır. Bu durum, kişinin siyasi beklentilerinin açığa çıkacağı bir kanal olarak anlamlıdır. Sivil toplumdaki tartışmaların resmi kamusal alana yansması ise seküler bir dilde olmalıdır. Anahtar nokta denebilecek koşul ise farklı görüşten insanların birbirini dinlemeye, birbiriyle konuşmaya ve anlamaya istekli olmasıdır. Bu çerçevede Habermas, dinleme ve konuşmanın insanları tek bir doğruya yönelteceği, eninde sonunda insanların o doğruyu bulmasına yol açacağını savunmaz. Asıl önemli olan karşıtını tanımak, onun varlığını kabullenmek, neyi nasıl savunduğunu bilmektir. Dindar ve seküler görüşler arasında seküler devletin müdahalesini gerektirmeyecek şekilde tartışma ortamının önünü açtığı için Habermas'ın post-seküler toplum modeli, bu çalışmada çerçevesi çizilen anayasa sekülerizm modelinin genişletilmiş bir versiyonu olarak düşünülebilir. Çünkü Habermas'a göre devletin dinden ayrı olması halen gerekli bir koşuldur. Fakat Habermas bunun talepkar dine karşı yapılması gerekenler arasında yeterli bir koşul olmadığını da belirterek seküler anlayışın ötesine geçer. Bu noktada din ve devletin ayrımını devletin tarafsızlığının koşulu olarak görmesi eleştirilebilecek bir noktadır. Fakat post-seküler toplum modeli, seküler yönetimin ötesine geçtiği için ve dini

olan ile seküler olanı olabildiğince eşit bir düzlemde bir araya getirme çabasında olduğu için olumlu değerlendirilecek bir atılımdır.

Habermas, sekülerizmin dışlama ve eşitsizlik gibi sorunlarına devletin sekülerliğini koruması gerektiğini iddia etse de dini argümanları kamusal alana dahil edip yasal temsiliyet anlamında bir temel sunduğu için uygun bir alternatif üretmiş denebilir. Burada dinin din olarak olmasa da seküler bir dilde olsa da bir temsil edilme ihtimali, dini grupların kendini sisteme bağlı hissetmeleri, ve dini ve seküler olanı eşit düzlemde kurarak normatif bir sekülerleşme anlayışından vazgeçildiği görülür. Post-seküler toplum modeli, sekülerizmin ortadan kalkmadığı ve fakat otoriterliğinin ve kapsamlılığının, dolayısıyla da doktriner özelliğinin önemli derecede aşıldığı bir model olarak okunabilir. Yine de tarafsızlık ve kapsayıcılık açısından problemler akılda tutularak devletin sekülerliğinin de aşıldığı ve dini ve seküler olanın tam anlamıyla siyasal düzeyde de eşitlendiği bir model için çalışmaların yapılmasına ihtiyaç vardır.

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